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	 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
A central task for historians and philosophers of science is to characterize and 
analyze the epistemic practices in a given science. The epistemic practice of a science 
includes its explanatory goals as well as the methods used to achieve these goals. This 
dissertation addresses the epistemic practices in gene expression research spanning the 
mid-twentieth century to the twenty-first century. The critical evaluation of the standard 
historical narratives of the molecular life sciences clarifies certain philosophical problems 
with respect to reduction, emergence, and representation, and offers new ways with 
which to think about the development of scientific research and the nature of scientific 
change.  
The first chapter revisits some of the key experiments that contributed to the 
development of the repression model of genetic regulation in the lac operon and 
concludes that the early research on gene expression and genetic regulation depict an 
iterative and integrative process, which was neither reductionist nor holist. In doing so, it 
challenges a common application of a conceptual framework in the history of biology and 
offers an alternative framework. The second chapter argues that the concept of 
emergence in the history and philosophy of biology is too ambiguous to account for the 
current research in post-genomic molecular biology and it is often erroneously used to 
argue against some reductionist theses. The third chapter investigates the use of network 
representations of gene expression in developmental evolution research and takes up 
some of the conceptual and methodological problems it has generated. The concluding 
comments present potential avenues for future research arising from each substantial 
chapter.  
	 ii 
In sum, this dissertation argues that the epistemic practices of gene expression 
research are an iterative and integrative process, which produces theoretical 
representations of the complex interactions in gene expression as networks. Moreover, 
conceptualizing these interactions as networks constrains empirical research strategies by 
the limited number of ways in which gene expression can be controlled through general 
rules of network interactions. Making these strategies explicit helps to clarify how they 
can explain the dynamic and adaptive features of genomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
	
“On se rend compte peu à peu que la molécule, c’est à la fois beaucoup et pas assez” 
(Gros 1986, 167).  
 
This dissertation addresses some of the epistemic practices in gene expression and 
gene regulation research. The epistemic practices of a scientific field include its 
explanatory goals, approaches, and strategies. A science’s approaches and strategies are 
used to achieve its explanatory goals. However, approaches and strategies are distinct. 
Throughout the dissertation, I use the term approaches to signify the set of methods in 
particular fields, or sub-fields, of molecular biology, such as biophysics, crystallography, 
molecular genetics, biochemistry, genomics, computational biology or bioinformatics, 
etc. I use the term strategies to denote conceptual frameworks or heuristics at work in the 
molecular life sciences; examples include top-down or bottom-up strategies, and 
mathematical/structuralist or biological/functionalist strategies.  
There are two general questions motivating this dissertation. First, what is an 
adequate characterization of the approaches and strategies in research on gene expression 
and genetic regulation throughout the last half century? Second, how do representations 
of gene expression and genetic regulation constrain the strategies that aim to address the 
dynamic and adaptive features of genomes? To answer these historical and philosophical 
questions, I look closely at specific case studies, while focusing on the continuation of 
certain research strategies throughout the history of the molecular life sciences. In this 
project, I focus on models of genetic regulation, including the lac operon model in E. 
coli, the discovery of micro-RNA in C. elegans as well as subsequent research on the 
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different regulatory roles of micro-RNAs, and cases of changes in coordinated gene 
regulatory responses in the context of developmental evolutionary studies. 
I have structured the dissertation into three relatively-independent chapters that 
investigate three research programs in the molecular life sciences – (1) bacterial genetic 
regulation in the mid-twentieth century, (2) post-genomic regulatory RNA biology, and 
(3) gene regulatory networks in developmental evolution. There is, however, a common 
thread weaving the project together under general themes in the philosophy of science. 
Before I address this common thread, I first briefly summarize the aims and arguments of 
each of the three chapters.     
In the first chapter, I argue that the research on gene expression and genetic 
regulation during the dawn of molecular biology was an iterative and integrative process, 
which was neither reductionist nor holist, contrary to some historical and philosophical 
accounts of the history of molecular biology. To argue for this claim, I revisit some of the 
key experiments that contributed to the development of the repression model of genetic 
regulation in the lac operon (Jacob & Monod 1961). I present an analysis of the 
experiments that François Jacob and Jacques Monod designed to explain the regulation of 
enzyme synthesis in the bacteria, E. coli. I use this paradigmatic case in the history of 
molecular biology to argue against the application of a common conceptual framework in 
the history and philosophy of biology based on a dichotomy between mechanistic 
materialism and holistic materialism.  
This dichotomy has been used to explain many of the scientific developments in 
twentieth century biology in terms of changes that began from a more practical 
mechanistic or reductionist strategy to a more complete and holistic one (Allen 1978). In 
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its place, I offer an alternative framework based on the notion of tracking processes to 
interpret and analyze particular episodes in the history of biology, and I consider the 
implications of this framework for the historiography of science. One of the upshots of 
this conceptual framework over one that emphasizes a dichotomy between reductionist 
and non-reductionist research strategies is that it is more useful for understanding the 
instances of convergence of the different concepts and experimental techniques from 
distinct scientific research traditions. That convergence has often proved to be crucial in 
generating and addressing empirically tractable research problems, as was the case in 
Jacob and Monod’s fruitful collaboration on the problem of enzyme induction. This 
framework can better accommodate some of the details of scientific practice within 
particular historical episodes, which, in turn, can offer insights into the process of science 
at a finer grain of resolution.  
 In the second chapter, I investigate both the continuities and discontinuities 
between pre-genomic molecular biology and current post-genomic work. I argue first that 
many strategies and practices in post-genomic molecular biology are, in fact, continuous 
with earlier work in molecular biology, yet post-genomics incorporates many new tools 
and techniques, or more generally, approaches. Second, I argue that the concepts of 
emergence and context-dependency in the philosophy of biology are often too ambiguous 
to rigorously account for current research strategies in molecular biology and are often 
erroneously used to argue against certain forms of reductionism. Both theses are 
developed through the presentation of case studies in RNA biology.  
The first half of chapter two addresses a standard narrative of the shift from the 
pre-genomic biology of the twentieth century to the current era of twenty-first post-
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genomic biology, often presented as a shift from a reductionist science to a different, non-
reductionist endeavor. Here, I outline some of the ways in which prominent biologists, 
philosophers, and historians have tried to make sense of some of the conceptual changes 
that post-genomic biology has brought about, with an emphasis on how they have defined 
and conceived of genes and genomes.  
I next consider the ways in which some of these changes might have affected the 
epistemic practices in gene expression research. To do so, I present an overview of 
micro-RNA research to provide a concrete example of the kind of scientific research and 
practices that some biologists, philosophers, and historians have in mind when they 
describe the changing concepts in gene expression research in the post-genomic era. This 
case study illustrates several characteristics of the practices within current gene 
expression research. Within current micro-RNA research, biologists have adopted novel 
technologies, tools, and techniques previously unavailable to most biologists and 
embraced exploratory experimentation in addition to hypothesis-driven methods in their 
research. These approaches represent some discontinuities with pre-genomic molecular 
genetics of the twentieth century. However, the iterative and integrative use of 
approaches and strategies is continuous with previous episodes in twentieth century 
molecular biology, such as the one described in chapter one. 
In the second half of the chapter, I argue against philosopher John Dupré’s (2010) 
case for anti-reductionism in post-genomic biology. Much of Dupré’s argument rests on 
the claim that the entities in post-genomic molecular genetics are inherently context-
dependent. Because context-dependency relies on the emergent properties of a system, 
reductionism cannot make sense of these entities or their interactions. I argue that much 
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of current research in molecular genetics can and does take context-dependencies into 
account by providing representations of molecular entities and how they interact. Context 
ends up being represented as other entities that interact with the focal entities under 
investigation. Therefore, the thesis of emergence understood as context-dependency does 
not entail acceptance of anti-reductionism, as Dupré understands it. In fact, there seems to 
be no clear relationship (logical or otherwise) between claims of emergence as context-
dependency, on the one hand, and claims about reductionism or anti-reductionism, on the 
other. The success of a strategy that attempts to take into account context-dependency has 
nothing to do with whether it is reductionist or not, and this has important consequences 
for how we understand and evaluate the development of research in molecular genetics.  
In the third chapter, I investigate how representations of gene expression as 
networks are widespread and explanatorily fruitful in developmental evolutionary studies. 
Developmental evolution focuses on the role of development in phenotypic and 
morphological evolution and the generation of novel types. This chapter is divided into 
three sections. First, I discuss distinct narratives of the history of evolutionary biology in 
the twentieth century, and how development came to be seen as essential to the study of 
evolution. These historical narratives are useful for drawing a distinction between 
different research programs in evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) and 
developmental evolution (devo-evo). I next present examples of research in 
developmental evolution in order to address some conceptual and methodological 
problems this research has generated. These problems include (1) distinguishing between 
convergent and parallel evolution and drawing inferences about evolutionary processes 
from such patterns, and (2) defining homology and identifying novelty. And, third, I 
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distinguish between different strategies to studying gene regulatory networks in 
developmental evolution. Each strategy is explanatorily promising in some ways, yet 
limited in others. I focus on some challenges to the strategy based on the biological 
properties of gene regulatory networks, and propose a framework that combines that 
strategy with one that takes account of the relational properties of systems of regulation.  
 Throughout the chapters of this dissertation, I pay close attention to the role of 
historical narratives in the development of the life sciences over the last century. Such 
narratives sometimes obscure aspects of the scientific process, especially with respect to 
changes in the approaches and strategies of a science. Chapter one provides an example 
of how a narrative based on a dichotomy between reductionism and holism can conceal 
the iterative and integrative way research in molecular genetics developed within a 
particular research program.  
At the same time, analyzing and comparing historical narratives, with particular 
attention to how they characterize scientific approaches and research strategies, can also 
illuminate certain aspects of the process of science, such as theory construction and 
theory change. Certain aspects of theory construction are revealed in the narratives of the 
origins of evolutionary developmental biology and developmental evolution, presented in 
chapter three, while other aspects of theory development are revealed in the narrative of 
the shift from pre-genomics to post-genomics and the evolving concepts of the gene and 
genome, presented in chapter two. In this sense, a common thread in the dissertation 
displays how attention to historical narratives of a science can provide philosophical 
insights into the process of science and the nature of scientific change.   
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 By taking a closer look into the process of science and the nature of scientific 
change (both conceptual and experimental) via some leading historical reconstructions of 
the development of the molecular life sciences in particular, the dissertation also 
contributes to general issues in the philosophy of science, including the topics of 
reductionism and emergence, as well as scientific representation. With respect to 
reductionism, the dissertation addresses the nature and the legitimacy of reductionist 
strategies in the molecular life sciences. With respect to emergence and the emergent 
properties of systems, chapter two attempts to separate the concept of emergence from 
certain methodological and explanatory kinds of anti-reductionism.  
In addition, the dissertation engages with how scientific representations of 
molecular or genetic interactions as regulatory networks have constrained certain 
research strategies in current molecular genetics and genomics. For example, in chapter 
two, I suggest that representing the context-dependency of biomolecules, such as 
regulatory, non-coding RNAs, by foregrounding their causal interactions with other 
molecular and genetic components represents a continuation with the complementary 
strategies of molecular genetics and biochemistry of the twentieth century. Similarly, in 
chapter three, I address the different research strategies used to study gene regulatory 
networks in developmental evolution. Representing the complex molecular and genetic 
interactions in development as networks has imposed certain structural, functional, and 
logical constraints on how such complex interactions can achieve stability over time, yet 
also how they are likely to evolve. These constraints provide convenient handles for 
researchers to manipulate or intervene on in experimental systems to test hypotheses 
about genomes and their evolution.  
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 By critically evaluating the standard historical narratives of the molecular life 
sciences, and by addressing the philosophical issues of reduction, emergence, and 
representation, I provide the following answers to the two driving questions of the 
dissertation stated above. First, the approaches and strategies in gene expression research 
depict an iterative and integrative process, which is neither reductionist nor holistic, and 
which tends to produce representations of the complex interactions of gene expression as 
networks. Second, by representing the complex genetic interactions as networks, 
researchers can constrain their models by the limited number of ways in which gene 
expression can be controlled through general rules of network interactions.  
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THE MECHANISTIC-HOLSITIC DIVIDE REVISTED: THE CASE OF THE LAC 
OPERON  
	
Introduction1   
	
The history and philosophy of science requires a conceptual framework with 
which to interpret the significance of scientific events or periods, the emergence and 
acceptance of scientific theories, concepts, models, and metaphors, and the multiple lines 
of influence between scientists, institutions, and ideas. Most philosophers and historians 
adopt or develop conceptual frameworks and defend these frameworks as useful for 
understanding the nature of scientific change or for illuminating some aspect of scientific 
practice. That has been the case for many scholars addressing episodes in the history of 
molecular biology, especially the significance of the molecular turn in mid-twentieth 
century biology and the entrenchment of certain concepts, such as the genetic code and 
the genetic program. Some major works that have illuminated these aspects of molecular 
biology include Garland Allen (1978), François Jacob (1970), Horace Freeland Judson 
(1979), Lily E. Kay (2000), Michel Morange (1998), and Robert Olby (1974).  
Often, in these works and elsewhere, episodes in the history of molecular biology 
are interpreted in terms of shifts from a reductionist or mechanistic approach to studying 
phenomena to a non-reductionist or holistic one. This framework has been used to 
explain transformative periods in the history of modern biology, such as the early 
contributions of biochemistry, physiology, and genetics to molecular biology (Allen 
1978), and shifts to new problems in molecular biology, such as the role of genetic 
																																																						
1 A version of this chapter appears in Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part C: 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science (Racine 2016).  
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regulation in cellular differentiation and the developmental programs of multi-cellular 
eukaryotes (Morange 1997). The framework appears again after the completion of the 
Human Genome Project to address emerging questions about how to study the functions 
of non-coding DNA in the post-genomic era (Keller 2005, Woese 2004).   
In this chapter, I focus on Allen’s influential account of the key shifts in particular 
research traditions within twentieth century biology to illustrate the conceptual 
framework at work.  Influenced by a dialectical materialist view of historical progression, 
Allen represents episodes in the history of science through dichotomies and views 
scientific change as a series of discontinuities and revolts. Allen uses a dichotomy 
between “mechanistic materialism” and “holistic materialism” to interpret the 
developments in the fields of physiology, biochemistry, and genetics, all of which 
converged to form the field of molecular biology in the mid-twentieth century. Imposing 
this lens on the developments in twentieth century biology leads Allen to make two 
general inferences about the nature of scientific practice; (1) that “the mechanistic 
approach has often been the only practical way to begin the study of a complex process,” 
and (2) that the approach described as “holistic materialism” aims to provide a more 
complete and accurate description of the natural world (Allen 1978, 105-016). Because 
Allen’s view has been influential and continues to receive attention, it is worth looking 
more closely at his framework in order to get at the implications of thinking about the 
history of the life sciences in the ways he suggests.  
I argue that his generalized claims about scientific practice are doubtful when 
looking closely at the practices within a particular research program, such as those used 
by scientists working on the problem of enzyme induction in the labs of the Pasteur 
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Institute during the mid-twentieth century. To defend this claim, I first present an 
historical analysis of the development of the lac operon model in molecular biology. I 
then present a critical review of Allen’s conceptual framework and his generalizations 
about scientific developments. I argue that a close look at the scientific practices in early 
gene expression research depicts an iterative and integrative process that does not 
progress from a mechanistic or reductionist approach towards a more holistic approach. 
And, it also presents a challenge to the assumption that the holistic or anti-reductionist 
approach to representing phenomena is inherently more complete or complex. I offer an 
alternative framework based on the notion of tracking processes to interpret and analyze 
episodes in the history of molecular biology in the following section. This alternative 
considers the ways in which biologists track and prioritize different aspects of biological 
phenomena over time. I argue that this framework is more useful for the purpose of 
shedding light on the nature of the conceptual and experimental practices in particular 
episodes within the history of biology. Finally, I consider some implications for the 
historiography of science by reflecting on the appropriateness of different conceptual 
frameworks for different grains of resolution in the history of biology. 
Revisiting the development of the lac operon model  
	
In this section, I present a study of the concepts and methods used by François 
Jacob and Jacques Monod (and their colleagues) to construct and justify their model of 
genetic regulation in bacteria. As is well documented, the Pasteurian scientists made use 
of many different experimental methods and techniques throughout their collaboration, 
including crossbreeding methods from classical genetics and induction techniques from 
biochemistry, as well as conceptual tools and metaphors from cybernetics. I first briefly 
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outline the research projects on which Jacob and Monod were working to explain how the 
problem of bacterial gene expression arose. I then show how their experimental designs 
resulted from a convergence of their previous research projects. Finally, I outline how 
they developed and justified their model to represent the regulation of the lac operon 
system in E. coli. The case is used to emphasize the integrative and iterative nature of the 
scientific practices involved, and to challenge Allen’s general claims about the process of 
science and its goals.2   
Jacob and Monod’s path to the problem of bacterial enzyme induction  
	
During the 1950s, many researchers at the Pasteur Institute focused their research 
on lysogenic bacteria (or lysogeny). A lysogenic bacterium is a bacterium infected by a 
phage, or virus, referred to as a bacteriophage. A phage infects a bacterium and inserts its 
genetic material, which is composed of either RNA or DNA, into the bacterial host cell’s 
DNA. Within the host cell, the bacteriophage can have two different life cycles. During 
the lysogenic cycle, the bacteriophage that infects the bacterium is referred to as 
temperate, or non-virulent, because it does not immediately result in the lysing 
(destruction) of the bacterial cell. When the bacteriophage inserts its genetic material into 
the host cell’s DNA, it is referred to as a prophage. The prophage’s genetic material is 
then replicated with the rest of the genetic material of the host cell as the bacterium 
reproduces itself. However, the temperate bacteriophage has the ability to switch to the 
lytic, or virulent, state under certain conditions. The lytic cycle occurs when the 
																																																						
2 Although Allen does not specifically address this episode in the history of molecular biology, it 
is an exemplar of the scientific practices adopted in molecular biology during this period and 
subsequent decades. 
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bacteriophage’s genome directs the synthesis of enzymes that lyse the bacterial cell, 
essentially killing the host cell, allowing its progeny phages to disperse and infect other 
bacterial cells in the surrounding environment (Racine 2014). 
When Jacob joined André Lwoff’s laboratory at the Pasteur Institute in 1950, his 
main focus was the phenomenon of prophage induction, or how the phage shifts from the 
lysogenic to the lytic state (Jacob 1972 [1965], Kay 2000, 208).3 While in Lwoff’s lab, 
Jacob worked with Élie Wollman on bacteria and bacteriophages, with a focus on the 
temperate lambda phage (λ-phage) in a particular strain of E. coli, E. coli K-12. They 
studied the cellular and genetic properties of lysogenization and virulence, and mapped 
the E. coli K-12 genome using crossbreeding techniques, which they published in 1959, 
in La sexualité des bactéries (Jacob & Wollman 1959; Racine 2014, Wollman & Jacob 
1956).  
Within their research, Jacob and Wollman performed bacterial conjugation 
experiments (i.e. chromosomal transfers between bacteria), which led them to observe a 
phenomenon they called zygotic induction (Wollman & Jacob 1956). In their 
experiments, they transferred the chromosome from a donor lysogenic bacterium, 
referred to as male, into a receptive non-lysogenic bacterium, referred to as female. 
During this process, the receptive bacterium becomes temporarily partially diploid, 
referred to as a merozygote, because it possesses two copies of the chromosomal 
segments (Grmek & Fantini 1982, Kay 2000, Schaffner 1974, Wollman & Jacob 1956). 
Jacob and Wollman noticed that the transfer of genetic material induced the lytic cycle in 
																																																						
3 Their research on lysogeny was influenced by the rich tradition in microbiological work 
conducted by their predecessors at the Pasteur Institute (See futher: Burian & Gayon 1999). 
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the receptive merozygotic bacterium, and so, they named the phenomena “zygotic 
induction” to draw attention to the induced lytic state in the merozygotic bacterium 
(Grmek & Fantini 1982, 200). From these experiments, Jacob and Wollman also 
established that the chromosome from the donor entered the receptive bacterium in a 
linear and unidirectional way, at constant rate (Wollman & Jacob 1956). They did this by 
interrupting the process of chromosome transfer between bacteria at different time 
intervals with the help of a Waring blender. These interventions would sever the 
chromosomes at different locations during the process at different time intervals, which 
served to create a genetic map of the bacterial chromosome. Thus, their series of 
experiments on lysogenic bacteria enabled the researchers to localize the phage’s genetic 
material on a precise segment of the bacterial chromosome, and to establish that the 
phage’s genes were immediately expressed after entering the receptive bacterial cell.  
Jacob’s work on lysogeny during the 1950s and his experimental knowledge of 
bacterial conjugation proved instrumental in his later experiments with Monod, which led 
to the establishment of the lac operon model. Jacob and Wollman’s experimental 
system—merozygotic bacteria—provided a simple and effective way to study the 
problem which preoccupied Monod, the genetic control of enzymes in E. coli. During 
their collaboration, Jacob and Monod made use of the bacteria’s temporary diploid state 
to track genetic dominance and used classical and reverse genetics methods to identify 
the function of particular genes or alleles in the bacterial and phage genomes. Their 
ability to engineer their experimental system in order to design experiments that could 
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test their working hypotheses was perhaps one of their greatest achievements and is now 
a commonplace practice in molecular genetics.4  
 At the other end of the attic of the Pasteur Institute, Monod worked on a different, 
but related problem: the synthesis of the enzyme beta-galactosidase (ß-gal) in E. coli. 
Monod’s work with Melvin Cohn in 1953 had revealed some interesting features of 
enzyme synthesis in E. coli (Monod 1966). When E.coli is grown on lactose, the bacteria 
synthesize the enzyme, ß-gal, to metabolize, or break down, lactose. Lactose is 
considered to be an exogenous inducer of the enzyme. However, during their 
collaboration, Monod and Cohn noticed a result they found peculiar. They observed that 
other types of sugars could serve as exogenous inducers of the enzyme, ß-gal, even 
though the enzyme could not metabolize those other sugars. In other words, those other 
sugars acted as inducers, but not as substrates, to enzyme, ß-gal. This result led Monod to 
question the previously-held theory that a precursor molecule transformed into the 
functional enzyme, ß-gal, only after interaction with the substrate. The presence of these 
“free inducers” led Monod and Cohn to believe that the function of inducer must be 
distinct from that of the substrate (Grmek & Fantini 1982, 197; Monod & Cohn 1952, 
																																																						
4 As Craver and Darden note: “[T]he logic of experimentation in contemporary biology often 
demands that the experimental system be isolated and prepared so that the experiments can shape 
the space of possible mechanisms. …In many cases, this engineering is not antecedent to the 
experiment, something readily cordoned off as a background against which the intervention takes 
place. Instead, the preparation of experimental systems is itself crucial to understanding just how 
the experiment works. It is only in the context of such contrived experimental systems that the 
proposed interventions can meaningfully be interpreted. Model organisms and model systems are 
rightly prized by biologists precisely because standard organisms and systems have been prepared 
in such a way as to afford the researcher a particular kind of leverage over the mechanism that 
could not be achieved or presumed without the active construction of the model system” (Craver 
& Darden 2013, 138-141). 
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Monod 1966).5 Monod’s studies with Cohn were the first step towards a clear articulation 
of the problem of the genetic control of enzyme synthesis in E. coli precisely because 
they were able to think about the inducing “factor” and the substrate separately. 
The next step involved Monod’s later collaboration with Georges Cohen, in which 
they investigated so-called “cryptic” bacterial mutants. One of these mutant strains, 
referred to as “Lac-,” could synthesize ß-gal but could not metabolize lactose. They 
hypothesized that there existed another enzyme—a “permeation factor” or permease—in 
non-mutant strains. This additional enzyme was thought to allow lactose to permeate the 
cell so that the non-mutant strains could metabolize it. The idea, then, was that these 
“cryptic” mutants had dysfunctional permeases. The permease was later experimentally 
isolated by Eugene Kennedy (Monod 1966, Kay 2000, 206).  
 Their study of the permease led Monod and his collaborators towards the final 
piece of the puzzle. In particular, they next turned their attention towards strains of E. coli 
that synthesized ß-gal even in the absence of lactose. These bacteria were said to have 
phenotypes that were constitutive for ß-gal. They noticed also that the phenotypes that 
were constitutive for ß-gal were also constitutive for permease. From this observation, 
they inferred that the two enzymes might be genetically linked. Consequently, Monod 
																																																						
5 The existence of “free inducers” led Monod to question the appropriateness of the term enzyme 
adaptation to describe the phenomenon (Cohn et al. 1953; Cohn 1980). The term adaptation 
carries with it connotations of an advantage or an increase in fitness. Yet it is not uniformly 
advantageous to synthesize an enzyme when induced to do so, for sometimes those inducers 
cannot even be metabolized. In light of this, Monod and Cohn, along with Martin R. Pollock, Sol 
Spiegelman, and Roger Y. Stainier wrote a note entitled, “Terminology of Enzyme Formation,” 
published in Nature in 1953, to propose a change in terminology to replace enzyme adaptation 
with enzyme induction, which they regarded as a much more neutral term. Some have interpreted 
their proposal to replace the terms enzyme adaptation with enzyme induction as an effort to avoid 
confusion or implications of teleology, and to challenge vitalist and neo-Lamarckian thinking in 
French biology (Cohn 1980, 4-5; Kay 2000, 197-198).  
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came to understand the problem of enzyme induction as one of genetic control. He 
hypothesized that there must be a genetic factor that had a pleiotropic effect on the other 
genes determining the enzymes, ß-gal and permease. He constructed this hypothesis by 
classifying mutants by three variables, z, y, i, in their efforts to understand the synthesis 
of ß-gal (Grmek & Fantini 1982, 199; Jacob & Monod 1961, 328; Kay 2000, 206). Types 
z+ could synthesize ß-gal and types z- could not. Types y+ could synthesize permease 
and types y- could not. And, the inducible wild type i+ synthesized both ß-gal and 
permease in the presence of lactose, whereas the constitutive type i- could also synthesize 
both enzymes even in the absence of lactose.  At that time, Monod held the “generalized 
induction theory,” which predicted that the crossing of an i+ type with a i- type would 
result in the dominance of the constitutive type, as the latter variant, he thought, might be 
responsible for producing an endogenous inducer, which the inducible phenotype could 
not produce and therefore relied on exogenous inducers (Schaffner 1974, 368-369). 
By 1957, Monod was set to tackle the problem of locating the genes involved in 
this lac system and discovering the mechanisms of the genetic control responsible for the 
observed phenotypes (Grmek & Fantini 1982, 199). To address this problem of enzyme 
induction in the lac system, Monod needed tools to adapt classical genetic methods to his 
investigation. Jacob and Wollman’s merozygotic bacteria provided the perfect 
experimental system to pursue a deeper understanding of enzyme induction in the lac 
system because they could use the partially diploid systems to track gene function. Given 
this, the stage was set for the two Pasteurian scientists to tackle the problem. Jacob was 
an expert with an experimental system that was ideal to design and test genetic 
hypotheses, and he had some experience inducing the lytic cycle in lysogenic bacteria, 
	 18 
which (as we shall see) later helped them infer a generalized model of negative 
regulation. Monod had been preoccupied with the induction of a certain metabolic 
enzyme and, through a series of experimentation and re-conceptualizations, he had 
gained greater understanding of the phenomena, and he was prepared to address the 
genetic control of that phenomena. 
The Pajama experiments and the inhibitor  
	
In 1957, Jacob and Monod began to collaborate, along with Arthur Pardee, who 
was on a sabbatical at the Pasteur Institute from the University of California, Berkeley. 
They worked together on experiments with the E. coli K-12 system to better understand 
the mechanism of induction of the enzyme β-gal by lactose in E. coli. From this 
collaboration came the “PaJaMo” or “Pajama” experiment, named after the researchers’ 
first letters of their last names (Pardee et al. 1959; Cobb 2015, 149). In these 
experiments, they introduced mutations into the genetic circuitry of their experimental 
system in order to see how each gene contributed to the functioning of the overall system. 
Their approach became associated with the typical research approach in molecular 
genetics, in contrast to the approach in biochemistry. This distinction is illustrated in the 
correspondence between geneticist William Sullivan and biochemist Douglas Kellogg 
(Stephens 2004). As a geneticist, Sullivan was particularly interested in the genes that are 
responsible for regulating cell growth and division. Kellogg, a biochemist, focused on 
proteins and how they carry out their regulatory functions in the cell. In their 
correspondence, the geneticist was likened to a car mechanic who wanted to understand 
the functions of all the different components involved in a functioning car. To do this, he 
intervened in the delivery of specific parts to a manufacturing facility (or intervened in 
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the order in which the parts were introduced in the car-building process) then waited to 
see the effects on the functioning of the cars that were produced when they left the plant. 
Such a process represents the top-down strategy in genetics, where researchers are 
interested in particular components of a system insofar as the parts are arranged in a 
particular way and that arrangement can influence or restrict the function of other 
components, as well as the activity of the entire system. In molecular genetics, this kind 
of strategy is exemplified in knock-out and knock-down experiments, in which a gene is 
either knocked out of the genome completely or its transcript is interfered with so that it 
is prevented from being translated. In contrast, the biochemist was compared to a curious 
mechanic with a penchant for a more bottom-up strategy, who instead started by taking 
apart the car and separating each component to study its individual properties. She then 
attempted to rebuild the car in a piecemeal manner by looking at how the specific 
components interacted with each other. The notion of the genetic method as a top-down 
approach is a plausible description of Pardee, Jacob, and Monod’s work. They were 
interested in the control of enzyme induction in the lac system and adopted genetic 
methods in their research, rather than a strictly biochemical approach, which would have 
them attempting to isolate the component parts to analyze their properties.  
In the Pajama experiments, Pardee, Jacob, and Monod’s goal was to identify the 
genes involved in E. coli’s ability or inability to synthesize the enzyme, β-gal (Pardee, 
Jacob, & Monod 1959).6 They had identified several loci, including i and z, which they 
																																																						
6 Pardee, Jacob, and Monod also looked at the effects of the gene locus, y, to better understand the 
regulation of the lactose permease. Another enzyme, galactoside transcaetylase, is also part of the 
lac operon. Hereafter, I focus on i and z for simplicity, and because they are the crucial elements 
in the Pajama experiments. 	
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believed to be located in the part of E. coli’s genome that was previously established to 
be involved in lactose metabolism. There were two variants at each loci. Allele z+ was the 
wild-type responsible for the synthesis of β-gal, whereas z- was the mutant that lost the 
ability to produce the active enzyme. The i+ allele was the wild-type responsible for the 
inducible phenotype, and the i- mutant was the type with the continuous production of the 
enzyme, whether or not an inducer was present, referred to above as the constitutive 
phenotype. To better understand the effects of the genes on the different phenotypes, they 
performed experiments using Jacob’s experimental techniques of bacterial mating. As 
before, these crosses created merozygotic bacteria. But now, the researchers were 
tracking the effects of the introduced gene variants on the production of β-gal.  
Pardee, Jacob, and Monod, performed several crosses, but their most significant 
result occurred when they conjugated a wild-type male into a mutant female, that is, a 
cross between genotype [z+ i+] and genotype [z- i-]. Before the cross, both types could not 
synthesize β-gal. In the absence of any inducers, the male [z+ i+] could not synthesize the 
enzyme because of the i+ variant, and the female [z- i-] could not synthesize it because of 
its z- variant. Their initial hypothesis about the results of this crossing was that the 
merozygote would continually produce β-gal, because of both the introduction of the z+ 
variant and because they thought that the constitutive type, i-, was responsible for 
producing an endogenous inducer that induced the enzyme’s continual synthesis. After 
the cross, they observed the immediate synthesis (i.e. 3 to 4 minutes after injection) of β-
gal, which the researchers expected as a result of the introduction of the z+ gene. 
However, two hours after the intervention, the synthesis of β-gal ceased. It could be re-
initiated by introducing an exogenous inducer (Figure 1). This result was surprising, as it 
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was contrary to what the researchers were expecting on the basis of their initial 
hypothesis about the constitutive type. The results revealed that the inducible allele was 
indeed ‘dominant’ (albeit, after some time had passed) over the constitutive type.  
 
Figure 1: Results from the PaJaMo Experiment (Pardee, Jacob, & Monod 1959, 172). 
Reprinted from Journal of Molecular Biology, Vol. 1, Pardee, A. B., Jacob F., & Monod, J., 
“The Genetic Control and Cytoplasmic Expression of ‘Inducibility’ in the Synthesis of β-
galactosidase by E. coli,” 165-178, (1959), with permission from Elsevier.  
This graph represents the different rates of enzyme synthesis over time that resulted from 
the experimenters’ crossing between [z+ i+] and [z- i-]. It shows the synthesis of the 
enzyme, β-galactosidase, first, as a result of the introduction of the z+ variant (without 
inducer). The synthesis of the enzyme stopped approximately two hours after the 
intervention. After the addition of an exogenous inducer, the bacteria were able to 
synthesize β-galactosidase again, as a result of the i+ gene.  
 
In their interpretation of the results, Pardee, Jacob, and Monod, rejected their 
initial hypothesis and eventually constructed an alternative account of enzyme induction, 
with the help of Leo Szilard (Monod 1966, Schaffner 1974). When Szilard visited the 
Pasteur Institute, he suggested to Monod that instead of inducers, either endogenous or 
exogenous, being directly responsible for the onset of enzyme synthesis, it might be the 
case that enzyme synthesis resulted from interference in a mechanism in which synthesis 
was being repressed or inhibited. Inducers, then, would be acting by interfering with the 
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mechanism of repression. This was directly contrary to Jacob and Monod’s initial 
working hypothesis. When faced with their results, they had to flip their logic. It was not 
the case that the i-  allele coded for an endogenous inducer. Rather it was the case that the 
i+ allele coded for the synthesis of a repressor that inhibited enzyme synthesis. The 
exogenous inducer then functioned by interfering with, or de-repressing, the repressor.7 
 In summary, the Pajama experiment helped expose how the E. coli genome itself 
regulates the synthesis of β-gal. After Szilard’s visit, Pardee, Jacob, and Monod 
hypothesized that a protein, the lac repressor, binds to the gene that synthesizes β-gal 
when lactose is not present, suppressing the gene’s expression. When the inducer is 
present, the lac repressor protein detaches from the gene, the gene’s transcription and 
translation are activated, and β-gal is synthesized. In 1961, Jacob and Monod published 
“Genetic Regulatory Mechanisms in the Synthesis of Proteins,” in which they explained 
in more depth the negative regulation of enzyme induction in E. coli and proposed a more 
general model of gene regulation (Jacob & Monod 1961).  
 During the 1950s, other groups of scientists in American research institutions 
were also studying the mechanisms involved in enzyme, or more broadly, protein 
synthesis (Burian 1993). For example, Paul Zamecnik and his colleagues studied tissue 
slices and developed a cell-free system in which to study the biochemical basis of protein 
																																																						
7 While Szilard played a role in pushing Monod and Jacob to think about their experiments 
through a framework of negative regulation, both scientists, especially Monod, were already 
aware of the concepts and metaphors of cybernetics and they knew about the negative feedback 
control of the synthesis of precursors to the amino acid tryptophan by tryptophan itself observed 
by Szilard and Aaron Novick in 1953. Monod even prepared a manuscript in 1959, entitled 
Cybernétique enzymatique, which was never published (Peluffo 2015). I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for bringing attention to this point. As the reviewer pointed out, Monod’s mind “was 
prepared” to reconceptualise the results of the experiments.  
	 23 
synthesis (Burian 1993, Morange 1998, Rheinberger 1997). They did so by separating the 
cellular components in an ultracentrifuge and analyzing the properties of the cellular 
components. Zamecnik’s research program contributed to particular facets of the problem 
of protein synthesis; namely, the role of the ribosomes in translation. In contrast, whereas 
Jacob and Monod were likewise concerned with the mechanics of protein synthesis, they 
were also interested in the metabolic processes of the entire cell (not just the cell’s 
individual components). Consequently, they conducted genetic experiments to discover 
the organization of the system and how it functioned (Racine 2014). 
 Jacob and Monod’s research program, which led to the development of the operon 
model, is not a clear-cut example of a bottom-up strategy, or a reductionist analysis, of 
individual genes, enzymes, and their substrates. They did not gradually move from that 
approach to synthesize a more holistic account of the organization of the genome in the 
bacterial cell. In fact, as the later justification of their model suggested (see below), their 
presentation of the lac operon model was theoretical and lacked descriptions of some of 
the molecular entities and activities involved in the process of genetic regulation. 
The operon as a model for the regulation of gene expression  
	
Jacob and Monod continued to provide evidence for the negative control of 
enzyme synthesis and the existence of a protein they called the “lac repressor” (Jacob & 
Monod 1961). They conjectured that the repressor protein binds to another element—
what they called the “operator” or the o gene—to suppress the transcription and 
translation of the metabolic enzymes, like β-gal and permease, when the bacteria exhibit 
the inducible phenotype. In other words, Jacob and Monod thought that the repressor 
protein, by either binding or not on the operator, acts as an on/off switch in gene 
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expression, controlling cell metabolism under different environmental conditions. Jacob 
and Monod called this “switch” system of gene expression an operon, and thus	their 
model of the lac system in E. coli became known as the lac operon. In their most-cited 
1961 paper, “Genetic Regulatory Mechanisms in the Synthesis of Proteins,” their model 
was pictured graphically. The i gene was depicted as having a context-sensitive influence 
on the o gene. In the absence of lactose, this influence was negative. In the presence of 
lactose, the repressor gene had no influence on the operator gene. The o gene, in turn, 
was thought to have had a pleiotropic effect on both genes z and y.  
 In the fourth section, “The Operator and the Operon,” of their 1961 paper, Jacob 
and Monod addressed the question of how the repressor was able to act on the operator in 
the lactose system. While they had previously established that the repressor kept β-gal 
from being synthesized until lactose interrupted repression, they next wanted to find out 
exactly how the repressor repressed the expression of the o gene in the wild-type. That is, 
they wanted to know the particular mechanical properties of the system that made it so 
that the expression of the repressor could do its job in the absence of lactose. To solve 
this problem, they once again turned to mating experiments with different strains of E. 
coli. Like the other genes in this system, the o gene has two variants: The o+ variant of the 
o gene locus is the inducible type and the oc variant is the constitutive type. Jacob and 
Monod conjugated a wild-type male [o+ i+] into a mutant female [oc i-].8 Because they 
already knew that the i+ allele was dominant, they figured that the outcome of the 
expression of the repressor gene in contexts of the oc allele would help them understand 
																																																						
8 Jacob and Monod also looked at various other crossings that I do not have the space to discuss 
in any great detail. For the purposes of this article, the crossings I describe are sufficient.  
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the conditions under which the repressor gene could properly repress the operator gene. 
From these conjugation experiments, the oc mutants continued to produce β-gal in the 
absence of any inducer. They concluded that, “the o+à oc mutations correspond to a 
modification of the specific, repressor-accepting, structure of the operator. This identifies 
the operator locus, i.e. the genetic segment responsible for the structure of the operator, 
but not the operator itself” (Jacob & Monod 1961, 342). The last sentence of the 
quotation is crucial, as it indicates that Jacob and Monod were unable to infer any more 
details about the conditions or mechanistic properties under which the repressor could 
function from their particular bacterial mating experiments. They remained uncertain 
about the nature of the operator molecule and, in particular, whether the repressor acted 
upon the o+ variant by binding directly to a segment on the DNA molecule or whether the 
repressor acted upon the o gene’s product, or what they called the “cytoplasmic 
messenger” (Jacob & Monod 1961, 344; see figure 2).9  
																																																						
9 Jacob and Monod go on to address this very question in the following section of their paper, 
“The Kinetics of Expression of Structural Genes, and the Nature of the Structural Messenger.” In 
brief, in that section, Jacob and Monod describe their work that provided evidential support for 
the “genetic operator model” and claimed that the system indeed functions at the genetic level 
“by governing the synthesis of the structural message,” rather than “at the cytoplasmic level, by 
controlling the protein-synthesizing activity of the messenger” (Jacob & Monod 1961, 346-352). 
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Figure 2: “Genetic Regulatory Mechanisms in the Synthesis of Proteins” (Jacob & Monod 
1961, 344). Reprinted from Journal of Molecular Biology, Vol. 3, Jacob, F., & Monod, J, 
“Genetic Regulatory Mechanisms in the Synthesis of Proteins,” 318-356, (1961), with 
permission from Elsevier.   
The top half of the figure, Model I, depicts the operator as a site on the DNA segment 
linked with the structural genes of the operon. Model II, in the bottom half of the figure, 
depicts the operator linked to a “cytoplasm messenger”.  
 
 As they had foreseen, Jacob and Monod’s 1961 paper had a large impact on 
subsequent research in molecular genetics. Some of their novel contribution to molecular 
biology was to show that genes could be switched on and off, and that enzymes could be 
synthesized de novo. However, it remained unclear exactly how inducers interact with the 
repressors, and how repressors acted upon operators. Their work encouraged researchers 
to try to isolate the repressor molecules, both in E. coli and the λ-phage genes. In 1966, 
Walter Gilbert and Benno Müller Hill achieved the biochemical isolation of the lac 
repressor (Gilbert & Müller Hill 1966). And, in 1967, Mark Ptashne successfully isolated 
the λ-phage repressor and its binding site on DNA (Ptashne 1967). Jacob and Monod’s 
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model was relatively simple, but later biochemical isolation of the repressors in the 
experimental systems they studied and discoveries of the specific sites on DNA to which 
repressors bind allowed for the further development of models of genetic regulation 
(Morange 1997).  
 The previous presentation of research on the lac operon system suggests that 
biology does not always begin with a bottom-up strategy, or reductionist approach, by 
studying the properties of the smallest individual components of a system and then 
progress towards a more complete or holistic description of the phenomena under study. 
In fact, the case of the origins, the subsequent developments, and the justification of the 
lac operon model indicates that while Jacob and Monod were curious about the role of 
individual molecular components within bacterial cells, they were more concerned with 
explaining the components’ role in the functions of the system. To do so, they used a 
hybrid of techniques in biochemistry and classical genetics and designed an experimental 
system, the merozygotic bacterium, which allowed them to impose a general 
organizational structure on the phenomena and to trace the processes of interest. The 
experimental techniques employed by Jacob and Monod provided the best handle with 
which to manipulate and understand the regulation of enzyme induction in E. coli at the 
time. It was only later that their model was further supported by knowledge of the 
biochemistry of its components.  
Allen’s application of the mechanistic-holistic dichotomy  
	
 In the previous section, I have presented the development of the lac operon model 
as an example of a particular episode in the history of biology that does not fit neatly 
within the mechanistic-holistic dichotomy. I now turn to Allen’s account of developments 
	 28 
in physiology, biochemistry and molecular biology in early and mid-twentieth century 
biology to illustrate one way that the dichotomy between mechanistic and holistic 
approaches has been used to interpret historical developments in modern biology. 
Throughout his account, Allen suggests that the production of scientific knowledge often 
proceeds from a mechanist and reductionist account of phenomena to a more complete, 
holistic description of the phenomena. In fact, many other historians and philosophers 
have interpreted some of the transitions in twentieth century biology along these lines. 
Some have described the empirical success of early research in molecular biology as a 
result of adopting the mechanistic, or reductionist, approach (Griffiths & Stotz 2013, 
Morange 2006, Powell & Dupré 2009). However, in Allen’s treatment of the history of 
the life sciences, he infers the following generalizations: (1) that the approach described 
as “holistic materialism” provides a more complete and accurate description of the 
natural world (Allen 1978, 105-106), and (2) that “the mechanistic approach has often 
been the only practical way to begin the study of a complex process” (Allen 1978, 106).  
 Allen explicitly articulates the difference between mechanistic materialism and 
holistic materialism in his chapter on physiology (Allen 1978, 103). There, he uses the 
dichotomy to make sense of the shift from Jacques Loeb’s mechanistic physiology to 
Lawrence J. Henderson and Walter B. Cannon’s work on the self-regulating buffer 
systems involved in certain physiological processes.10 Allen explains that holistic 
materialists, like Henderson and Cannon, believed that looking at parts of a system and 
																																																						
10 In brief, Henderson worked on the carbonic acid buffer system of blood, which regulates the 
blood’s pH level (See further: Allen 1978, 95-100; Henderson 1928). Cannon, known for coining 
the term “homeostasis,” worked on the sympathetic nervous system (See further: Allen 1978, 
100-103; Cannon 1929).     
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their properties in isolation, as the mechanist materialist would, could not provide 
adequate explanations of the systems under study because “new characteristics emerge 
from the interaction of parts” and these new characteristics “are qualitatively different” 
(Allen 1978, 106). Allen understands the mechanistic tactic as a sort of decompositional 
approach to understanding biological processes and claims that, by the 1920s, 
physiologists were slowly moving away from that approach and towards holistic 
materialism (Allen 1978, 103). The mechanistic view upheld a materialist metaphysics, 
and so rejected idealist notions such as vitalism. However, it prioritized the events and 
processes between entities rather than the material entities themselves. For physiologists, 
“atoms and molecules as material entities [became] less important than the interactions… 
in which they [were] involved” (Allen 1978, 104). This shift from entities to processes or 
interactions is what Allen takes to represent the move from a mechanistic materialism to 
a holistic materialism.  
 Allen is careful not to equate either position with ontological or metaphysical 
claims. He claims: “The chief, or important, difference was not that, by and large, the two 
groups worked at different levels of organization within living systems” (Allen 1978, 
104; my emphasis). Many of the scientists who Allen sees as occupying opposite sides of 
the divide were concerned with the same ontological level of organization. It was their 
outlook on which methodology, or strategy, would be more successful that differed. 
According to Allen, Loeb and other mechanistic materialists assumed that the whole was 
just the sum of its parts. The holistic materialists, in contrast, believed that the whole, 
consisting in the interactions between the system’s components, exhibited emergent 
properties that mechanistic materialism would fail to countenance.  For example, 
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mechanists would perhaps overlook, or fail to explain, phenomena like the control of 
antagonistic muscle contractions or the total buffering potential of the blood. These 
phenomena could not be explained by the additive effects of a system’s components; e.g. 
single pathways of stimulation or the chemical components of blood (Allen 1978). Thus, 
if Allen’s notion of mechanistic materialism has anything to do with how philosophers 
now discuss different varieties of reductionism, then his notion is clearly concerned with 
a methodological kind of reductionism, and not an ontological or metaphysical one.11  
A methodological reductionist assumes that the most fruitful way to study living 
systems is to decompose these systems into lower-level components, then, ideally, to 
localize how structural entities perform certain functional activities (Bechtel & 
Richardson 1993; Griffiths & Stotz 2013). And, according to Allen, during the 
development of physiology, towards the advent of molecular biology, scientists were 
rejecting that thesis in favor of a methodology that embraced the emergent properties of 
complex phenomena. Allen summarizes the point of difference: 
To a mechanist, interaction does not impart new characteristics to any one 
component when it is interacting as part of a whole or when it is acting in 
isolation. A complete description of the characteristics of any part is possible by 
studying that part separately from others. Mechanists believe that studying 
interactions is also important. But the interactions are just quantitatively more 
complex situations. To holistic materialists, on the other hand, new characteristics 
emerge from the interaction of parts. These new characteristics are not merely 
																																																						
11 See Griffiths and Stotz (2013) for an overview of the different types of reductionisms. I also 
offer an overview of reductionism in the second chapter of this dissertation.  
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quantitatively more complex. They are qualitatively different. New characteristics 
of parts emerge during interactions. These new characteristics result from the 
parts affecting and altering each other. To holistic materialists, these new 
characteristics are interpretable in terms of rational laws of science, but they are 
not quantitatively extrapolatable from analytical studies alone (Allen 1978, 106). 
 Likewise, on the development of biochemistry in the early twentieth century, 
Allen emphasizes the move towards a holistic materialist approach to the study of 
biomolecules. When describing Otto Warburg’s work on the problem of cellular 
respiration, he claims that Warburg’s mature view was consistent with “the principles of 
mechanistic materialism” because he looked at enzymes in vitro, outside of the context of 
a living system, as “free-floating molecules carrying out a reaction whenever they 
encountered appropriate substrate molecules” (Allen 1978, 181). Later developments in 
biochemistry, according to Allen, progressed towards a holistic approach in order to 
produce a detailed picture of the structure and function of cells. In this case, he claims 
that the mechanistic work by Warburg and others was necessary to transition to the 
holistic phase of biochemistry: “The isolation studies came first out of necessity but, by 
the 1960s, biochemists were beginning to move away from the view that the 
characteristics of a reaction in vivo were necessarily identical to those in vitro” (Allen 
1978, 182). He reiterates this point about the normal, and somewhat expected, transition 
from the mechanistic to the holistic, in his conclusion: 
The history of biochemistry, as with the other areas of biology discussed in this 
textbook, illustrates clearly the importance of the mechanistic materialist stage in 
the development of the modern life sciences: that it is often necessary to isolate 
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individual components (in this case single enzymatic reactions) from a complex 
interacting system at the outset. The cast of characters, so to speak, must be 
identified. But the history of biochemistry also illustrates the limitations inherent 
in the mechanistic approach if applied as an overall philosophy of nature (Allen 
1978, 183-184). 
Finally, on the origins of molecular biology, Allen argues that there was a brief 
return to mechanistic thinking, when the molecular structure of DNA was discovered and 
explained in terms of its physical structure and biochemical properties. A central role was 
attributed to the gene, and to a particular molecule in the cell, that of DNA, in the 1940s 
and 1950s. However, soon after, according to Allen, molecular biologists recognized that 
gene expression involved complex control systems involving interactions that resulted in 
emergent properties of the whole. As Allen writes, “in vivo gene transcription and 
translation [was discovered to be] inordinately more involved than the systems studies in 
vitro,” (Allen 1978, 223). This mediated against a simplistic view that the properties of 
individual molecules or the specific chemical reactions between enzymes and substrates 
could suffice to explain living systems. In the case of molecular biology, then, Allen 
maintains the narrative of a practice originating from a mechanistic materialist view 
evolving towards a more holistic view. While this interpretation could be consistent with 
the research on enzymes and their substrates preceding the research on the operon model, 
some of the research subsequent to the operon seems to flow in the opposite direction; 
that is, as scientists accepted the sketch of gene regulation from the operon model, some 
of the later research turned to achieving a better understanding of the molecular 
components involved in bacterial physiology in isolation. Given this, we might explore 
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the idea that the dichotomy itself is not the best lens with which to represent and interpret 
particular episodes, or the development of particular research programs, in the history of 
biology. Perhaps another perspective would be better suited for such ends, and perhaps 
the dichotomy itself (along with Allen’s generalizations) might be better suited for 
different ends.	
Tracking processes: Moving beyond dichotomies for particular episodes of scientific 
practice  
	
As an alternative to the dichotomy, I submit that a better framework with which to 
represent and interpret some of the particular episodes in twentieth century molecular 
biology is to view the scientific practices involved as efforts to track certain biological 
processes. To defend this view as an alternative to the dichotomy, I make the plausible 
assumption that there is a fact of the matter concerning what molecular biologists track. 
That is, there is a fact of the matter about what a molecular biologist foregrounds and 
backgrounds in her models. To develop this framework, I make use of James Griesemer’s 
notion of “tracking processes” in science, and, more specifically, his description of 
scientific representations (including models) as commitments to following a process in a 
particular way, foregrounding and backgrounding different elements of the process, or 
phenomena, under study (Griesemer 2006; 2007).  
 Tracking a process representative of a phenomenon is a common practice in 
science. It is used both as an exploratory tool (to observe where a process will lead) and 
as an intervention (to determine causal relationships) (Griesemer 2007). Moreover, the 
practice of following a process necessitates creating a representation of the phenomenon 
in such a way that some aspects of the process are foregrounded while others are 
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backgrounded (Griesemer 2007). Griesemer explains that the representation “…focuses 
attention on foregrounded elements as the significant and explanatory aspects of the 
process-as-followed. The result is constraint and guidance on how processes may be 
followed on other occasions, as well as what implications are (literally) drawn from 
reported work” (Griesemer 2007, 376).  
Griesemer borrows from Hans Reichenbach’s (1991) “mark principle” and 
Salmon’s (1984) “mark transmission” to explain how scientists habitually follow 
processes to gain a causal understanding of phenomena (Griesemer 2007, 377). The 
marks that are tracked are thought to be factors that have causal relevance in the process 
of interest. The notion of mark transmissions can be operationalized such that the 
manipulation plays a theoretical role in determining the process as causal: 
In a manipulative marking intervention, the experimenter focuses on a ‘target’ of 
attention prior to the marking interaction and then introduces a mark that 
physically changes a property of the process in such a way that continuous mental 
attention is not required to track the process. This is a procedural benefit of the 
irreversibility of marks that Reichenbach required of causal processes. The mark 
can be tracked in intermittent ‘checkups’ via subsequent observation of or 
interventions in the process to see if the process still carries the mark. This 
operational notion of mark transmission thus also plays a theoretical role in 
identifying the process as causal. Theory and methodology are as intimately 
related as two sides of a coin” (Griesemer 2007, 380).  
Gene knockout or knockdown methods provide a now commonplace example of this kind 
of process-following interventionist practice within the life sciences. Likewise, Jacob and 
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Monod’s bacterial conjugation methods and experiments can be interpreted as this kind 
of intervention on the process of enzyme induction in E. coli. Additionally, in the case of 
the repression model of the lac operon, foregrounding the entities of a system of 
regulation means attending to the so-called “mark transmissions” in the genetic control 
and regulation of E. coli’s metabolic enzymes. This is the research strategy or style that 
Jacob and Monod established in molecular genetics with their operon model. The later 
biochemical studies of the entities within this system of genetic regulation followed the 
same biological process as did Jacob and Monod; however, those studies re-oriented their 
research strategy in such a way that the structural and chemical properties of the entities 
in the system were foregrounded in a different manner. Nonetheless, the regulatory 
structure (i.e. the logic of genetic regulation) that Jacob and Monod imposed on the 
entities within the bacterial cell was crucial in making sense of one part of the process of 
enzyme synthesis, and furthermore, constrained subsequent research strategies in 
regulatory genetics and developmental biology.12  
 There are several upshots to adopting this conceptual framework for interpreting 
particular episodes in the history of science. By shifting our focus to the practices of 
tracking processes, we can better understand how and why much of molecular genetics, 
including Jacob and Monod’s construction of the operon model, made use of the 
investigative methods of classical genetics (e.g. crossbreeding with bacterial 
conjugation). We can also see how, in this particular example from twentieth century 
biology, the scientific knowledge of transcriptional genetic regulation did not proceed 
																																																						
12 See Morange (1997) for an account of the influence of the lac operon model on later research 
projects in regulatory genetics and embryology.  
	 36 
from knowledge about individual entities to a more holistic understanding of the 
functioning of the entire system, contra Allen’s generalizations. The more gradualist 
picture of scientific practice that emerges from this conceptual framework blurs any clear 
distinctions between theory construction and experimentation, and offers a narrative of 
scientific change that pays attention to the origin and entrenchment of certain scientific 
practices and research strategies, and the way in which these constrain subsequent 
scientific developments. This framework also better encapsulates the usefulness of 
considering the details of scientific practices to understand episodes in the history of the 
life sciences. 
Implications for historiography: mode and tempo in the history of science  
	
There is a further point about understanding and interpreting the history of science 
with implications for both the history and the philosophy of science that I would like to 
make in this essay. As I mentioned in the introduction, Allen represents scientific change 
as a series of discontinuities and revolts. In a commentary on Allen’s work, Jane 
Maienschein, Ronald Rainger, and Keith R. Benson claim instead that scientific change 
ought to be interpreted in a gradualist manner, as “complex changes that cannot be stated 
in oversimplified terms as dichotomies; [they] seek to understand continuities and 
gradual change” (Maienschein et al. 1981, 86).  
In his response to the commentary by Maienschein, Rainger, and Benson, Allen 
claims that the distinction between the gradualist approach and the revolutionary 
(dichotomist, or saltationist) approach to the history of science represents “two sides of 
the same coin” (Allen 1981, 173): 
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There is a constant interplay between quantitative (evolutionary) and qualitative 
(revolutionary) changes in the history of science. The rate of change may vary 
considerably from one period to another… to ignore differences in tempo, and the 
rather important differences in consequences between quantitative and qualitative 
change, is to miss an important aspect of the dynamics of history (Allen 1981, 
174).  
Instead, Maienschein, Rainger, and Benson suggest that the difference between their 
approaches might simply be a difference in emphasis or orientation, which offers a better 
way to understand the difference between an evolutionary/gradualist approach and a 
revolutionary/dichotomist approach to the history of science. 
Rather than representing an actual difference in the rate of change or tempo in the 
historical development of twentieth century biology, I propose that both Allen’s approach 
and my proposed framework represent shifts in the grain of resolution on historical 
timescales. Historians of science can zoom in or out of the timescale to focus on slightly 
different patterns emerging from a given time period. Jon F. Wilkins and Peter Godfrey-
Smith first proposed that shifting the grain of resolution is a useful heuristic for 
understanding different facets of evolutionary change (Wilkins & Godfrey-Smith 2009; 
2011). They argue that the debate in evolutionary biology over the significant factors 
responsible for evolutionary outcomes (e.g. ecological demands, developmental biases, or 
historical contingencies) can be deflated, to some extent, by paying sufficient attention to 
the grain of evolutionary analysis. For example, at the broadest, most “zoomed out” level 
of analysis, evolutionary patterns appear such that populations seem restricted by a very 
limited range of possible phenotypes and ways of life. Such macro-evolutionary patterns 
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bring attention to restrictions imposed by developmental biases on natural selection. 
When we zoom in on shorter timescales in the history of life, the restrictive features at 
the broader grain of analysis become less important, and they are replaced by factors that 
can explain different variants within populations and between several generations. At the 
mid-level analysis – that is, zooming somewhere in between microevolutionary and 
macroevolutionary patterns – the variations within any groups on the tree (genera or 
species) will become more apparent, but so will some of the traits or characters that 
become entrenched in a lineage. Wilkins and Godfrey-Smith suggest that this mid-way 
level is useful in understanding certain phenomena, such as cases of heterozygote 
superiority (Wilkins & Godfrey-Smith 2011, 198).  
 In any case, the main idea here is that different factors become appropriate, or 
relatively more significant, as explanans of evolutionary change according to both what 
is being explained and the chosen grain of analysis on evolutionary timescales. Likewise, 
for the history of science, it might be the case that looking at the history of science at a 
finer grain of resolution – for example, the development of the research programs of 
particular individuals or research groups at a particular time and place – will culminate in 
a gradualist picture of continuity and path-dependency; whereas looking at the history of 
biology at a more “zoomed-out” level – for example, the trends in the currents of thought 
within a certain cultural context, country, or continent during an extended period – will 
bring about a more saltationist, revolutionary view, which can be represented as shifts 
from a mechanistic approach to a holistic one. This view of the different ways to 
delineate periods and episodes in the history of science suggests a pluralist view of the 
historiography of science.  
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However, it is still worth arguing about which approach (or level of analysis) is 
better or more appropriate for any particular historical question, and about the potential 
benefits and challenges that different levels might bring. On the one hand, taking a too 
myopic view of the history of biology during the twentieth century might mask the extent 
to which the science changed during that period. That lens, or level of analysis, might not 
always be optimal to explain the sorts of Copernican revolutions – that is, the 
foundational changes which transform the way scientists conceive of their work and the 
phenomena they study – that have occurred in the history of science. Framing the history 
of science in terms of debates and oppositions can sometimes help bring out the 
fundamental issues and assumptions that are at odds within competing conceptual 
frameworks in science. On the other hand, looking at the history of molecular biology as 
a dichotomy between clear-cut methodologies or research strategies can misrepresent the 
range of scientific work being done at the time and conceal the continuation between 
research programs. For example, imposing apparent dichotomies between mechanistic 
materialism and holistic materialism, or reductionism and anti-reductionism, on the 
history of biology during the twentieth century might skew the facts about what scientists 
were tracking in their experimental and conceptual practices. Perhaps then, in some 
instances, taking a more gradualist, or “zoomed-in,” view can help communicate the 
myriad of influences, both constitutive and contextual, which contribute to the uptake of 
scientific ideas and research agendas and constrain subsequent developments within a 
scientific domain. 
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Summary 
 
Conceptual frameworks should be useful for shedding light on the process of 
science and its goals. The framework adopted by Allen leads him to make generalizations 
about the development of science that do not apply neatly to the details of particular 
episodes in the history of molecular biology. It becomes difficult to understand the 
instances of convergence of different concepts and experimental techniques, like that of 
Jacob and Monod’s collaboration, in terms of a clear development from a mechanistic to 
a holistic approach to science. I have suggested that a framework based on the idea of 
tracking processes can better accommodate some of the details of scientific practices in 
particular historical episodes and can offer a better account of the scientific process at a 
finer grain of resolution.   
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THE MICRO-RNA WORLD: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN POST-
GENOMIC RESEARCH 
	
Introduction  
 
In an opinion piece published in Nature, geneticist John Mattick suggested that 
research on non-protein coding RNA molecules, specifically their role in genetic 
regulation, is at the heart of post-genomic molecular biology in the twenty-first century 
(Mattick 2004; see also Mattick 2003). Historians and philosophers of biology are 
attending to what post-genomic biology means for historical and philosophical accounts 
of theory change and scientific methodology, particularly with respect to discussions 
about reductionism and anti-reductionism (Burian 2007; Dupré 2010, 2012; Keller 2005; 
O’Malley, Elliott & Burian 2010; Morange 2006; Powell & Dupré 2009; Richardson & 
Stevens 2015; Woese 2004). Many have represented the revised concepts of genes and 
genomes within post-genomic molecular biology as an acknowledgement that the so-
called reductionist strategy, in which the whole system is explained by an analysis of its 
parts and their interactions, has now reached its limits (see, for example, Woese 2004). 
The general argument is that the study of these systems will have to be holistic, or anti-
reductionist, for several reasons. Reductionism won’t work, the argument goes, because 
genetic or genomic systems exhibit emergent behaviors, or because the functions of these 
systems’ components are context-dependent (i.e. the context in which molecules interact 
makes a difference to the outcome of the system), or because these functions cannot be 
inferred solely from the components’ structure. Though there are clear conceptual and 
experimental shifts between pre-genomics and post-genomics, there are also continuities 
in these research traditions. In this chapter, I begin to tease out these changes and 
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continuities. I argue first that many practices in post-genomic molecular biology are, in 
fact, continuous with earlier work in molecular biology, yet post-genomics incorporates 
many new tools and techniques within these practices. Second, I argue that some claims 
about the shortcomings of reductionism rest on a mistaken view of emergence and what it 
entails about anti-reductionism, and a misunderstanding about what it means to account 
for context dependencies. 
 I begin by demonstrating the presence of a standard narrative of the trajectory of 
molecular biology in the history and philosophy of science. This narrative traces the 
historical development of molecular biology from the twentieth century pre-genomics era 
to the current twenty-first century post-genomic period as a shift from reductionism to 
some form of anti-reductionism, or holism. To do this, I sketch some of the ways in 
which biologists, philosophers, and historians have described the conceptual change in 
post-genomic molecular biology and the ways in which some have called for novel, non-
reductionist strategies to understand and explain gene expression.  
I next present an overview of micro-RNA (henceforth, miRNA) research to 
provide a more concrete example of the kind of scientific research and practices that 
some biologists, philosophers, and historians have in mind when they describe the 
changing concepts in gene expression research in the post-genomic era. I first give a 
general description of the biogenesis and some molecular functions of miRNAs. I also 
briefly outline the history of miRNA discovery, bringing attention to some of the 
important contributions made by Victor Ambros and Gary Ruvkun, and their respective 
research teams. I finish the overview of miRNA research by describing some of the 
methods and techniques within miRNA research, with a particular focus on some of the 
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new approaches used to detect miRNA, their targets, and their biological functions.13 
This survey reveals several characteristics of the practices within current gene expression 
research. These characteristics indicate that the research programs in post-genomic 
molecular biology, especially in miRNA research, have adopted novel tools and 
techniques, yet the iterative and integrative processes between the approaches and 
strategies are continuous with previous episodes in twentieth century molecular biology.  
In the second half of the paper I clarify different meanings of reductionism in the 
philosophical literature, with particular attention to the concept of emergence. 
Philosopher of science John Dupré argues that the context-dependency inherent in the 
conceptualization of the genome leads to a strong sense of emergence that precludes any 
sort of reductionism (Dupré 2010). Dupré’s arguments concerning reductionism engage 
with exactly the sorts of research projects in post-genomic molecular biology that I 
discuss throughout this chapter. Against Dupré, I argue that the context-dependency of 
miRNAs does not necessarily preclude a reductionist methodology. In fact, context-
dependencies are easily accounted for by the causal interactions between different 
macromolecules. The explanatory frameworks used to represent these kinds of 
interactions have a long and successful history in molecular biology. I illustrate my 
argument with appeal to current biomedical research focused on miRNA target 
recognition and regulation in the context of lung cancer. 
																																																						
13 Recall I am using the terms approaches and strategies in a specified way throughout the 
dissertation. Approaches signify the set of methods in particular fields, or sub-fields, of molecular 
biology, including the new technologies in genomics, computational biology or bioinformatics, 
etc. Strategies represent conceptual frameworks used within these approaches, such as the top-
down and the bottom-up strategies described in the previous chapter.  
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In summary, this chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the concepts 
and practices within a branch of current post-genomic molecular biology and to help 
clarify and deflate some of the tensions in philosophical debates between reductionism 
and anti-reductionism with respect to molecular biology. 
From pre-genomics to post-genomics: A gradual continuation in the history of 
molecular biology 
	
A standard narrative of the conceptual shift in post-genomic molecular biology  
	
After the successful sequencing of the human genome, some biologists hoped, 
and often assumed, that knowledge about the underlying genetic and genomic make-up of 
organisms would lead to a clearer and more complete understanding of life, its 
development, and its evolution. But that type of optimism surrounding the promise of 
genomics was never quite realized, at least not in the way that many had hoped. 
Nonetheless, the assumption was reasonable because, during the previous decades, 
molecular biology had made considerable progress by looking deeper and deeper into the 
cell and identifying, classifying, and organizing the cell’s components to explain gene 
expression, physiological and developmental processes, and to support phylogenetic 
reconstructions.  
 While molecular biologists continued to conduct research, philosophers became 
interested in the changing concept of the gene within this research tradition. They began 
to wonder about the relation between different gene concepts, such as the Mendelian 
concept of the gene, the molecular concept of the gene, and the post-genomic concept of 
the gene. The classical Mendelian notion of the gene signified a unit of transmission 
across generations. The molecular concept of the gene was associated with a physical bit 
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of DNA that determined a protein with a particular structure and function. The emerging 
post-genomic notion of genes includes protein-coding genes, as well as non-protein 
coding RNAs that have a variety of enzymatic and regulatory functions previously 
relegated as “junk” DNA. Many began questioning whether the simplicity and elegance 
of the Central Dogma – i.e. the idea that information cannot be transferred from proteins 
back to DNA – could adequately capture the complex processes of gene expression 
within an organism. The new discoveries of introns, exons, non-coding RNAs, such as 
miRNAs, as well as the phenomena of alternative splicing, alternative polyadenylation, 
and epigenetic regulation, all signaled a move towards discarding, or revising, the Central 
Dogma. Some theoretical updating was called for to better understand the genomic 
contributions to biological complexity, the development of organisms and their ability to 
reproduce, and the scope of phenotypic variation (Mattick 2003). Shortly after the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, historians, philosophers, and scientists began to try 
to make sense of the meaning of these changes. I now turn to some of these influential 
scholars in order to give textual evidence of what I take to be the standard narrative of the 
shift from twentieth century molecular genetics to twenty-first century genomics. This 
narrative is centered around the notion that pre-genomic research was driven by a 
reductionist approach to science and reaped its rewards because of that approach, 
whereas the dawn of the post-genomic era is characterized by a move towards a holistic, 
or anti-reductionist, science with a focus on the emergent properties of biological 
systems. 
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Woese  
 
In 2004, Carl Woese, a microbiologist best known for distinguishing the group 
Archaea from Bacteria and Eukarya, wrote “A New Biology for a New Century.” In this 
commentary, he argues that twenty-first century biology was in need of a new “guiding 
vision,” and “a new, deeper, more invigorating representation of reality” (Woese 2004, 
173). Woese addresses several research programs in the life sciences in that article, but he 
is particularly concerned about the effects that twentieth century molecular biology has 
had on the current state and the future directions of biological investigations. The 
molecular era, he claims, was centered on the “encapsulatable” problems of the gene and 
the cell, which meant that those biological entities could be studied in isolation. 
According to Woese, molecular biology was influenced by the metaphysics on which 
much of nineteenth century classical physics was founded. The central idea was that 
scientists gained true knowledge and a firm understanding of phenomena by studying its 
smallest underlying physical entities. Investigations of the cell and the gene, explains 
Woese, “were amenable to a reductionist approach” and “would benefit from the fresh, 
no-nonsense outlook and experimental power of molecular biology” (Woese 2004, 174). 
However, he continues, reductionism “is deeply woven into the fabric of modern biology, 
and biology today has hit the wall of biocomplexity, reductionism’s nemesis” (Woese 
2014, 174). He offers the following evaluation of the historical significance of the 
molecular era in biology: 
I think the twentieth century molecular era will come to be seen as a necessary 
and unavoidable transition stage in the overall course of biology: necessary 
because only by adopting a heavily reductionist orientation and the technology of 
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classical physics could certain biological problems be brought to fruition and 
transitional because a biology viewed through the eyes of fundamentalist 
reductionism is an incomplete biology. Knowing the parts of isolated entities is 
not enough. A musical metaphor expresses it best: molecular biology could read 
notes in the score, but it couldn’t hear the music… The molecular cup is now 
empty. The time has come to replace the purely reductionist “eyes-down” 
molecular perspective with a new and genuinely holistic, “eyes-up,” view of the 
living world, one whose primary focus is on evolution, emergence, and biology’s 
innate complexity (Woese, 2004, 175).  
Woese is advocating for a shift in the methodological strategies to studying and 
representing biological phenomena because the reductionist strategy cannot address some 
of the most fundamental problems in biology, including the problem of the nature of 
complex organization. To be fair, Woese is not advocating for an end to molecular 
research in biology, but rather insists that the new representations in biology will need to 
be freed from the “procrustean reductionist perspective,” borrowed from the metaphysics 
of nineteenth century science (Woese 2004, 175). Nonetheless, he is clearly presenting 
the shift from twentieth century molecular era to the twenty-first century as one that 
brings holistic problems to the fore, and describes his own scientific contributions as 
providing “the links between biology’s reductionist past and its holistic future” (Woese 
2004, 176). 
Keller 
	
In 2005, five years after the publication of The Century of the Gene, historian and 
philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller published a reflection paper entitled, “The 
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Century Beyond the Gene” (Keller 2000, 2005). In both works, Keller alludes to a move 
away from the reductionist paradigm of early molecular biology in current biology. In the 
latter work, she addresses, more specifically, what the United States Department of 
Energy (DOE) has called, “Bringing Genomes to Life,” to understand the move “beyond 
‘reductionism’ to ‘systems biology’” (Keller 2005, 3). The project proposed by the DOE 
represents a broader turning point in the history of gene concepts, according to Keller. 
One in which the old paradigm of the genome as a collection of single genes and the 
reductionist approach to the study of gene structure and function were being replaced by 
a systems-level focus on the complexity of biological systems and their emergent 
properties. About the transition, she writes: 
The more we learn about how the parts work not only in interaction with each 
other, but also with the larger entities in which they are embedded, about the 
extraordinarily complex and versatile systems of gene regulation, about the 
signals mediating all the different levels of organization, and about the variety of 
epigenetic mechanisms of inheritance at play and the evolutionary feedback 
between the different mechanisms, the more compelling the need for an entire 
new lexicon, one that has the capacity for representing the dynamic interactivity 
of living systems, and for describing the kinds of inherently relational entities that 
can emerge from those dynamics (Keller 2005, 9).  
Here, Keller emphasizes the emergent properties of the regulation of gene expression as 
the pressing problem of twenty-first century molecular biology. Keller has maintained 
this narrative in later work, and though she does not herself explicitly advocate for a 
move towards anti-reductionist strategies in her writing, she sometimes suggests how 
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alternative conceptions of the gene and the genome can lead to different strategies in 
certain research programs.  
In a recent paper on the “postgenomic genome,” Keller writes:  
I am proposing that today’s genome, the postgenomic genome, looks more like an 
exquisitely sensitive reaction (or response) mechanism – a device for regulating 
the production of specific proteins in response to the constantly changing signals 
it receives from its environment – than it does the pregenomic picture of the 
genome as a collection of genes initiating causal chains leading to the formation 
of traits” (Keller 2015, 25).  
She goes on to suggest her concept of the “postgenomic genome” can have implications 
on how certain research programs are pursued. For instance, she argues that biomedical 
research of disease that is focused on locating single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) is 
limited because it is too reliant on the classical concept of mutation and gene variants 
(alleles). That research carries the implicit assumption that a gene is an identifiable and 
discrete unit within the genome, and masks other kinds of causes of diseases that are 
better characterized as “genomic disorders” (Keller 2005). These disorders have to do 
with structural features of the genome and its organization. Research on genomic 
disorders, according to Keller, should focus less on DNA sequences and more on 
genomic level phenomena, such as genomic inversion, genome duplication, and genome 
deletion. In this way, Keller thinks the conceptual shift in postgenomic biology, from the 
reductionist focus on DNA sequences and genes towards the properties of the genome, 
has implications for how research is pursued.      
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Morange 
 
Like Keller, Michel Morange is attentive to the “reductionism to anti-
reductionism” narrative in the history of molecular biology and uses these terms to 
describe some of the scientific developments in post-genomic biology. And also like 
Keller, Morange leaves any normative claims about whether post-genomic molecular 
biology ought to adopt research strategies that can be described as holistic or anti-
reductionism as open-ended. In a short paper, published in 2006, Morange tackles the 
different meanings of post-genomics and of emergence and considers whether this new 
era in biology is a reductionist or holist project. He begins the paper by claiming: 
Reductionism, under the label of molecular biology, seemed to have definitively 
won at the end of the twentieth century: the characteristics of organisms were 
considered to be explained by the structural properties and enzymatic capabilities 
of their macromolecules, which could be assessed using genome sequences. This 
victory was only apparent and transient, and holistic models reemerged at the eve 
of the twenty-first century (Morange 2006, 355). 
In this passage, Morange is describing the current view in biology that knowledge of 
gene sequences alone does not explain much about organisms. Morange goes on to argue 
that there are several ambiguous terms and metaphors in post-genomic biology that lie “at 
the border between reductionism and holism” (Morange 2006, 357). The ambiguous 
concepts generate confusion about what the terms, reductionism and holism, imply for 
scientific practice (Morange 2006, 357). An example of this is the concept of pleiotropy. 
Morange argues that this term is ambiguous because it is applicable in different ways. For 
example, a gene can be characterized as pleiotropic when its protein product has multiple 
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structural domains,14 each of which have a specific function. Or, it could be pleiotropic 
when its protein product has structural components that associate with several targeted 
molecules in different cellular contexts. In the latter case, the pleiotropic effects of a gene 
are dependent on different contexts, and not simply on the structure of its protein.  
Morange leaves open how one ought to interpret the meaning of this kind of 
context-dependency and how biologists go about studying, representing, and explaining 
the phenomena at hand. Biologists often continue to operate by explaining the properties 
of a pleiotropic protein, or gene, by characterizing its interactions with the molecular 
components involved in its different functional roles (Morange 2006, 358). This is, 
nonetheless, a departure from investigations reliant on the pre-genomic concepts of genes 
and genomes, according to Morange. Post-genomic biology addresses problems of gene 
expression and gene function as problems of complex systems of networks, rather than 
straightforward correspondence between a gene’s structure and function.  
Burian  
	
The preceding authors have addressed the shift from pre-genomics to post-
genomics in terms of the changes in the conceptualizations of the gene and the genome. 
Additionally, all have appealed to instances of research on the regulation of gene 
expression to illustrate the conceptual change happening in the new era of post-genomic 
molecular biology. Richard Burian has further probed into the characteristics of post-
genomic molecular biology by paying close attention to one particular research program 
focused on specific non-coding regulatory RNAs and their roles in the regulation of gene 
																																																						
14 For example, important protein domains include the homeodomains (to bind to DNA, such as 
transcription factors), RNA recognition motifs (to bind to RNA), and nuclear hormone receptors. 
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expression (Burian 2007). Burian addresses both the conceptualization of the genome’s 
causal contribution to the development and maintenance of organisms, and the 
approaches and strategies available to biologists in the post-genomic era to study gene 
expression.  
In brief, Burian argues that biologists working in the post-genomic era no longer 
attempt to infer the biological functions of regulatory molecules, such as miRNAs, from 
nucleotide sequence or structure alone. What is new in post-genomic molecular biology, 
according to Burian, is a conceptualization of the genome and of gene expression that 
takes into account the context in which macromolecules carry out certain biochemical 
functions. Burian’s notion of context includes much more than the cellular context in 
which gene expression occurs. It also includes what he calls “epigenetic historicity” 
(Burian 2007, 286). By this, he means the evolutionary contingency of the entire 
organism, which has resulted from processes of co-adaptation at several levels of 
organization within the organism. He draws out this point with respect to his example of 
miRNA research, explaining:  
Part-by-part analysis of relevant biological structures plus the arrangement of 
their parts does not suffice to reveal their roles in integrated organisms or their 
functions… The context – e.g. what happens or happened in distant parts of an 
organism or its environment – may fundamentally alter the structure and/or 
function of a particular biomechanical structure, machine, organ, or process. The 
resulting contingency or historicity poses serious obstacles to any principled 
theory of function. The problem is amplified and clarified by co-evolutionary 
changes in structure-function correlations and is exceptionally clearly illustrated 
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in the instance of miRNA… Accordingly, it may not be possible to derive 
relevantly significant properties of developing systems from the properties and 
relations of the fundamental units out of which they are built at a particular time 
(Burian 2007, 286-288). 
 Burian argues that this complexity in post-genomic research on miRNAs requires 
exploratory experimentation, which he defines as “situations in which experimental 
outcomes cannot be accurately predicted by available theories together with general 
background knowledge plus boundary conditions” (Burian 2007, 287). I take it that what 
Burian has in mind here is that much of post-genomic research proceeds by exploring 
genomes for recognizable patterns of interest. For Burian, exploratory experimentation 
represents a new research strategy in post-genomic biology. This strategy is required 
because there is no general theory about the rules of molecular interactions that can be 
used to assess the functions of miRNAs in different cells and under different 
circumstances. 
Burian’s account of current research on miRNA and his argument for exploratory 
experimentation is consistent with the general narrative about the shift from pre-
genomics to post-genomics. He presents this research as a move away from the 
reductionist strategies of the twentieth century towards a renewed interest in studying the 
contingent contexts in which genes, genomes, organisms and environments interact.  
Micro-RNA: A case study of scientific practices in post-genomics molecular biology  
	
There is a standard narrative in the history and philosophy of biology about the 
significance of the shift from twentieth century pre-genomics to post-genomic molecular 
biology in the twenty-first century. The shift is portrayed as one that has moved from a 
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reductionist strategy to a holistic strategy of investigating the different phenomena in 
gene expression. Post-genomic molecular biologists realize that there is no 
straightforward path between genes (as specific sequences) and their phenotypic effects. 
They are concerned with the complexity, contingency, and interactions (e.g. between 
genes and environments) involved in the development of biological systems. Of course, 
there are some exceptions to this narrative. Gene sequences still occupy a central position 
in some approaches in post-genomic research and even the research program of 
epigenetics has been defended by some as a continuation of gene-centric research as it is 
primarily focused on how molecular mechanisms affect gene expression (Richardson & 
Stevens 2015, 4; Maderspacher 2010). It is therefore reasonable to state that, unlike 
Kuhn’s notion of paradigms shifts, the transition from pre-genomics molecular biology to 
the era of post-genomics cannot be neatly represented in terms of a clean break or 
transition from a reductionist science to a holistic one, at least not without many caveats 
and qualifications.  
But, questions about the nature of the continuities and discontinuities between 
these periods in molecular biology remains. The philosophers and historians of science 
cited above are correct in emphasizing the conceptual change that has occurred in how 
we define and conceive of genes and genomes. What I want to consider next is how this 
conceptual change has translated into some of the scientific practices in gene expression 
research. Morange has suggested that, despite the radical changes in our 
conceptualizations of genes, genomes, and genotype-phenotype maps, there is, perhaps, 
still room for some kind of fruitful reductionist strategy in post-genomics molecular 
biology (Morange 2006). Others have been more forceful in claiming that new 
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approaches and new strategies, particularly non-reductionist ones, are required to pursue 
research in post-genomic biology. In the following subsections, I consider the case of 
miRNA discovery and subsequent miRNA research to illustrate some of the continuities 
this research shares with earlier research in molecular biology, as well as its 
discontinuities with respect to novel approaches. 
What are miRNAs? 
 
Before identifying the class of RNAs referred to as micro-RNAs (miRNAs), 
molecular biologists were aware of numerous small non-coding or “non-messenger” 
RNAs (ncRNAs) present in cells, including small nucleolar RNAs (snoRNAs) and small 
nuclear RNAs (snRNAs). When Andrew Fire and Craig C. Mello determined the 
mechanism of RNA interference in the late 1990s, researchers were beginning to 
understand the identity and the functions of these small non-coding RNA molecules (Fire 
et al. 1998). RNA interference, in brief, is the process by which short ncRNAs mediate 
both transcriptional and post-transcriptional gene silencing via target degradation. Micro-
RNAs were later identified as specific kinds of short ncRNA found in both plants and 
animals, involved in developmental, physiological and pathological processes via its 
regulation of gene expression. It is estimated that the human genome encodes 
approximately 1000 miRNAs that target about 30% of genes in many different cell types 
(Kuhn et al. 2008).   
 In contrast to small-interfering RNAs (siRNAs) involved in RNA interference, 
miRNAs are coded in the genome, and thus are produced endogenously. miRNA 
transcripts tend to fold back on themselves to form recognizable hairpin secondary 
structures, whereas other siRNA molecules are derived from longer hairpin structures or 
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from single-stranded precursors, such as piwi-interacting RNAs (piRNAs) (Bartel 2009). 
Most miRNA genes are transcribed by RNA polymerase II, which results in precursor 
transcripts with a 5` cap and a 3` polyadenylated tail. However, miRNAs can also be 
transcribed from introns or exons from their host, or target, genes. Some miRNAs can 
also be derived from polycistronic transcripts.  
miRNA biogenesis and functions 
	
Transcription of miRNAs occurs via two steps: First, primary transcripts, referred 
to as primary miRNAs, or pri-miRNAs, are transcribed either from genes, introns or 
exons of their target protein-coding genes, or polycistronic transcripts. Two proteins, 
Drosha and Pasha, then process the pri-mRNA. Drosha, an enzyme from the RNAse III 
family, crops the pri-miRNA into a ~70nt-long precursor transcript, referred to as pre-
miRNA. The pre-miRNA transcripts feature a hairpin structure with some bumps or 
bulges in its stem. The precursors also have two unpaired nucleotides that overhang at the 
end of the hairpin, which help to interact with factors that are important for further 
processing. The dsRNA-binding protein Pasha interacts with Drosha by helping to orient 
Drosha’s catalytic RNAse III domain to the appropriate locations on the pri-miRNA for 
cleavage. The pre-miRNA is then carried out of the nucleus to the cytoplasm by exportin-
5 with the help of Ran GTPase. Once in the cytoplasm, the Dicer protein processes the 
precursor into a 22-nt RNA duplex (i.e. miRNA:miRNA*), which assembles with RISC 
(i.e. the effector complex) to become a mature miRNA (Figure 3).     
 Mature miRNAs are then used to regulate gene expression by silencing genes 
through post-transcriptional repression or degradation. To carry out their function, mature 
miRNAs associate with the Argonaute protein to recognize their target mRNA. In plants, 
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miRNAs tend to have perfect, or near perfect, complementarity with their target, resulting 
in the cleavage of the target and its subsequent degradation. In animals, the guiding 
miRNA, bound with the Argonaute protein, tends to have only partial complementarity 
with its target, usually on a ~7-9nt region of its target, referred to as the “seed region.” 
This partial match allows for the recruitment of factors that inhibit translation during 
different stages of the process. Whereas perfect complementarity results in the cleavage 
and degradation of mRNA, partial matching allows for only temporary translational 
repression because the silenced mRNA transcripts can be kept intact in the cytoplasm 
(Figure 3). 
 
	
Figure 3: Biogenesis of miRNA (He & Hannon 2004, 524).  
Model of the biogenesis of pri-miRNA transcripts to mature miRNA transcripts, with 
depiction of how miRNAs acts on its targets via translational repression or mRNA 
cleavage. 
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A brief history of miRNA discovery 
	
The first miRNAs were detected in the nematode C. elegans by Victor Ambros 
and Gary Ruvkun, and their research associates, in the 1980s (O’Malley, Elliott, & 
Burian 2010). When constructing cell lineage maps to understand the normal 
development of the worms, the researchers used mutants to understand how each genetic 
“switch” turned on or off during development to develop different cell types in the 
organism during different stages of development. From their experiments, they 
discovered heterochronic mutants in the lin (lineage) gene, which resulted in abnormal 
cell lineages, and the let (lethal) gene, which resulted in arrested development.  
 Ambros and his colleagues showed that the gene lin-4 downregulates another 
gene, lin-14, by some form of repression or silencing. Lin-14 produces a protein that 
forces cuticle cells to remain in the first larval stage instead of turning into adult cells. 
When lin-4 was not expressed, lin-14 continued to express its protein and the organism 
stayed in an arrested state of development and failed to develop into an adult (Ambros & 
Horvitz 1987; O’Malley, Elliott, & Burian 2010). It was only when lin-4 was expressed 
that lin-14 was properly regulated and the organism could continue to develop in the next 
stages of larval development. The researchers then showed that lin-4 regulated gene 
expression post-transcriptionally, because its target, the mRNAs of lin-14, were still 
present in the cells’ cytoplasm when lin-4 was expressed (Bartel 2004). Ruvkun and his 
team thus characterized the regulatory influence of lin-4 by showing how it suppressed 
translation rather than transcription. 
 In the early 1990s, Ambros and Ruvkun exchanged notes on their research to 
discover that the transcript of the lin-4 gene shared partial complementarity with 3’ UTR 
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regions of the lin-14 mRNA transcript (O’Malley, Elliott, & Burian 2010). Lee, 
Feinbaum, and Ambros also began to characterize the product of the lin-4 gene. They 
indicated, at first, that the gene’s product was approximately 22 to 61nt long, producing 
very short RNAs that do not encode amino acids for protein synthesis. They then 
suggested that lin-4 regulates expression of lin-14 via an anti-sense RNA-RNA 
interaction (Lee et al. 1993).  
 Seven years later, micro-RNA research took off when researchers discovered 
another miRNA gene in worms, let-7, and then found homologous versions of some of 
the miRNAs that were initially discovered in worms in other organisms, including 
vertebrates (Ruvkun 2008; Reinhart et al. 2000; Pasquinelli et al. 2000). The discovery of 
let-7 by Reinhart et al. showed a gene whose product was a 21nt-long RNA that 
intervened on the 3’UTR of five different heterochronic genes, including lin-4. Base-
pairing with sites from the 3’UTR of target genes showed that the miRNAs interacted 
with 39 sites on their mRNA targets, revealing the complexity of miRNA’s involvement 
in post-transcriptional regulation of gene expression. Moreover, genomic comparisons 
revealed the deep conservation of let-7 in worms, mammals, and flies (Pasquinelli et al. 
2000). Meanwhile other miRNA genes were being identified in different model 
organisms. For example, researchers discovered the miRNA gene, bantam, in Drosophila 
(Brennecke et al. 2003). That gene codes for a miRNA which functions to downregulate 
the Hid gene by targeting the 3’UTR region of its mRNA. The Hid gene activates 
apoptosis in the cell and its regulation is crucial for normal development.  
 This deep conservation signaled that miRNAs are part of an ancient regulatory 
mechanism that has been present in bilateral animals for approximately 400 million years 
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(Pasquinelli et al. 2000; O’Malley, Elliott, & Burian 2010). Knowledge of their 
conservation triggered a search for the tiny molecules, their targets, and most 
importantly, their biological functions. As stated above, most miRNAs in animals do not 
have perfect complementarity with the sequences of their target sites. They also often 
combine with other elements or modes of gene regulation to carry out their functions. 
Because of these features, researchers realized that the traditional on/off switching model 
of gene regulation, depicted in Jacob and Monod’s operon model, would be insufficient 
to understand miRNA interactions and functions. miRNAs have a subtler influence on 
gene regulation by fine-tuning differential gene expression in post-transcription. Because 
of the added degrees of complexity, both experimental genetic approaches and sequence-
based approaches to predicting or identifying miRNAs are insufficient, and sometimes 
even unreliable, by themselves (Ambros 2004; Bartel 2009). Biologists and philosophers 
of biology have correctly pointed out that miRNA research requires “multiple levels of 
confirmation” from several approaches in molecular biology (O’Malley, Elliott, & Burian 
2010). The next section gives an overview of these different methodological approaches 
and strategies used in miRNA research. 
Methodological approaches and strategies in miRNA research 
	
The history of micro-RNA discovery depicts a series of incremental discoveries 
that depended on the available technologies and experimental techniques of the time, as 
well as the accessibility of data from certain model organisms, such as C. elegans. 
Current research on miRNA identification in humans and different model organisms, 
such as Drosophila, and understanding the biological functions of these miRNAs once 
identified, depend on both genetic and genomic experimental methods and tools.  
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 Experimental work in genetics includes two different methods (Ambros 2004). 
There is the forward genetic analysis of miRNA function and the reverse genetics 
approach to studying miRNA. The former kind of analysis proceeds by classical methods 
in genetics, as well as more modern techniques developed in molecular biology. Forward 
genetics, simply put, starts with observations of a phenotype and looks for the genes that 
act as difference-makers in the production of that observed phenotype. The classical 
methods involved Mendelian cross-breeding, with several methods of generating mutants 
using chemicals or radiation, but modern forward genetics involves additional laboratory 
techniques to introduce mutagens that help identify the gene(s) by attempting to “rescue” 
the phenotype. Within this approach, researchers try to identify the gene (or genes) 
thought to be a difference-maker for an observed phenotype, then clone it, and then, they 
look to see whether the gene encodes for a non-coding RNA product in the cell that is 
involved in mRNA silencing. The canonical miRNA genes discovered in C. elegans, lin-
4 and let-7, were discovered by the identification of loss-of-function mutations in genes, 
which played a role in the developmental timing of the sequential larval stages in worms. 
The miRNA gene, bantam, which regulates programmed cell death or cell proliferation in 
different contexts in Drosophila, was also discovered by forward genetic analysis 
(Hipfner et al. 2002). Moreover, the lsy-6 gene, another miRNA gene found in worms 
that regulates neural development, was also specified by forward genetic methods. In 
fact, Ambros contends that this miRNA gene could not have been revealed by any other 
method (Ambros 2004, 351). Because, he argues, the number of lsy-6 miRNAs in 
specific cells was so low, the researchers could not get any clear confirmation of the 
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gene’s expression from northern-blot hybridization procedures15 (Ambros 2004). They 
introduced different mutations in the lsy-6 locus to see if their interventions would result 
in a rescued phenotype. They tested rescuing activity by looking for disruptions to the 
distinctive hairpin structure of the gene’s transcript. Their results showed that a single 
point mutation could eliminate rescuing activity by disrupting the hairpin required for the 
processing of the mature miRNA.  
 Reverse genetics, as Ambros describes it, is a method whereby a specific gene is 
knocked-out, knocked-down, or over-expressed to identify the gene’s function or its 
contribution to a phenotype (Ambros 2004, 350). However, testing for gene functions by 
the method of reverse genetics is often dependent on computational methods to first 
identify potential miRNA genes. The reverse genetic approach led to the discovery of the 
mir-273 gene, a miRNA gene associated with the same pathway as the lsy-6 gene in 
worms, which regulates neuron asymmetry by repressing die-1 mRNA (Ambros 2004, 
351). Researchers came to understand the function of this miRNA by ectopic expression 
of the gene. That is, instead of conducting a knock-out experiment by introducing a loss-
of-function mutation, they interfered in the expression of the gene by introducing a 
transgene with an inactive promoter.  
 The genomic approach in miRNA research can be illustrated by two different 
methods, including cDNA cloning and search algorithms in bioinformatics designed for 
generating computational predictions. cDNA cloning is used by looking at isolated 
samples of small RNA molecules in the cell as candidates of potential miRNAs in order 
																																																						
15 Northern-blot hybridization procedure is a common laboratory technique used to detect mRNA 
transcripts in a sample of cells. 
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to detect new miRNAs. The small RNAs in the sample are then joined to adaptor 
molecules and amplified by PCR (Elliott & Ladomery 2011, 404). There are potential 
drawbacks to using this method, such as producing clones that correspond to other RNA 
molecules; e.g. rRNA and tRNA. But, such errors can be detected and corrected. 
However, cDNA cloning methods can fail to clearly reveal the presence of miRNAs in a 
cell because, like the example of the miRNA transcribed from the lys-6 gene, miRNAs 
are sometimes not very abundant in a sample (Elliott & Ladomery 2011, 404).    
 Finally, bioinformatics search methods play a crucial role in current miRNA 
research. Using this method, algorithms are designed to search for and identify potential 
miRNA genes by focusing on some of the familiar properties of miRNA. For instance, 
because miRNA have precursor transcripts with hairpin structures, algorithms can be 
generated to search for sequences that give rise to such structures (Elliott & Ladomery 
2011, 404). In addition, algorithms can track gene clusters, as miRNAs are thought to be 
found in clusters as a result of duplication, and they can look for homologues to already 
known miRNA genes. The results from these searches must then be verified 
experimentally. Computational methods are also used to discern the targets of miRNA on 
mRNA transcripts. miRNA targets are often located in the 3’UTR of mRNAs, so 
searches target the phylogenetic conservation of the 3`UTR of orthologous genes. This 
kind of search is difficult because a given miRNA can target and regulate more than one 
protein-coding gene, and a given mRNA transcript can be regulated by more than one 
miRNA. In most animal miRNA, the seed region – the guide sequence of the miRNA at 
the 5’ end and the 3’ end of the targeted mRNA, usually between 6 to 8 nucleotides long 
– is the standard used to search for and identify miRNA targets. Figure 4 illustrates the 
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way that some genomic and computational approaches have been used alongside genetic 
approaches to discover and study particular miRNAs. These approaches continue to be 
“refined through an iterative process of in silico prediction and in vivo experimentation” 
(Ambros 2004, 354). 
	
	
	
Figure 4: Genetic and Genomic Approaches to miRNA Gene Discovery (Ambros 2004, 352) 
	
Post-genomic miRNA research: A continuation of iterative and integrative research in 
molecular biology   
	
The case of the discovery of miRNA, and the subsequent research program it has 
generated, allows us to see that several research strategies and novel experimental 
approaches in genetics and genomics were required to understand the biological functions 
of these tiny regulatory molecules. Because miRNAs work to “actively sculpt expression 
domains through a combination of tuning and classical switch targeting,” their study is 
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crucial for understanding the regulation of gene expression in a variety of contexts, from 
development to metabolism (Bartel 2009). miRNA research is continuous with earlier 
research on genetic regulation, such as the development of the lac operon model, in the 
way it displays the iterative and integrative use of different approaches and strategies 
used to trace the process of genetic regulation. That is, miRNA research presents an 
example of the iterative and integrative process between genetic and genomic methods. 
As genetic experimentation accumulates evidence of these molecules and their regulatory 
functions, better bioinformatics tools are designed to track new potential candidates of 
miRNAs and their regulatory sites, and then further genetic experimental manipulations 
are preformed to reach a better understanding of the regulation of gene expression.  
miRNA studies also reveal that there are new conceptualizations of genes and the 
genome at play in post-genomic molecular biology that differ from the assumptions about 
genes in pre-genomic biology. For example, biologists know that the regulatory function 
of any given miRNA gene cannot be determined simply by studying its sequence or 
structure. The functions of miRNA genes are known to be context-dependent, as they 
depend on the presence of specific molecular complexes to carry out their functions, and 
on the presence of specific mRNA targets and their particular context. Given this, the 
biological functions of miRNAs might be said to depend on the emergent state of the 
entire cell. However, whether the idea of emergence as a cell’s molecular and genetic 
interactions precludes any sort of reductionist strategy in post-genomic molecular 
genetics depends on how we represent and understand the context-dependencies of 
miRNA function. The next section of this chapter addresses that issue. 
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A case against anti-reductionism (and reductionism) in post-genomic molecular 
biology  
	
Much of the philosophical debate surrounding discussions about how to 
understand genes and their functions depends on particular theses about reductionism and 
emergence. The terms reductionism and emergence have taken on several different 
meanings in the history of philosophy of science. I begin with a survey of these meanings 
to indicate how some theses about reductionism and emergence in science are related to 
each other, and to prevent confusion about the use of the terms in the following sub-
sections. I then present Dupré’s arguments in defense of anti-reductionism and strong 
emergence in the molecular life sciences. Last, I then present my argument against 
Dupré’s position by appealing to how diagrammatic representations of interaction 
between molecular components in the cell in current biomedical research on miRNAs can 
account for context-dependency.  
The different varieties of reductionism & emergence 
 
Philosophers of biology were initially interested in questions about reductionism 
with respect to the relation between the classical Mendelian concept of the gene and the 
molecular concept of the gene. What motivated this research question was the idea that 
perhaps the theory of Mendelian genetics could be reduced to the theory of molecular 
genetics. That philosophical problem is concerned with epistemic reductionism, which 
characterizes the relation between two scientific theories or entire scientific domains.   
Ernst Nagel first proposed this model of reduction to demonstrate how classical 
thermodynamics can be reduced to statistical mechanics. Nagel’s schema is that a 
reducing theory 𝑇" reduces the reduced theory 𝑇# if and only if the laws of 𝑇# are 
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derivable from those of 𝑇" (Nagel 1961). Nagel’s type of reductionism assumes formal 
relations between the theoretical terms or the laws of the reduced and reducing theories, 
which are described by bridge laws or coordinating definitions. But, some philosophers 
of biology came to agree that this type of reductionism was inapplicable to the two 
genetic theories because they lacked laws or a set of statements that could be expressed in 
a formal language, and so they could not partake in formal deductions (Hull 1979; 
Kitcher 1984).  
Shifting to think about the semantic relation between the theories or theoretical 
terms, others also argued against the possibility of reducing the Mendelian gene to the 
molecular gene. The problem was that biological phenomena described in Mendelian 
genetics terms are multiply realizable by underlying molecular mechanisms. That is, 
there are multiple kinds of molecular mechanisms described by a molecular theory that 
can produce a phenomenon described in classical genetics (Griffiths & Stotz 2013, 59). 
One example is the phenomenon described by the concept of dominance. In classical 
genetics, dominance occurs when the phenotype of a heterozygote at a particular locus, 
with one recessive allele, has the same phenotype as a homozygote at that locus because 
the dominant allele suffices to instantiate the particular functional phenotype. At the 
molecular level, there is no one kind of mutation or molecular mechanism that underlies 
the phenomenon of dominance. Given these peculiarities in the study of genetics, most 
philosophers, with some exceptions,16 have reached an anti-reductionist consensus with 
respect to epistemic reductionism (Waters 1990).  
																																																						
16 C.f. Rosenberg, 2008.  
	 68 
However, philosophers became more interested in explanatory and 
methodological reductionism, rather than theory reduction, after developments in 
molecular biology during the 1970s and 1980s. Explanatory reductionism is a form of 
epistemic reductionism in which lower-level explanations, such as those offered in 
molecular biology and biochemistry can explain phenomena that is described at a higher 
level of biological organization (Sarkar 2005). Methodological reductionism is associated 
with explanatory reductionism as it prescribes the methods or research strategies that can 
reliably lead to reductionist explanations.  
There are two further senses of reductionism—ontological and metaphysical 
reductionism. In contemporary philosophy of biology, most philosophers begin their 
discussions of reductionism by clarifying their stance on ontological reductionism with 
respect to organisms and the life sciences. This is a stance about what exists, or about 
what organisms consist of. And, most accept a materialist position (e.g. Dupré 2010; 
Keller 2010). That position stands in contrast to the belief in vitalism; i.e. the belief that 
all life forms must be animated by some kind of non-physical élan vital (vital force).  
Metaphysical reductionism, in turn, addresses the hard philosophical question 
about the nature of the connection between the higher-level biological phenomenon and 
the lower-level physical one assumed by ontological reductionists. A common concept 
related to this type of reductionism (or, more accurately, related to metaphysical anti-
reductionism) is downward causation, which, in short, is the idea that the properties and 
behavior of the individual components in a system are caused by higher level properties 
of the whole system. A common example used to illustrate the idea of downward 
causation is the idea that mental states can cause physical states. The idea of downward 
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causation is a contentious one, and I return to it in the following section on Dupré’s 
argument for anti-reductionism. But, before I turn our attention to his position, I want to 
briefly discriminate between the two different senses of emergence found in the 
philosophical literature.  
Philosophers have drawn a distinction between weak emergence and strong 
emergence (Bedau & Humphreys 2008; Dupré 2010, 2012; Pigliucci 2014). Weak 
emergence is the view that the emergent properties of a system are completely dependent 
on (and determined by) its parts, their properties and interactions, but because there might 
be a lack of general laws or principles at the lower-level that explain certain kinds of 
emergent properties, the more practical way to explain them might be by appeal to 
higher-level properties or through simulations of the interactions between the system’s 
components. This understanding of emergence captures the idea that it might be too 
practically cumbersome to study or explain the behavior of certain complex systems by 
appealing to their lowest-level components (Pigliucci 2014). Such a weak concept of 
emergence is therefore consistent with certain kinds of reductionist theses. In contrast, the 
concept of strong emergence holds that complex systems, specifically in biology, are not 
determined by the properties of their parts, or their interactions. Strong emergence 
requires that emergent properties of a system have a causal influence on a system’s 
components.  
There is an additional, but related, distinction that philosophers have used to 
discriminate between epistemic theses about emergence and their metaphysical 
implications. O’Connor and Wong (2015) present a distinction between predictive 
emergence and irreducible-pattern emergence. The former concept is defined as: 
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“properties [that] are systemic features of complex systems which could not be predicted 
(practically speaking; or for any finite knower; or for even an ideal knower) from the 
standpoint of a pre-emergent stage, despite a thorough knowledge of the features of, and 
laws governing, their parts” (O’Connor & Wong 2015). The idea of predictive emergence 
is similar to that of weak emergence, and emphasizes the pragmatic challenges of 
studying and explaining complex phenomena. The latter concept of irreducible-pattern 
emergence is defined as: “properties and laws [that] are systemic features of complex 
systems governed by true, law-like generalizations within a special science [and] 
irreducible to fundamental physical theory for conceptual reasons. The macroscopic 
patterns in question cannot be captured in terms of the concepts and dynamics of physics” 
(O’Connor & Wong 2015). The idea of irreducible-pattern emergence emphasizes the 
conceptual challenges of explaining certain phenomena using the theoretical terms and 
concepts of a more fundamental theory. The example of irreducible-pattern emergence 
most cited in the literature, offered by Fodor, is that of the struggles of an “immortal 
economist” explaining the relation of supply and demand, or boom-and-bust cycles, in 
terms of the properties of quarks or the principle of indeterminacy (Fodor 1974; Pigliucci 
2014). Fodor holds that this is impossible not because it is impractical to do so, but 
because the concepts and theoretical terms in physics are just not useful to explain the 
phenomena and the regularities which economists seek to understand.  
While both concepts of emergence here are epistemic in nature, they can also 
have metaphysical implications. For example, if we think that “metaphysical statements 
ought to be evaluated in terms of our epistemic access to the world, meaning that what 
we can know empirically should constrain how we think metaphysically,” then we should 
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adopt a metaphysical position about the irreducible-pattern type of emergence (Pigliucci 
2014, 263; see also Ladyman & Ross 2009).  
Given the general landscape of the different categorizations of reductionism and 
emergence just described, there remain many nuances in what can be implied by specific 
reductionist and anti-reductionist positions. I next provide a brief re-construction of 
Dupré’s argument for anti-reductionism in the context of post-genomic biology to tease 
apart some of its implications. 
Dupré’s arguments  
 
In a recent edited collection of current debates in the philosophy of biology, 
Dupré was tasked to answer the question: “Is it possible to reduce biological explanations 
to explanations in chemistry and/or physics?” and his response was negative (Dupré 
2010). Dupré is somewhat ambiguous about the exact meaning of the question and about 
what exactly the phrase “physics and/or chemistry” means. He claims that he is in 
agreement with Keller (who defends a reductionist position) that biology cannot be 
derived from the theories or laws of physics and chemistry (Dupré 2010, 33). And, like 
Keller, he is a materialist about the ontology of life. In later parts of the discussion, he 
describes the reductionist principle to outline what he takes to be the crucial 
disagreement between reductionists and anti-reductionists. His principle seems to imply 
that all explanations and representations in molecular genetics and biochemistry below 
the level of the cell are reductionist explanations. In short, his arguments are targeted 
towards the relative merits of a more general, epistemological kind of reductionism, with 
clear implications for explanatory, and perhaps methodological, reductionism. However, 
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Dupré also defends a strong notion of emergence, which, he claims, has certain 
metaphysical implications.  
Dupré’s reductionist principle & strong emergence 
 
Dupré begins by clarifying what he takes to be implied by reduction in the 
question posed above. He does so by articulating the reductionist principle: 
The reductionist’s claim should be that [the organism] is nothing but a collection 
of physical parts assembled in a certain way. So here, finally, is a proposition that 
we might expect the reductionist and the anti-reductionist to disagree about: if we 
knew everything about the chemicals [or molecules] that make up [an organism], 
and the way they are assembled into cells, organs, and so on, we would in 
principle, know everything about the [organism]. Reductionists will generally 
endorse something like this, whereas anti-reductionists will deny it. Let me call 
this… the reductionist principle (RP) (Dupré 2010, 34).   
The passage seems to indicate that the reductionist’s explanatory toolkit includes the 
cell’s molecular and genetic components, and the “way they are assembled,” or the way 
they interact. What is more, the “in principle” part of the reductionist principle is 
important here because it stops short of dismissing the work of other life sciences (as well 
as all the other special sciences that are not part of the physical sciences) as misguided or 
superfluous. That is, the reason there remain non-molecular explanations in biology could 
be because our current state of knowledge of the molecular foundations of life is 
underdeveloped, or we might concede that non-molecular explanations are a pragmatic 
short-hand to explain and predict some phenomena. So, the methodological and 
explanatory reductionist’s claims are not necessarily normative. That is, the reductionist 
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might not think that we should explain everything about life in terms of its molecular 
structure. But, descriptively, and in principle, it is possible to do so.  
If we limit our characterization of reductionism in this discussion to the 
reductionist principle articulated above, then it follows that Dupré’s anti-reductionist’s 
objection to the “in principle” argument relies on a strong notion of emergence. Recall 
that, unlike a weak notion of emergence, the strong notion of emergence precludes the 
possibility of explaining the behavior or properties of a system by appealing to its 
components, and not only because doing so might be practically unmanageable. Dupré 
explicitly claims to defend strong emergence and argues that there are systems, 
specifically in biology, that are not determined by the properties of their parts, or their 
interactions (Dupré 2010, 35). For Dupré, strong emergence in biology entails some form 
of downward causation.  
 Dupré admits that most reductionists feel uneasy about downward causation 
because it seems to invoke a mysterious force. However, he thinks that it is a natural way 
to think about biology (Dupré 2010, 42). For instance, he argues that phenomena, such as 
genome behavior (e.g. the transcription of particular sequences) and protein-folding, are 
explained “by appeal to features of the whole” and not merely additional interactions 
(Dupré 2010, 42). With respect to protein-folding, he writes:  
There is a very specific environment, in this case one replete with appropriate 
chaperones, which endows the amino acid sequence with the capacity, or 
disposition, to fold in a particular, functionally desirable way. Still more it is a 
specific environment that disposes the various relevant parts of the genome to 
produce, in the end, an appropriately folded protein. And again, this environment 
	 74 
is not something that could possibly be generated de novo by the genome but, on 
the contrary, it is one that took a few billion years to evolve. The cell, I think we 
must say, with all its intricate structure and diverse contents, is what causes these 
contents to behave in these life-sustaining ways (Dupré 2010, 42; my emphasis).   
Dupré is arguing that explanations about certain macromolecular mechanisms, such as 
protein-folding, refer to the genome or the entire cell (the complex systems in which the 
molecular components operate). But, more strongly, he is also arguing that these systems 
have a causal influence on the behavior of the molecules and their interactions. The point 
Dupré is making here is stronger than merely pointing out that many molecular-level 
phenomena in biology are described in terms of their functional capacities or dispositions 
within a particular system. His point is not merely semantic. He is presenting a 
metaphysical argument for strong emergence and downward causation, and against 
reductionism.17   
Context dependency in molecular genetics 
 
Dupré further argues for downward causation by appealing to the fact that the 
main theoretical terms and entities in molecular biology are also dependent on context, in 
a similar way to descriptions of molecular phenomena, such as protein-folding described 
above. To make this argument, Dupré attends to the changing concept of the molecular 
gene to illustrate this idea of context-dependency. In biology, it might be assumed that a 
																																																						
17 In some parts of the paper, Dupré seems to be presenting a semantic argument for anti-
reductionism. For example, he writes: “…we are talking about science, not Nature. Biological 
explanations are part of biology, not part of the world, and biology, like any other science, is an 
articulated conceptual structure not a repository of things-in-themselves…and the fact that 
biology—a science—works with concepts that depend on the larger systems of which they are a 
part, as well as on their constituents, is a fatal objection to the [reductionist] claim” (Dupré 2010, 
37-38).  
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gene simply corresponds to a particular sequence of nucleotides. However, in addition to 
a specified sequence of nucleotides, scientists sometimes use the term to refer to a unit 
that tracks inherited phenotypes in organisms, a gene’s protein product, or sometimes its 
primary transcript. And, other times, a gene can refer to a complex set of entities, 
including a transcript’s exons and introns, alternative mRNA isoforms, and other 
regulatory RNAs that take part in a gene transcript’s expression. Stotz and Griffiths 
(2004) have investigated how scientists actually use the term ‘gene’ and showed that 
there is little consensus on an accepted definition. Though this view does not entail that 
there are no such things as genes, according to Dupré, it does suggest that there is no one 
true way to carve up the genome into genes. Partitioning the genome into genes is only 
possible by categorizing a particular sequence of nucleotides according to its functional 
role in the cell. He writes: “…the conceptualization of the genome, as an object of study 
and as divisible into discrete functional constituents, requires that it be placed in the 
wider context with which it interacts” (Dupré 2010, 42). Dupré, therefore, takes the cell 
as the complex system that is required to understand the meaning of the entities to which 
molecular geneticists refer.  
He then argues that the context-dependency of genetic entities and their 
interactions also captures a metaphysical notion of downward causation. He 
acknowledges that “reductionist methods” have been useful in molecular biology, but 
claims that they cannot address or explain some of the features of biological systems, 
such as their stability, order, and function (Dupré 2010, 44). He argues that it is those 
emergent properties of the systems that in fact “constrain and causally influence the 
behavior of their molecular constituents” (Dupré 2010, 44). According to Dupré, the 
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reason that a reductionist strategy cannot explain that particular set of behaviors or 
properties is because biological complex systems, like cells and organisms, are order-
preserving, evolved systems. He states: “Biological order is the extraordinary 
achievement of systems honed by billions of years of evolution. It is not something that 
comes for free with the determinism of the physical and chemical worlds” (Dupré 2010, 
44). What I take Dupré to be saying here is that, unlike physical systems (according to 
him), there is some degree of contingency by which biological systems, such as cells, 
behave the way they do and display the particular properties they do. Because of that fact 
of contingency, it is the higher, systems-level, properties or behaviors, like order and 
stability, that cause, quite literally, the molecular and genetic interactions within cells.   
Dupré’s anti-reductionist position   
 
Dupré is right to emphasize the context-dependency required to identify 
molecular and genetic entities and to study their functions in post-genomic molecular 
biology. But, I suspect that he is wrong to think that context-dependency entails a strong 
notion of emergence. In fact, there is much that molecular explanations can explain about 
biological systems, such as cells, by explaining what Dupré calls context in terms of the 
interactions between the cell’s molecular and genetic components. However, before I get 
to my argument against what Dupré infers from the context-dependency of molecular 
entities, I want to clearly summarize what I take to be his argument against reductionism. 
Dupré argues that we cannot fully understand complex biological systems by a 
detailed knowledge of their constitutive parts, their properties, and their interactions. The 
main reason for his claim against the reductionist principle is that identifying and 
characterizing the molecular or genetic components of complex systems requires the 
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context of the larger system of which they are parts. Dupré takes strong emergence to 
imply downward causation, and the mark of downward causation is the context-
dependency of molecular mechanisms and genetic entities. So, because there is context-
dependency in the domain of molecular biology, reductionist strategies are not optimal.  
Context-dependency without anti-reductionism  
 
Dupré’s position seems to carry the normative implication that molecular 
biologists ought to do something different from merely elucidating the ways in which 
molecular constituents interact with each other. Yet, much of current work in molecular 
biology aims to provide representations of molecular constituents and how they interact 
to explain certain phenomena. Context is represented as other (collections of) entities that 
interact with the focal entities in the investigation. Hence, I argue that Dupré’s ideas of 
strong emergence and context-dependency do not entail, or lead to, an acceptance of anti-
reductionism across the board. In fact, I question whether there is any clear conceptual 
relation between the context-dependency of the genetic and molecular elements within a 
cell, on the one hand, and any normative claims about reductionism or anti-reductionism, 
on the other.  
Explanations and representations of interactions in molecular biology  
	
The methods used in post-genomic miRNA research, as I have sketched above, 
are numerous and inter-dependent. One of the strategies, however, can be described 
according to Dupré’s account of reductionist explanation insofar as its aim is to elucidate 
the mechanisms in which miRNAs play a causal role. To help make my argument, I rely 
on the difference between approaches and research strategies. Approaches include the set 
of experimental tools and techniques that researchers use in experiments, such as the 
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computational search processes in genomics and knock-down experiments in reverse 
genetics. The explanatory strategy in much of post-genomic miRNA research accounts 
for the way researchers conceive of the phenomena of interest, as well as how they 
conventionally understand, represent, and explain them.  
 Biologists and philosophers have given several accounts of post-genomic 
molecular biology, by focusing on its new approaches. Some have divided the approaches 
in current molecular biology into different categories of strategies, like data-driven 
methods, hypothesis-driven methods, and exploratory experimentation (Burian 2007; 
O’Malley and Soyer 2012). Exploratory experimentation is needed when there is not a 
clear theoretical framework that can provide background assumptions and boundary 
conditions to guide experimental design so that a set of outcomes can be predicted, or 
expected. Exploratory experimentation describes the process by which researchers aim to 
discover patterns or regularities that call out for further investigation and explanation by 
varying parameters and conditions. Some researchers adopt this strategy of exploratory 
experimentation within the context of miRNA studies. However, here I focus on miRNA 
target validation studies because it illustrates a research strategy that attempts to provide 
mechanistic descriptions of miRNA functions by representing and explaining how 
different molecular constituents causally interact in cells.    
In the philosophical literature, a mechanism is defined as a group of “entities and 
activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up 
to termination conditions” (Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000). Scientists attempt to 
provide descriptions of mechanisms via schematic, diagrammatic, or mathematical 
representations – i.e. models – to explain the phenomena (Tabery 2004). Philosophers 
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have argued that one of the main epistemic goals of molecular biology is to “elucidate” 
models of mechanisms (Craver & Darden 2013). Mechanistic models explain by more 
than merely describing the regularity of certain phenomena. Models of mechanisms 
provide researchers with control over the phenomena by identifying the causal links in a 
system, and picking out the loci of control in these systems. Researchers can then 
systematically intervene in the system to change its outcome. It is important to note that 
mechanisms, so understood, are neither necessarily reductionist or anti-reductionist.18  
miRNA research in the context of cancer  
	
To illustrate the research strategy used to elucidate the mechanisms and causal 
interactions between molecular genetic components, I present a case of biomedical 
research on the function of miRNA in cancer. The epistemic goal of providing a 
mechanistic description of miRNA function is evident in the biomedical context. One of 
the most pressing challenges in miRNA biology is to discover the mRNA targets of 
mammalian miRNAs. Doing so is often a preliminary step towards understanding the 
regulatory structures in which miRNA are involved, and inferring their larger biological 
functions. In the biomedical context, target validation studies have been important for 
determining the role of miRNAs in cancer. miR-15-16 was the first miRNA found to be 
implicated in cancer. But, since then, many other miRNAs involved in cancer have been 
discovered and shown to regulate processes such as cell proliferation, cell differentiation, 
and apoptosis (Garzon et al. 2006). miRNAs can act either as oncogenes, which are 
																																																						
18 While there is an extensive literature on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations in the 
philosophy of biology, for the purposes of this paper, it suffices to summarize this general 
description of the practices involved in searching for and elucidating mechanisms in molecular 
biology. 
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typically upregulated in tumors and promote oncogenesis, or as tumor suppressors, which 
are typically downregulated and target the mRNAs of oncogenes. They carry out these 
functions in a variety of ways, including sustaining proliferative signaling, evading 
growth suppressors, activating invasion and metastasis, enabling replicative immortality, 
inducing angiogenesis, and resisting cell death (Esquela-Kerscher 2006).  
 Researchers have found differences between expression profiles of miRNAs in 
cancer cells and those of normal tissue (Calin & Croce 2006; Elliott & Ladomery 2011). 
For instance, in a significant and oft-cited study by Johnson et al. (2005), researchers 
found that the expression of the let-7 homologue in humans was comparatively lower in 
patients with lung cancer and inferred that the miRNA played a regulatory role in the 
incidence of lung cancer (Johnson et al. 2005; Elliott & Ladomery 2011, 408). The 
researchers thought that the let-7 homologue in humans was involved in the regulation of 
the expression of Ras, a family of oncogenes involved in cell-signaling whose mutations 
often lead to cancer (Elliott & Ladomery 2011, 408). In their investigations, they used a 
variety of methods, including animal experiments, in vitro studies with HeLa cells, 
miRNA microarray analysis, and Northern analysis to provide supporting evidence for 
their hypothesis about the regulatory function of the miRNAs. The researchers used let-7 
in a model organism, C. elegans, to hypothesize about potential complementary sites on 
the 3’UTR regions of target transcripts. Using computational search tools, they identified 
let-60/Ras as a potential target. From this comparative work (along with other analyses), 
the researchers found that human Ras transcripts contain similar let-7 complementary 
sites (LCSs), which allows the let-7 homologue to regulate Ras expression in a similar 
way to the regulation that occurs in C. elegans. The researchers also produced data that 
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showed that let-7 expression is down-regulated in lung cancer tissue, while the RAS 
protein is over-expressed in these same samples, leading the researchers to infer a 
possible causal relationship between the two gene products. They then showed, in in vitro 
experimentation, that the overexpression of the miRNA gene inhibited the growth of a 
lung cancer cell line. They inferred from all of these lines of evidence that the let-7 
miRNA gene functioned as a tumor suppressor. 
 In this case, the identification of the mRNA target was crucial in determining the 
role of miRNA as a tumor suppressor because the mRNA target is part of the Ras 
pathway. That pathway is part of a well-studied regulatory network involving other 
molecular genetic components in the cell (Cox & Der 2010; Malumbres & Barbacid 
2003). Scientists are able to take into account the relevant pieces of the cellular and inter-
cellular context by extending the interactions of the miRNA with a previously established 
model of the interactions involved in the Ras pathway. The explanation of the functional, 
regulatory role of the miRNA in the context of lung cancer remains “reductionist,” 
according to Dupré’s sense of the term, yet it takes into account the context of the system 
by including an extension of the miRNA’s interactions with other molecular components 
into the foreground of the research.19 
Moreover, researchers have also demonstrated that miRNAs play a role in the 
control of the expression of the protein products of proto-oncogenes, which contribute to 
tumor growth, without any genetic mutations or alterations to the proto-oncogenes 
																																																						
19 My claim here is similar to Delehanty’s (2005) description of a “reductive” molecular 
explanation of the behavior of the slime mold, Dictyostelium discoideum. In brief, Delehanty 
argues that emergent properties are susceptible to reductive explanations by extending 
mechanisms to incorporate the required context.  
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themselves (Mayr & Bartel 2009). In this case, miRNAs are believed to play the role of 
repressive mediator in the expression of these genes. The mRNA transcripts of these 
proto-oncogenes can be instantiated in different isoforms, some of which have shorter 
3’UTR regions because of alternative cleavage and polyadenylation (APA) mechanisms 
(Shi 2012; Kornblihtt et al. 2013). Because miRNAs generally target the 3’UTR of 
mRNA transcripts, miRNAs cannot regulate the alternatively polyadenylated mRNA 
transcripts which lack the regions with the targeted sites. Consequently, the shorter 
mRNAs, because of the increased stability of the shorter isoforms, tend to produce ten-
fold more protein, which in turn may play a role in oncogene activation. In this example, 
identifying the target genes and the target sites of miRNAs is a crucial step to 
understanding their regulatory functions. But, more importantly, an important part of the 
explanations offered is centered on the interactions between particular molecular 
constituents and their extended interactions with other pathways in the cell. 
 miRNA research, in the context of cancer, requires genomic studies and genetic 
experimentation to identify and understand the functional roles of particular miRNAs in 
specific kinds of cancers. That is, researchers begin with bioinformatics tools to search 
for candidates by looking for homologues, clusters, or hairpin structures to identify 
miRNA genes and by looking for sequence complementarity, thermodynamic stability, or 
evolutionary conservation to identify their targets genes and sites. They must then 
investigate the implications of repression or activation of miRNA molecules on the 
function of particular genes and their expression profiles within a cell or tissue through 
further genetic interventions. The kind of strategy within this research is consistent with 
the kinds of explanations that Dupré deems to be reductionist. Its aim is to provide 
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representations and explanations of the causal interactions between different molecular 
genetic components within the cellular environment in order to explain or infer the 
biological functions of miRNAs in the cell. In the cases of post-genomic miRNA cancer 
research, which I have described above, the miRNAs’ context ends up being represented 
as additional entities that interact with other known entities and their interactions. 
Context-dependency does not entail anti-reductionism (or reductionism) 
	
 Post-genomic research on miRNA can and does take into account the context in 
which genetic and molecular components interact. Dupré cannot defend a strong anti-
reductionist position and strong emergence on the basis that the biological functions of 
genetic and molecular elements of a cell are dependent on context, if context amounts to 
the elements’ causal interactions with other molecular components and networks within 
cells or tissues. There seems to be no logical connection between Dupré’s idea of 
context-dependency in post-genomic biology and any forms of reductionist or anti-
reductionist theses. Perhaps, then, we are better to move beyond the reductionist/anti-
reductionist debate when thinking about post-genomic molecular biology in the history 
and philosophy of science, and to conceive of the properties of complex biological 
systems, such as genomes, cells, and organisms, instead in terms of the causal 
interactions of their components.    
Lastly, I want to briefly address a possible rebuttal to my argument against 
Dupré’s position on emergence. Recall that part of Dupré’s argument rests on the idea 
that the reductionist strategy, as he sees it, cannot adequately explain particular kinds of 
emergent properties of biological systems, such as stability, order, and function. So, it 
seems that Dupré could accept my claim that certain functional properties, such as the 
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functions of particular miRNA within networks of molecular interactions, can be 
explained by the research strategy that I describe. However, he might insist that those 
types of properties are not the only, or the most important, properties in the explanatory 
domain of molecular biology. He writes: “A science such as molecular biology tells us 
not only how particular entities come to have the complex capacities they do, but also 
how complex systems enroll some of these capacities to create stability, order, and 
function” (Dupré 2010, 44). Those latter sorts of properties might still preclude what he 
takes to be a reductionist strategy.  
It might seem that Dupré thinks that accounting for those properties involves 
identifying laws, or generalizable regularities, that govern complex biological systems. 
Yet, he claims that the non-reductionist, “top-down approach” is required to explain the 
“actual behavior” of systems and offer “higher-level description of particular systems” 
(Dupré 2010, 43; my emphasis). The practices in biomedical research show that 
researchers are, in fact, trying to understand the actual causal interactions between the 
molecular genetic components of cells and providing mechanistic representations of 
behaviors of particular systems. Doing so remains a significant goal in biomedical and 
biological research because it gives researchers insight into where they might intervene to 
change certain outcomes.  
 However, molecular biologists are often not only after one-off models or 
representations of particular systems. Like any science, they also aim for models that can 
be generalizable, though perhaps not universal. Providing causal representations of the 
interactions between genetic molecular components, in terms of mechanisms or networks, 
can also help to fulfill that goal. If there are particular causal dependencies or structures, 
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such as certain types of regulatory network systems that reoccur again and again in 
molecular biology, then explicitly modelling and representing these systems in terms of 
the variables that correspond to particular genetic or molecular features of the system will 
provide insight into the causal dependencies within biological systems. It may also give 
us insight into what kinds of causal dependencies at the molecular genetic level generate 
the patterns that are observed at higher levels of biological organization. Those patterns 
are what I take Dupré to be referring to when he mentions the properties of order and 
stability. If certain types of causal interactions reliably produce these patterns, and that 
can be established only with further empirical investigations, then, once again, Dupré’s 
metaphysical notion of downward causation would seem superfluous. So, even here, 
Dupré’s arguments for strong emergence seem to lose their bite.  
Conclusion  
	
In this chapter, I first described a standard narrative of the historical trajectory of 
molecular biology in the history and philosophy of science. This narrative presents a shift 
from reductionism to some form of anti-reductionism in biology, while highlighting the 
changing concepts of the gene and the genome in molecular biology. I then considered 
how that conceptual change has translated to the scientific practices in post-genomic 
biology. Using miRNA research as an example, I argue that there are many new 
approaches used to detect miRNA, their targets, and their biological functions. However, 
despite the adoption of many new tools and techniques, the iterative and integrative 
processes between the approaches and strategies are continuous with previous episodes in 
twentieth century molecular biology. 
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Next, I showed that research strategies in post-genomic molecular biology can 
take into account the context dependencies of molecular genetics. Many miRNA studies 
in biomedicine seek mechanistic representations of interactions between the genetic and 
molecular components of the cell to understand the regulatory role of miRNAs in cancer. 
The claim that the biological functions of molecules, like miRNAs, cannot be inferred 
without taking into account the cellular context does not preclude molecular-level 
explanations. These explanatory strategies illustrated in the case of miRNA cancer 
research are also in part continuous with earlier research strategies of twentieth century 
molecular biology, such as the research guiding the development of the repression model 
of regulation of the lac genes in E. coli, presented in the previous chapter (see Figure 2). 
 An adequate account of the epistemic practices in post-genomic molecular 
biology is important for epistemological reasons within philosophy of science and for 
gene expression research, as well as for broader sociological issues concerning scientific 
practice. First, understanding the epistemic aims and constraints of a given research 
project is crucial for designing successful experiments, evaluating its success and 
failures, and creating theoretical frameworks to guide future work. Thinking about post-
genomic biology through the lens of the reductionist/anti-reductionist framework seems 
to blur these epistemic aims rather than illuminate them. Second, evaluating the promise 
of research proposals based on their methodology and experimental design is an 
important task of funding agencies. With increasing cuts to funds appropriated for basic 
research, promising programs that are described as “reductionist” might be overlooked 
due to the opinion that post-genomic biology is so radically different in nature than 
previous research in molecular biology and that the so-called reductionist biology of the 
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twentieth century is passé. On the other hand, research described as “anti-reductionist” 
might be dismissed as non-tractable. In either case, these are reasons to be wary of using 
these labels to describe current research in post-genomic biology.  
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THE EPISTEMIC VALUE OF GENETIC NETWORKS IN DEVELOPMENTAL 
EVOLUTION 
	
Introduction  
	
 In recent years, scientists, historians, and philosophers have discussed the 
prospects of extending or reconceptualizing some aspects of the Modern Synthesis 
paradigm of evolutionary theory (Pigliucci & Müller 2010; Laland et al. 2015; 
Laubichler & Renn 2015). The old paradigm of the twentieth century has been criticized 
for being too narrow, or sometimes too reductionist in its gene-centered approach, to 
fully account for the richness of evolutionary phenomena or to track the many factors that 
contribute to them (e.g. Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray 2003). Among the new empirical 
research programs in evolutionary biology that have challenged some previous 
assumptions and expectations about evolution, many philosophers have focused on the 
recent convergence between development and evolution (Amundson 2005; Hall 2000, 
2012a; Laubichler 2010; Laubichler & Maienschein 2007, 2013; Maienschein & 
Laubichler 2014; Sansom & Brandon 2007). 
In this chapter, I focus on one of these research programs referred to as 
developmental evolution. Developmental evolution is focused on the role of 
developmental mechanisms in phenotypic/morphological evolution, the generation of 
novel types, and the origin of variation. I demonstrate how research on the regulation of 
gene expression in developmental evolution has generated interesting philosophical 
problems regarding the patterns of morphological evolution, as well as the concepts of 
homology and evolutionary novelty. The focus on gene regulatory networks has been 
fruitful in developmental evolution, and models centered on gene networks can provide 
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valuable explanations of evolutionary phenomena such as the generation and origin of 
variation, but there remain interesting conceptual and empirical challenges to some 
investigative strategies reliant on gene networks.  
I distinguish between two strategies using networks to conceptualize gene 
expression. There is a mathematical strategy to study gene networks wherein the focus is 
on abstract topological features of networks. And, there is a biological strategy to 
studying gene networks wherein the focus is on the biological properties of the molecular 
or genetic constituents of gene expression. I point out some of the challenges that the 
strategy based on the biological properties of networks might face. I then propose a 
framework to combine what I call the relational or logical properties of certain types of 
regulatory systems with the biological strategy. This might serve as a basis for 
developing an integrative research strategy for studying networks in development 
evolution.  
Developmental evolution as a research program  
	
 There have been several recent attempts to draw epistemological and 
methodological distinctions between the research programs labeled as evolutionary 
developmental biology and developmental evolution (Hall 2000; Laubichler 2010; 
Laubichler & Maienschein 2007, 2013; Maienschein & Laubichler 2014; Wagner, Chiu, 
& Laubichler 2000). Most notably, Manfred Laubichler and Jane Maienschein have 
provided a critical look at different historical trajectories tracing the convergence of 
developmental and evolutionary biology in recent decades. Their work has been crucial 
for shedding light on different epistemologies at work within these research traditions. It 
has also elucidated the ways in which some research within this convergence can be 
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interpreted as a synthesis of evolution and development, whereas other research might 
offer a significant challenge to the explanatory structure of the Modern Synthesis 
paradigm of evolutionary theory. To better understand the nature and origins of the 
research problems in development evolution, to which I attend in the following section of 
this chapter, it is worthwhile to begin with a brief exposition of the different 
epistemologies at work in these research traditions. Evolutionary developmental biology 
is concerned with elucidating the genotype-phenotype map. The concept of 
developmental constraints has played an influential role in creating a theoretical space for 
development in evolutionary theory within this research tradition. Developmental 
evolution is concerned with explaining the nature and origin of variation, and thus the 
focus is on the ways in which developmental and genetic mechanisms generate novel 
phenotypes and phenotypic change. In what follows, I present parts of the historical 
narratives presented by Maienschien and Laubichler and the distinctions they have drawn 
between evo-devo and devo-evo, but I also emphasize how the diverging epistemologies 
have been represented and taken up in the philosophy of biology.  
Evo-devo and developmental constraints  
	
As Laubichler and Maienschein have noted, the history of a science is often 
presented as a succession of changes and developments that have progressively led to the 
theories and beliefs that make up the current state of knowledge. They have labelled this 
standard narrative, “From Darwin to Evo-Devo,” to emphasize the way it portrays its 
development as “a story of completions and syntheses that not only celebrates Darwin’s 
genius but also implies an implicit progression of ideas, with inclusion of new empirical 
facts and methodological approaches within the general framework of Darwinism leading 
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to an increasingly more complete understanding of the evolutionary process” (Laubichler 
& Maienschein 2013, 375). 
That narrative’s defining character is its depiction of an implicit progression of 
ideas in evolutionary biology while bracketing ontogeny as a related but independent 
process. Darwin’s main achievement was the explanatory unification, or the consilience 
of explanations, provided by his theory of evolution by natural selection. Natural 
selection could explain a vast set of observations recorded by Darwin of the distribution 
and diversity of species, the adaptations of organisms to their environments, and the 
numerous homologies found in the structures of different species. The explanatory 
framework of Darwin’s theory is simple and elegant: (1) there is variation between 
organisms; (2) those variations are heritable across generations; (3) resources are limited, 
so organisms compete for them; and (4) those variants more successful at competing for 
resources leave more offspring. Though Darwin’s theory explained many observations of 
species’ characters, it did not provide a theory of inheritance or an account of variation.20 
In the decades following Darwin’s theory of natural selection, many different theories of 
inheritance were proposed and rejected. Yet, during this time, there was a somewhat 
unified view of development, inheritance, and evolution.  
August Weismann’s research into the material continuity between generations 
that led him to posit the separation between the soma and germ cells is often interpreted 
																																																						
20 In his Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, published in 1868, Darwin 
proposed a hypothesis to explain inheritance, which he called pangenesis. Darwin suggested that 
tiny particles, called pangenes, located around the reproductive organs, were transmitted from 
parent to offspring through the egg or the sperm. These particles carried the characteristics of the 
parents that had been altered or acquired during the parents’ lifetime as a result of the external 
conditions impinging on the reproductive organs (Young 2007, 155-156). Darwin’s cousin, 
Francis Galton, later refuted Darwin’s theory of pangenesis.    
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as the next big step in the progressivist story. Although Weismann began his research 
partial to a theory of epigenesis, which understood development to be the gradual 
emergence of complex form from zygote to embryo to adult form, he settled on a 
theoretical framework that proposed a certain deterministic character of the germ cells, 
separated from the differentiated soma lineages (Churchill 1987; 2015). Weismann’s 
initial theoretical separation led to the study of development, inheritance, and evolution 
as separate experimental and conceptual problems (Laubichler & Maienschein 2007). 
The study of inheritance became focused on tracking the discrete factors of heredity, 
exemplified in the breeding experiments of William Bateson and Hugo de Vries, and the 
re-discovery of Mendel’s work in 1900. Thomas Hunt Morgan’s research on Drosophila 
established both the transmission rules of these hereditary factors and the location of 
these factors on the chromosomes. Thus, within a progressive type of narrative, the 
chromosomal theory of heredity can be interpreted as the culmination of the separation of 
the problem of inheritance from the problem of development:  
Heredity was now a problem of transmission rules; genes, still identified by their 
phenotypic effects, were localized on chromosomes; and complications that arose 
due to development (the genotype-phenotype mapping problem) were soon 
hidden behind conceptual innovations designed to insulate the core assumptions 
of transmission genetics from all potential threats to the theory. Concepts such as 
‘penetrance’ and ‘expressivity’ allowed researchers to maintain a simple model of 
genetic determinism, while paying lip-service to the intricate process of 
development (Laubichler & Maienschein 2007, 15). 
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The standard narrative continues with the Modern Synthesis of Darwinian 
evolution and Mendelian transmission genetics in the following decades, and eventually, 
to the mathematical and statistical representations of evolution in population genetics 
(Mayr 1982). Population geneticists, for example, estimate changes in the frequencies of 
alleles in populations. They do this, in turn, by estimating parameters such as fitness, 
mutation rate, migration rate, and effective population size and writing some general 
equation for changes in allele frequencies given these population parameters. The 
apparent explanatory success and tractability of these models—despite their abstract and 
idealized nature—led to a constricted definition of evolution as allele changes across 
generations, and established certain “forces,” such as selection, mutation, migration (or 
gene flow), and drift, as estimable contributors of evolutionary change.  
As a consequence, the metaphor of developmental biology as a black box 
emerged, relegating development to a particular place in the framework of evolutionary 
biology. According to some historians and philosophers, the parting of developmental 
biology from evolutionary research was also the result of technical and experimental 
challenges within the life sciences during the first half of the twentieth century. In his 
work on the concept of the gene, Michel Morange argues that because many of the 
mechanisms of development, including the role of genes in development, were beyond 
experimental reach at that time, it was to be expected that biologists came to focus on the 
consequences of evolution and the evolutionary dynamics of populations, rather than 
attempt to account for the entire complexity of both organisms and populations, and their 
evolution. Reflecting on this period in the history of biology, he comments:  
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The progress of knowledge is often, if not always, the result of a renunciation. 
Seeking to know is to choose amongst the complexity of the real world what we 
want to know, and thus accepting to not know about the rest; everything that is 
neglected, forgotten. A choice that is unconscious more than conscious, social 
more than individual, and that only a study of the context could justify (Morange 
1998, 23; my translation).21  
Philosopher Ron Amundson presents a somewhat similar interpretation, by 
drawing a distinction between realism and phenomenalism in scientific methodology 
(Amundson 2008, 254-255). The main difference between a realist and a phenomenalist 
lies in the inferences they make from a set of observations. A realist will infer that the 
unobservable, or theoretical, entities in a scientific theory really exist. Thus, a realist will 
be more likely to think that investigation into the nature of these entities, and to any other 
unobserved processes related to them, is legitimate and even necessary. A phenomenalist, 
alternatively, will be content with accounting for the patterns and variations in the 
observed phenomena. The aim of their investigations is restricted to discovering laws, or 
fashioning general rules, that can explain and predict the phenomena. Amundson 
understands Morgan’s contribution to the history of modern evolutionary biology through 
this distinction. Because most of the chemical and physical causes of development 
remained a mystery at the beginning of the 1900s, according to Amundson, Morgan 
successfully split heredity from embryology by adopting a phenomenalist methodology 
																																																						
21 “Le progrès de la connaissance est souvent, sinon toujours, le fruit d’un renoncement. Chercher 
à connaître, c’est choisir, parmi la complexité du reel, ce que l’on veut connaître, et donc accepter 
de ne pas connaître le reste, tout ce qui sera négligé, oublié. Choix inconscient plus que conscient, 
social plus qu’individuel, que seul l’étude du contexte permet de justifier” (Morange 1998, 23).  
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regarding the problem of inheritance. His elaboration of transmission genetics 
successfully replaced the need for a causal understanding of the role of genes in 
development with an attempt to represent the correlations between parental traits and 
offspring traits. As Amundson notes: “Population genetics was based on transmission 
genetics, which was defined in terms of the Mendelian patterns of correlation of 
phenotypic traits between generations. Embryological development had been black-
boxed by transmission genetics. When transmission genetics was incorporated into the 
Evolutionary Synthesis, development remained in its black box” (Amundson 2008, 256).   
The re-telling of the succession of select episodes overlooks many contributions 
to the life sciences at the turn of the century. However, the popular narrative of 
evolutionary biology captures how the perceived separation of developmental biology 
from evolutionary biology, for some, came to represent much more than a merely 
historical or sociological accident in the history of evolutionary biology. Rather, it came 
to be viewed as an epistemological separation in which evolutionary biology could 
develop into a mature and empirically successful science. That divergence has 
implications for the way in which the origins of evolutionary developmental biology 
came to be represented, as is made evident by certain lines of criticisms against the 
Modern Synthesis paradigm that emerged in the 1970s. Here, I address one of these 
critiques and how it has contributed to generating certain problems in the philosophy of 
biology.    
Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin’s (1979) critique of the adaptationist 
program had significant uptake in the philosophy of biology. Gould and Lewontin’s 
central concern with what they considered as the dominant adaptationist framework in 
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evolutionary biology at the time was its potential for generating badly designed 
hypotheses and insufficiently verified claims, and, perhaps most importantly neglecting 
the potential contributions of other factors in explaining evolution change. Although there 
are valid criticisms of some of Gould and Lewontin’s argument structure and style,22 their 
arguments were thought to have provided a “useful corrective to naïve adaptationist 
assumptions” and inaugurated a shift towards a clearer methodological awareness in 
evolutionary biology (Okasha 2006). Adaptationists, according to Gould and Lewontin, 
often conceptualized individual organisms as conglomerates of disparate parts, 
abstracting away from the development and correlated growth of organisms, and the 
environment as an unchanging, pre-existent condition in which organisms are immersed. 
This oversimplified externalist understanding of the process of evolution by natural 
selection represents a static selecting environment acting upon passive individual 
organisms with separately optimizable parts.23 Gould and Lewontin’s critical reflections 
launched a series of attempts to defend or correct the adaptationist strategy in 
evolutionary biology. These responses often questioned the primacy of natural selection 
in evolution, which in turn, elicited reflections on the importance of developmental 
constraints.  
																																																						
22 Some responses to Gould and Lewontin’s critique have been to point out that working 
biologists are much more sophisticated and rigorous in their methods and experimental designs 
when testing specific adaptationist hypotheses that Gould and Lewontin let on (Maynard-Smith 
1978; Harvey & Pagel 1991.)	
23 This point has led to a re-conceptualization of organism-environment interactions – including 
the concepts of biological levers, plasticity, and niche construction, for example – with a focus on 
the life cycles of organisms. C.f. Barker (2008); Glymour (2011); Godfrey-Smith (1996); Laland, 
Odling-Smee & Feldman (2001); Pigliucci (2001); West-Eberhard (2003).  
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 Philosophers of biology started to quarrel over whether the notion of 
developmental constraints can have both negative and positive connotations and what 
theoretical role the concept could play in evolutionary biology. At first, developmental 
constraints took on a negative connotation, as constraining adaptations. Developmental 
constraints, in this sense, were seen as factors that limit or impede adaptive perfection; in 
other words, as design constraints. Those with stakes in this debate argued over whether 
adaptationists could properly account for developmental constraints in their use of 
optimality models to test adaptationist hypotheses. Steven H. Orzack and Elliott Sober, 
for example, defended the use of these models and argued that constraints are 
discoverable and explainable only by way of the adaptationist method (Orzack & Sober 
1994; 1996). Development, under this view, was treated as a background condition and 
developmental constraints were thought to be passive by-products of ontogeny, not 
contributing forces—like migration, drift, and selection—to evolutionary dynamics.  
 Alternatively, other philosophers defended a notion of developmental constraints 
as a positive influence, preventing certain evolutionary trajectories and influencing other 
towards a certain range of possible outcomes (Amundson 1994, 2008; Gould 2002; 
Orzack & Forber 2011). Under this view of constraints, ontogenetic processes were 
interpreted as positive contributors, or factors, to evolutionary change. Some 
philosophers have presented the conceptual shift from the negative connotation of 
developmental constraints on adaptation to a positive notion as a reflection of the growth 
of a new explanatory agenda in evolutionary developmental biology (Brigandt 2015). 
Philosopher Ingo Brigandt, for example, claims that the positive view of development as 
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constraining or biasing certain outcomes over others was expressed in the notion of 
evolvability. Brigandt states: 
[W]hile considerations about development are essential to an account of 
evolvability, unlike developmental constraints, evolvability is not set in 
opposition to selection, but, in fact, operates on a different dimension than 
selection… Selection presupposed the availability of phenotypic variation, and 
therefore evolvability, which means that an account of evolvability need not be in 
conflict with an evolutionary theory centered on natural selection; instead, a 
theory of evolvability completes evolutionary theory (Brigandt 2015, 309). 
The idea of evolvability, according to Brigandt, carved out a theoretical space for 
developmental biology in the Modern Synthesis paradigm of evolutionary theory. It fit 
perfectly with the idea that evolutionary developmental biology was to complete a theory 
of evolution that black-boxed the connection between genotype and phenotype. Thus, this 
positive construal of developmental constraints and the notion of evolvability were seen 
as orthogonal, rather than oppositional, to paradigmatic evolutionary explanations. This 
philosophical narrative of the origins of evo-devo structured subsequent philosophical 
discussions about the convergence of evolution and development as a problem of 
synthesis, and sustained philosophical attention to specific sorts of questions.   
The focus on developmental constraints and the portrayal of the epistemology of 
evolutionary developmental biology had consequences for what sorts of conceptual 
problems were taken up in the philosophy of biology. For example, philosophers debated 
over the relative significance of developmental factors in evolution and whether 
development can be understood as a probabilistic contribution to evolutionary outcomes 
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(e.g. Amundson 1994). Still others argued that these questions can be resolved 
empirically by using comparative methods to test adaptationist hypotheses versus 
constraint hypotheses in particular cases (Sansom 2003). In many of these cases, 
development has been represented as an additional factor that can complement the 
existing accounts of evolutionary outcomes.  
 These kinds of philosophical problems emerged out of what Laubichler and 
Maienschein have called the standard narrative of the convergence between evolution and 
development. The philosophers cited above seemed to assume that the theoretical 
bracketing of development was necessary for the continued progress of evolutionary 
biology during the first half of the twentieth century. Further, they assumed that the field 
of evolutionary developmental biology progressed in accordance with an agenda focused 
on constraints, evolvabilty, and, ultimately, on how this research could fill out the 
genotype-phenotype map. 
Devo-evo and the mechanisms of development  
	
Laubichler and Maienschien have questioned the standard narrative recounting 
the linear progression from Darwin’s theory to the latest synthesis of evolutionary 
developmental biology as the one and only interpretation of recent convergence between 
evolution and development (Laubichler & Maienschien 2013; Maienschein & Laubichler 
2014). They argue that this traditional narrative leaves out many substantial research 
contributions since Darwin. Moreover, the alternative history that they offer (which I 
sketch, in part, in this section) presents a different understanding of the current 
convergence of evolution and development in modern biology; one, they argue, that 
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explains developmental evolution as a distinct research program from evolutionary 
developmental biology (Laubichler & Maienschein 2013).  
In the aftermath of Darwin’s synthesis, and the theoretical separation of the 
problems of development, inheritance and evolution, some biologists continued to study 
the processes of differentiation and morphogenesis within an evolutionary context, 
including Morgan, as well as Theodor Boveri and Alfred Kühn, amongst others. 
Laubichler considers Boveri’s experimental and theoretical work in cell biology as an 
early representative of this alternative tradition of developmental evolution (Laubichler & 
Davidson 2008; Laubichler & Maienschein 2013). In his experimental work on the 
process of fertilization and inheritance, Boveri helped to establish the chromosomal 
theory of inheritance, later developed by Morgan, and the functional roles of the nucleus 
and the cytoplasm in the egg during development. He also offered an important 
conceptual insight about the practice of evolutionary biology in a 1906 speech, 
“Organisms as Historical Beings,” which clearly outlined the different focus of 
developmental evolution. He argued that to explain the evolution of organisms, one must 
first understand the constructive mechanisms that generate their forms. Moreover, Boveri 
claimed that because it was known that these mechanisms of development are controlled 
by the material found within the nucleus, the constructive processes ought to be studied 
experimentally via manipulation of the components of the cell. 
Experimentation - that will be the watchword for additional work in our field. But 
the most important experiment of all will be the attempt to modify organisms 
before our very eyes. After all, it seems inconceivable to me that we can proceed 
in a precise manner without devoting ourselves to the task of exposing organisms 
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to new conditions where they must perform a function unusual to them or no 
longer perform a familiar function. In addition, we must then record the resulting 
responses (Boveri 1906).  
According to Laubichler and Maienschein, Boveri’s methodological insights “mapped 
out the research program of experimental developmental evolution” (Laubichler & 
Maienschein 2013, 379).  
The experimental approach of developmental evolution continued in molecular 
biology and developmental genetics during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
François Jacob and Jacques Monod were among the first, in 1961, to contribute to 
understanding the logic of gene regulation and expression, by discovering a process of 
enzyme induction in Escherichia coli (E. coli) (Jacob & Monod 1961). While Jacob and 
Monod were cautious in extrapolating evolutionary consequences from this discovery, 
others like Roy Britten and Eric Davidson, and later, Allan Wilson and Mary-Claire 
King, considered whether mutations in regulatory genes, rather than structural genes, 
were more important for phenotypic evolution.  
In 1969, Britten and Davidson published Gene Regulation for Higher Cells: A 
Theory, in which they proposed a theory suggesting how the embryological processes of 
differentiation were controlled by the coordinated regulation of gene activity. The 
evolutionary implications of their theory suggested what King and Wilson (1975) later 
indicated in their comparative work between human beings and chimpanzees, i.e. because 
there was very little variation in the protein-coding genes in humans and chimpanzees, 
the major changes observed in phenotypes were more likely due to changes in the 
regulatory structure of the genome rather than to the addition of new genes. This belief 
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grew stronger with the discovery of the Hox genes in the 1980s and the surprising 
conservation of genetic material in evolutionary history.  
Developmental geneticists continued to detect deep patterns of conservation in 
enhancers, transcription factors, and entire signaling pathways in the genetic mechanisms 
of development (Morange 2011). The development of this research contributed to a 
distinct research program in which the emphasis was on the genomic control of gene 
expression during development and how those mechanisms of control mapped on to the 
patterns of phenotypic evolution.  
There are important conceptual differences between developmental evolution (and 
the research tradition that influenced it) and the research program of evolutionary 
developmental biology represented by the standard narrative described in the previous 
section (Laubichler & Maienschein 2013, 380). First, developmental evolution focuses on 
entire genomes, as integrated regulatory systems, rather than on allele frequencies of 
particular gene loci. Second, it focuses on the generation of variation, rather than the 
resulting distribution of types. And, third, it introduces experimental and causal-
mechanical thinking into evolution theory. In terms of approaches and strategies to 
studying evolution, developmental evolution offers a new manière de faire. Instead of the 
manipulation of phenotypic characters to study fitness consequences, the design of 
selection experiments tracking changes in allele frequencies in different populations, or 
the introduction of mutagens into different population strains, developmental evolution 
proceeds by studying the generation of novel variation and the way it is structured by 
investigating the control of genetic regulation in development. With developments in 
synthetic experimental evolution, it may also be possible to intervene in genomes (and 
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gene regulatory networks), via in silico and in vivo methods, by attempting to re-engineer 
changes that may have occurred in evolutionary history (Wagner, Chiu, Laubichler 2000; 
Laubichler & Maienschein 2013). Because of developmental evolution’s particular 
explanatory domain, the concepts of developmental and genetic mechanisms, including 
gene regulatory networks, play a central theoretical and experimental role. They are 
likely to be the key to understanding how novel variation is generated.  
 As with the discussion on the origins of evolutionary developmental biology, the 
tradition of developmental evolution likewise raises historical and philosophical 
questions concerning the nature of the convergence between its explanatory domain and 
the explanatory domain of population and quantitative genetics in evolutionary biology. 
Some theoretical biologists have addressed questions about whether developmental 
evolution challenges the structure of evolutionary explanations within the Modern 
Synthesis paradigm (Laubichler 2010; Laubichler & Renn 2015; Wagner, Chiu, 
Laubichler 2000). However, another way to think about the history and research program 
of developmental evolution is one that might eventually lead to a truly integrative model 
of evolutionary theory, which would bring together two types of genomic changes – i.e. 
changes in the regulatory systems that control development and changes in quantitative 
traits controlled by single- or multi-loci polymorphisms (Maienschein & Laubichler 
2014, 166-167).  
 While the questions of whether evo-devo presents an extended synthesis of 
evolutionary theory or whether devo-evo offers a new avenue towards an integrative 
theory of evolution provide interesting material for historical and philosophical 
reflection, an analysis of these questions is beyond the scope of this project. Instead, my 
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intent in this section was to show that developmental evolution has a particular 
explanatory domain. That domain includes the origin and structure of variation in 
evolution, and the generation of novel types.   
The application of developmental and genetic mechanisms in Devo-Evo research  
	
Developmental evolutionists think that causal-mechanistic explanations of 
developmental and genetic mechanisms can contribute something different from the 
explanation of how a phenotypic trait or organismal form tends to result from a given 
genotype. They can also provide novel insights into patterns in morphological evolution, 
homology, and evolutionary novelty, by investigating the generation of variation. In this 
section, I describe recent cases that have done that.  
The two following case studies are paradigmatic illustrations of developmental 
evolutionary studies. The first case addresses the findings of Armin Moczek’s lab 
concerning the origin and diversification of beetle horns in several related species. This 
case is illustrative of how approaches in developmental evolution can provide new 
insights on the patterns in morphological evolution. The second case addresses Ehab 
Abouheif’s and Günter Wagner’s conceptual work on homology, as well as experimental 
work from Wagner’s lab on homology and the origin of novelty. The second case is 
illustrative of how developmental evolution can provide explanations about genetic 
mechanisms that determine homology, or character identity, and produce novelties. In 
both these cases, genetic networks are used to explore the nature and the origin of 
heritable variation often assumed in evolutionary genetics, and provide different ways to 
think about morphological diversification.    
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Patterns in morphological evolution 
	
 There have been several attempts to make sense of the evidence of highly 
conserved genetic mechanisms in developmental, and how they affect our understanding 
of the observed patterns in morphological evolution. Before evidence of deeply 
homologous genetic mechanisms in development, biologists often assumed that many 
similar morphological structures were the result of independent, convergent evolution. In 
other words, they assumed that some observed similarities were the outcomes of finding 
similar solutions to similar ecological problems. The fact that deep homologies exist at 
the level of the regulatory genetic circuits deployed during development provided the 
insight that novel structures and adaptations do not evolve from scratch. But, that insight 
was not entirely new. Biologists, even those who adopted the Modern Synthesis 
paradigm, acknowledged, to some extent, the interplay between conservation and 
innovation in evolution – i.e. the process of bricolage (tinkering) – in which evolutionary 
innovations and adaptations result from modifications of previous structures. However, 
the way in which these conserved developmental pathways could give glimpses into the 
patterns in evolutionary history provided new possibilities for research in developmental 
evolution. 
Shubin, Tabin, and Carroll (2009) have remarked that these discoveries show that 
the same elements and tools have been used and re-used to create similar phenotypes that 
were formerly believed to have completely independent histories. They write: “If the 
mechanisms behind the formation of diverse organs are ancient and highly conserved, 
then parallel evolution must be considered a fact of life in the phylogenetic history of 
animals” (Shubin, Tabin, & Carroll 2009, 822). But, it has not been always clear what is 
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meant by parallel evolution, nor how biologists distinguish between parallel and 
convergent evolution when reconstructing phylogenetic histories.   
Convergent vs. Parallel Evolution 
	
There are three general patterns in morphological evolution. Convergent evolution 
occurs when similar morphologies evolved from different or unrelated common 
ancestors. The resulting forms are sometimes described as analogies or, in cladistics, 
homoplastic character states. These analogous structures often result when unrelated 
species occupy similar ecological niches. In contrast, divergent evolution occurs when an 
ancestor group accumulates differences that result in diverging species, which share 
similar character traits. In cladistics, these characters are called homologies. The different 
morphologies of Darwin’s finches are a paradigm example of divergent evolution. 
Similarities in characters that result from convergent evolution are thought to provide 
evidence of the influence of natural selection, and, to some extent, developmental 
constraints and the limits of chemical/physical possibilities. On the other hand, 
similarities that result from divergence are thought to provide evidence of the historical 
traces of common ancestry.  
Parallel evolution, in the general sense of thinking about phenomenal patterns 
rather than the developmental mechanisms that might be giving rise to them, describes a 
pattern in which similar characters have distantly-related ancestors, but are found in 
different clades.24 However, those concerned to elucidate the mechanistic underpinning 
of these patterns have given different understandings of parallel evolution because of the 
																																																						
24 A clade is defined as a group of biological individuals that includes a common ancestor and all 
of its descendants, both extinct and extant.  
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evidence of the deep conservation of developmental genetic mechanisms. For example, 
Abouheif’s account of parallelism is “the convergent or independent evolution of similar 
morphological characters that share a common developmental basis,” which emphasizes 
a distinction between different levels of biological organization (Abouheif 2008, 3). This 
account might suggest that parallel evolution really depends on which level of biological 
organization is being compared, and on whether the “common developmental basis” 
represents truly homologous structures. Consequently, biologists have come to different 
ways of accounting for observed cases of parallelism (Hall 2012b, 29).  
To consider this problem of parallel evolution, I next present research on the 
developmental genetic pathways involved in the formation of beetle horns. This research 
indicates the usefulness of studying developmental genetic mechanisms not only for 
insights into the processes responsible for the diversification of morphological characters, 
but also for studying the extent to which the same genetic mechanisms can be reused or 
redeployed in new contexts. Those studies can offer insights into whether similar 
generative developmental genetic pathways ought to count as truly deep homologies, or 
as having had separate origins.  
Beetle horns & the co-option of developmental genetic pathways  
	
 The origin and evolution of beetle horns, weapons used in male combat to gain 
access to females, presents a felicitous model for investigating whether such anatomical 
structures arose de novo on multiple occasions or whether they formed from pre-existing 
structures co-opted for new use. Beetle horns are cuticular and tubular projections from 
the body wall, similar in some respects to other insect appendages like antennas and legs 
(Shubin, Tabin & Carroll 2009). However, unlike other appendages in insects, beetle 
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horns typically lack joints, nerves and muscles, and grow from different anatomical sites 
like the head and the pronotum (the dorsal surface of the first thoracic segment), which 
generally do not develop outgrowth structures. The majority of the super-family of scarab 
beetles are hornless, including the family of dung beetles (Scarabaeidae). However, there 
are several genera of this family that have evolved a great diversity of horns, such as the 
genus Onthophagus on which several studies of beetle horn formation have focused. The 
beetle horns in Onthophagus are considered a prime example of evolutionary 
innovations, as they lack obvious homology to other morphological structures in insects.  
Beetle horns are unevenly distributed among several species and within different 
members of a species, and display great diversity in morphological structure. Prior 
analyses of horn distribution in beetle species have supported the hypothesis that they 
have arisen independently. However, recent studies by Moczek and colleagues have 
shown that beetle horns in the genus Onthophagus likely originated from the co-option of 
an ancient developmental limb-outgrowth program (Moczek & Nagy 2005; Moczek et al. 
2006a, 2006b; Moczek 2006). The horns form in the late larval stage of the insect’s 
development, within compact discs of epidermal cells. The cells proliferate and the discs 
then turn inside out during the pupal molt and grow to their full length. Not only is the 
developmental pathway of horn formation similar to the development of most body 
appendages in insects, it also uses the familiar suite of genes in the development of insect 
limbs, which subdivide the limbs’ proximodistal (p/d) axis. Several important genes are 
expressed during the development of the beetle horn in members of Onthophagus, 
including the Distal-less (Dll) gene found in the distal tip of the horn, the Homothorax 
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(hth) gene, and the Extradenticle (exd) gene expressed in the proximal area of the horn 
(Moczek et al. 2006a; Shubin, Tabin & Carroll 2009).  
In a comparative study on Onthophagus taurus and Onthophagus nigriventris, 
Moczek and Nagy found similar expression patterns of transcription factors, Distal-less 
(Dll) and aristaless (al) in the prepupal horn growth in male morphs (Moczek & Nagy 
2005). The expression of the suite of genes that determine the proximodistal axis was 
found in the developmental programs of both species, which develop horns on different 
locations; namely, the head and the pronotum. These expression patterns were similar to 
the gene patterning of appendages in other arthropods.  
Moczek and Nagy found evidence to confirm their hypothesis that the hornless 
male morphs and females in these two polyphenic and sexually dimorphic species would 
have reduced or absent expression domains of the transcription factors (Moczek & Nagy 
2005, 177).  They found that O. nigriventris males expressed Dll in the distal part of the 
developing pronotal horn axis, but the hornless males (or minor male morphs) expressed 
a smaller domain of the same transcription factor compared to the horned males. In 
contrast, the hornless females expressed the Dll transcription factor in the proximal 
region of the axis, instead of the distal area of the horn primordia. Similar Dll expression 
patterns were detected in the developing head horns of O. taurus. However, there was no 
detection of the protein in the pronotal horn primordia in O. taurus, where the 
reabsorption of pre-pupal thoracic proto-horns occurs in both males and females, 
eliminating the initial sexual dimorphism in the thoracic horn at the larval stage (Moczek 
& Nagy 2005, 181).  
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The expression patterns of al, on the other hand, was found to be similar in the 
development of pronotal horns in both morphs and sexes of both species, but the protein 
was absent in the development of head horns in O. Taurus males (Moczek & Nagy 2005, 
181). Moczek and Nagy concluded that the conservation of Dll in the patterning of horn 
development indicates that horn development might share a similar mechanism of 
arthropod appendage patterning (Moczek & Nagy 2005, 182). However, the origin of the 
sexual dimorphism of horns and male horn polyphenism in these species might be due to 
differences in the timing and exact location of the patterning genes (Moczek & Nagy 
2005, 182-183).  
 Moczek and colleagues investigated further some of the differences in Dll 
expression profiles within the genus Onthophagus and within the different morphs of the 
same species within this genus (Moczek et al. 2006a). The main differences were found 
in the location and the domain size of Dll expression, and these differences were 
correlated with the degree to which the proto-horns were retained or re-absorbed via 
programmed cell death (PCD) in the later development of adult beetles. Similar re-
absorption of appendage primordia has been recorded in ants, suggesting the 
developmental program of PCD is also an ancient and highly conserved developmental 
mechanism in arthropod appendage development. Thus, that evidence suggested that 
beetle horns might have originated in the co-option or re-deployment of several ancestral 
developmental pathways. Moreover, because the p/d axis-patterning genes regulating the 
growth of horns in the two species act at different anatomical sites, the two instances of 
horns in the different species may also represent two different instances of the co-option 
or redeployment of similar ancestral developmental genetic pathways.  
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In a related study, Moczek and colleagues also found evidence that the 
development of the proto-horns, or horn primordia, on the pronotum during the larval 
period was functional whether it was reabsorbed or not in later development, as it helped 
to split the head capsule during the pupal moult (Moczek et al. 2006b). This functional 
aspect of larval proto-horns offers a potential explanation for why the developmental 
capacity to form proto-horns has been maintained in many hornless members of the 
genus, despite the “loss” or “gains” of the anatomical structure in adults of the genus. The 
function of the proto-horns at the larval stage suggests that some beetle horns may be an 
exaptation. 
The conclusions supported by Moczek and colleagues’ analyses of the 
development genetic pathways in horn formation at different anatomical sites are 
different than what have been inferred from other phylogenetic analyses of the genus 
Onthophagus, which have previously proposed three independent origins for horn 
formation (Moczek et al. 2006a; 2006b). However, the authors point out, these previous 
phylogenetic analyses were based on adult morphologies and ignored the development of 
pre-pupal pronotal horn development and the later re-absorption of these outgrowths 
during the pupal stage. The incongruence between the phylogenetic studies based on 
morphological data and Moczek et al.’s comparative studies of the developmental 
mechanisms involved in horn formation signal an important role for the study of the 
regulation of gene mechanisms during development in evolutionary studies. 
Between homology & homoplasy  
	
Given evidence of the deep conservation of developmental genetic pathways and 
their co-option throughout a lineage’s evolutionary history, there remains a challenge of 
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defining homology at the level of developmental genetic mechanisms, and relatedly, of 
identifying patterns of evolution as parallelism or convergence. Moczek’s group’s 
experimental and comparative studies of the developmental genetic mechanisms of the 
genus Onthophagus raise questions about the role of conserved genetic pathways in both 
the origin of evolutionary novelties and the processes of phenotypic evolution. The 
results of these studies have shown several developmental mechanisms involved in the 
development of horns, including the function of proximodistal (p/d) axis patterning genes 
during prepupal growth, involving the Dll transcription factor, and the regulation of pupal 
re-modeling and reabsorption of horns via the activation of programmed cell death 
(PDC).  
Evidence of the first pathway supports the hypothesis that beetle horn formation 
in the prepupal developmental stage involves the co-option of some p/d patterning genes 
similarly involved in arthropod appendage formation. The results indicate that these new 
morphological structures do not require new genes or new developmental pathways. 
Instead, pre-existing developmental pathways were most likely recruited into new 
contexts. But, the results also indicate that beetle horns have an “unexpected degree of 
evolutionary lability,” suggesting that both anatomically different, as well as 
(morphologically) similar, horns may be regulated differently, and have distinct 
evolutionary origins and histories (Moczek 2009, 145-147). The re-occurrence of these 
conserved transcription factors at different locations and times during horn development 
might indicate that the same developmental pathways were co-opted numerous times in 
different ways.  
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 The same kinds of implications arise from the discovery of the developmental 
mechanisms responsible for the regulation of pupal re-modeling and reabsorption of 
horns in some Onthophagus species. During the pupal stage of adult horned phenotypes, 
the beetles undergo the apolysis of the epidermis (the process of separating the cuticula 
from the epidermis), the secretion of a new cuticle, and eclosion to the next 
developmental stage (Moczek 2009, 147). However, in some species, such as O. taurus, 
there is no proliferation of horn primordia during the pupal stage. Instead, there is 
reabsorption of the horn primordial tissue via PCD. As mentioned above, PCD is an 
ancient and conserved cellular physiological process found in the cells of all metazoan 
life during development. Thus, again in this case, experimental results indicate that the 
pupal reabsorption of horn primordia is based on an ancient developmental mechanism 
that was recruited into a new developmental context. But, the results also indicate that the 
exact timing and position of PCD-mediated horn remodeling – hypothesized to be 
regulated by endocrine factors – as well as the degree to which re-modeling or re-
absorption occurs, can differ between morphs, sexes, populations, and species. This 
variation implies that there are modifier mechanisms regulating these processes (Moczek 
2009, 148). The modifications of genetic regulatory mechanisms in horned beetles may 
represent how species in the genus can diversify quickly within lineages (Moczek et al. 
2006a). 
 According to Moczek, the co-option of highly-conserved developmental 
mechanisms in the formation of horns in Onthophagus reveals a certain tinkering pattern 
in the evolution of development: “The evolution of beetle horns involved the recruitment 
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of conserved developmental mechanisms into new contexts enriched by novel regulatory 
interactions acquired by pre-existing regulatory genes” (Moczek 2009, 153).  
The discovery of highly conserved mechanisms and the great variation of horn 
morphology in dimorphic males, sexes, and species present the following challenges 
(Moczek 2009, 153). First, they bring into question the assumed entrenchment and 
unmalleability of upstream regulators in evolution, such as the p/d patterning genes, and 
indicate the possibility that such regulators can acquire new additional functions while 
maintaining their highly-conserved properties. Second, they indicate that even these 
highly-conserved upstream regulatory genes and their networks can result in relatively 
quick adaptive radiation and diversification of morphological structures within species 
and even populations. 
The focus on developmental genetic regulation in the morphogenesis of beetle 
horns in Onthophagus challenges some previous assumptions about evolutionary trees, as 
well as the process of evolution, with respect to innovation and diversification. These 
studies might not settle the question of whether seemingly homoplastic character traits 
that share underlying genetic mechanisms ought to be considered homologous in some 
sense, but they do bring into question the assumed ubiquity of convergent evolution 
conceived as a process primarily driven by selective pressures external to organisms. The 
studies provide the kind of evidence that might be used to shed light on the grey areas 
between these patterns, and the genetic, developmental, and ecological processes 
responsible for how novelties can originate and how they can diversify within a lineage.    
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Homology & Evolutionary Novelty 
	
In the above case, the studies revealed that distinguishing homology from 
homoplasy and the evolutionary processes responsible for those respective character 
types is not always clear-cut in biological practice. However, Wagner thinks that the 
concept of homology in evolutionary biology should not be so vague as to be merely a 
coherent organizing principle used to describe shared similarities between different 
phenomena. Rather, the concept of homology should pick out a natural kind (Wagner 
2014). A concept of homology, he argues, is important to guide a certain empirical 
research program that can pick out characters, distinguish character identity from 
different character states, and explain evolutionary novelty. According to Wagner, the 
way to do so is to develop a genetic theory of homology (Wagner 2014). Before 
addressing Wagner’s genetic theory of homology in the following section, I first outline 
some of the challenges of identifying patterns of similarities across several levels of 
biological organization, and present Abouheif’s proposal of a hierarchical concept of 
homology to address these challenges. Wagner is concerned with some of the same 
challenges Abouheif outlines. However, Wagner is more explicit about the role that 
developmental genetic mechanisms play in generating structured variation.  
Abouheif’s hierarchical concept of homology  
Homology is typically applied to similar characters derived from a common 
ancestor. However, morphological structures are sometimes not found in the immediate 
common ancestor of a group, but the genetic and development potential to produce the 
character is retained throughout the taxonomic group and can be traced back to some 
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shared ancestor. In that case, there is a sort of continuity at the developmental genetic 
level, even though the character or trait is not continuously expressed in all taxa within a 
group.  
According to Abouheif, attention to hierarchical levels of organization – i.e. 
genes, gene networks, embryonic origins, morphological structures – can allow for the 
integration of data from developmental genetics into an explicit comparative method to 
determine homology at different levels of organization and to reconstruct phylogenies 
(Abouheif 1997). Abouheif appeals to the debate between Walter Gehring and W.J. 
Dickinson about the evolution of arthropod and vertebrate eyes to illustrate how focusing 
on only one level of organization may lead to problematic inferences (Abouheif 1997, 
407). He considers the example of the discovery of the similarities between the eyeless 
gene in Drosophila and the Pax-6 gene in mice and their roles in eye morphogenesis. 
Gehring and his colleagues had taken the similarities between the two genes as a reason 
to reconsider whether the compound insect eye and the vertebrate eye really evolved 
independently. Dickinson, on the contrary, argued that more information was needed 
about the genes in question to reasonably doubt the independent evolution of the different 
morphological structures generated by eyeless and Pax-6. That is, there needed to be 
evidence that a common ancestor of vertebrates and insects had an orthologous gene that 
functioned similarly in the morphogenesis of the eye.  
Given this example, Abouheif suggests that it is consistent to say that the genes 
responsible for the morphogenesis of some structure are homologous but the 
morphological structures generated by such genes themselves are non-homologous. 
Furthermore, according to Abouheif, the example suggests something important about the 
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role of regulatory genes that act as transcription factors, like eyeless and Pax-6, in 
evolution. He suggests that regulatory genes may be more likely to be co-opted or re-
deployed in evolution in such a way as to constrain evolutionary trajectories or reveal 
evolutionary opportunities in morphological structures that have evolved independently. 
Abouheif’s hierarchical concept of homology is designed to provide a principled 
way to make phylogenetic inferences based on evidence from genes, gene expression 
patterns, developmental genetic pathways, embryonic origins, and morphological 
structures. But, for Wagner, the fact that developmental genetic mechanisms can be 
conserved and generate different structures is something that requires explanation in 
itself. As Wagner insists, “Only when we can understand both the conservation and the 
variation of the development of homologous characters can we have a chance at 
successfully integrating developmental biology into evolutionary theory” (Wagner 2014, 
38). I now turn to Wagner’s proposal of a genetic theory of homology. 
Wagner’s ChIN concept & the genetic theory of homology 
Wagner insists that his genetic theory of homology is not hierarchical because the 
hierarchical concept of homology cannot distinguish between character identity and 
character states (Wagner 2014, 420). Wagner appeals to the example of the similarities 
between a bird wing and a bat wing to illustrate his point. He claims that while the wings 
are usually considered to be non-homologous “as wings,” they are homologous “as 
forelimbs.” His account, Wagner insists, can differentiate between this conflating sense 
of homology, by proposing that the bat wing and the bird wing are homologous 
characters (the homologue they share is that of forelimb), but their character states as 
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functional wings are divergent. He argues that statements about character identity and 
character states are not “conceptually equivalent homology statements” and that to talk 
about character states as homologous misses the point. Instead, Wagner introduces the 
concept of character identity networks, or ChINs, to explain homology as characters with 
shared identity. 
Wagner’s model of ChINs is described as “genes and gene regulatory networks 
that interpret the positional information signal and activate position-specific 
developmental programs” (Wagner 2014, 97). His account of ChINs involves important 
genetic characteristics: (1) the information for the developmental fate of a cell is 
contained within the responding cell itself and not in the inductive signals, (2) the genes 
involved in the character identity network are different from and control the downstream 
genes that are responsible for realizing a specific character state, and (3) these networks 
are often governed by transcription factor protein-protein interactions, in which the 
members of the network integrate multiple signals and sustain each other’s expression. 
These characteristics are important to the ChIN model because they indicate why the 
mere continuity of genetic information (genes or gene expression profiles) is not enough 
to identify or explain the structure of characters, and to differentiate between characters 
and their states. 
Wagner first explains why embryonic induction, or inductive signals more 
generally, cannot be a part of the causes of character identity. Since Spemann’s discovery 
of embryonic induction, biochemists have tried to discover the molecular or chemical 
basis for induction. Biologists could induce developmental processes with specific 
molecules, but they could also succeed with other chemical agents and even pH changes, 
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in in vitro bioassays. This proved to be both a technical and a conceptual difficulty until 
the rise of developmental genetics in the 1980s. Wagner explains that “the information 
for the developmental fate of a cell is not contained in the inductive signal itself; rather, it 
is in the responding cells. It turns out that, during each stage of development, cells have a 
limited number of possible fates, and the inductive signals simply choose between them. 
If left unperturbed, most cells have a default developmental pathway that they will 
pursue, as for example ectodermal cells become skin if not told otherwise” (Wagner 
2014, 93). Inductive signals, then, are only permissive, while the limited number of 
developmental fates is intrinsic to the cell’s genetic information. Thus, the genetic 
information for character identity is found within the cell.  
To unpack the second characteristic of ChINs, Wagner offers well-studied 
examples of arthropod development to illustrate that the genes in ChINs are different 
from the genes responsible for character state modification. Studies of homeotic genes 
provide a good empirical test for identifying the networks responsible for the 
determination of characters, and how to distinguish them from the downstream genes 
responsible for the morphogenesis of character states. More specifically, studies on ultra 
bithorax (Ubx) genes in Drosophila (and other arthropods) provide a felicitous example. 
Ubx codes for a transcription factor protein containing a homeodomain. Wagner explains 
that there are two possible hypotheses about the role of Ubx: it can be either a 
determinant of a derived character state (e.g. the haltere in the hindwing), or it can be a 
determinant of character identity, regardless of the state of the character (e.g. a factor 
necessary for the identity of hind wings). With the ChIN model, this difference becomes 
biologically meaningful, rather than merely semantic. Wagner cites studies conducted by 
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Warren et al. (1994) and Tomoyasu et al. (2005) to explain the evidence that show Ubx is 
one of the determinants of character identity, rather than character state. In the 1994 
study, Warren et al. hypothesized that if Ubx was involved in the determination of the 
character state of an haltere, then it would not be present in the third thoracic segment of 
the butterfly Junonia, as it has four wings. But, they found that, like Drosophila, it is 
expressed in the third thoracic segment in the butterfly Junonia. In the 2005 study, the 
researchers knocked down the expression of Ubx in the hind wing of the beetle, 
Tribolium. In that species, the hind wing has the character state of a wing blade, whereas 
the forewing has the state of the elytra (a hard protective cover). When Ubx expression 
was knocked down during the development of the hind wing, it developed into the elytra. 
Wagner interprets this result as a transformation of characters (or character identity) 
where the hind wing (a character) took on the identity of the forewing (also a character). 
For Wagner, these examples demonstrate the genetic developmental basis for 
distinguishing between character states and character identity. In this case, the character 
state determining genes have to be different from Ubx and act downstream from the 
character identity determining genes (Wagner 2014, 96). 
Third, Wagner suggests that there are important genomic processes other than 
changes to cis-regulatory elements, such as transcription factor protein-protein 
interactions and the role of transposable elements in changes to genomic architecture, 
which provide key mechanisms for the origin of characters. (Wagner & Lynch 2010; 
Wagner 2014). For instance, Wagner emphasizes protein-protein interactions as essential 
for character determination because they can integrate multiple signals to form a coherent 
gene regulatory response. Moreover, these interactions may play an important causal role 
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in the origin of novel regulatory responses, such as the gene network involved in the 
origin of endometrial stromal cells (ESCs) in placental mammals.  
Endometrial stromal cells in placental mammals work by suppressing the immune 
reaction (and inflammation) against the invading fetus and the fetal placenta. An essential 
gene regulatory network, in this case, activates and regulates the expression of prolactin 
in the cells by forming a transcription factor complex to bind to an alternative promoter 
located about 6kb from the transcriptional start site (Wagner 2014, 115; Lynch et al. 
2009; Brayer et al. 2011). Wagner and his colleagues have hypothesized that the 
evolution of a protein-protein interaction between Homeobox A11 (HoxA11) and 
Forkhead box 01A (FOXO1A) was important for the origin of a novel network 
responsible for the expression of prolactin in ESCs (Brayer et al. 2011; Lynch et al. 
2009; Nnamani et al. 2016). The functional cooperation between the two transcription 
factors was derived from its initial physical interaction and resulted in a neo-allosteric 
switch that, with other factors, could specify the upregulation of the expression of 
prolactin (Nnamani et al. 2016). These studies suggest that transcription factor complexes 
may evolve new functional or regulatory roles with significant effects. They also 
illustrate the logic of transcription factor complexes, emphasized by Wagner. The 
formation of transcription factor complexes can integrate multiple signals into one 
transcriptional complex. In this way, they combine to regulate specific target genes and 
act like an “AND” gate, such that the response is all-or-nothing rather than graded, as 
would be the case if transcription factors bound to enhancers or promoters independently 
and acted additively (Wagner 2014, 117). The all-or-nothing response is essential for 
networks that are responsible for determining cell identity (or character identity more 
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generally), and correlatively, for the origin of novel cells/characters. It is this 
characteristic of the genetic mechanism in question which makes the origin and 
determination of character identity different from character modification. While 
mechanisms responsible for mutations in cis-regulatory elements might explain the 
modification of characters, different mechanisms, like that of protein-protein interactions, 
as well as changes to genome architecture, such as transposable elements and gene 
duplication, are more likely responsible for generating novel characters (Wagner & 
Lynch 2010). 
Wagner’s ChIN model can be used to identify patterns of continuity (homology) 
in different lineages and explain certain kinds of changes in morphological evolution. 
Characters are determined by the ability of certain gene regulatory networks to activate 
one differential state out of the intrinsic possibilities within the cell. And, novel 
characters originate when ChINs form new combinatorial transcription factor complexes 
that yield new intrinsic possibilities within a cell. 
From homology to networks 
	
Although Wagner and Abouheif seem to offer different theories or concepts of 
homology, they both focus on a crucial aspect of the conservation of developmental 
genetic mechanisms in evolution. Wagner argues that evidence of similar genes or gene 
expression patterns is not enough to identify homology (although it can be suggestive). 
We also need to know the developmental role of these genes – i.e. “what the genes are 
doing and whether they convey developmental individuality” – to identify characters 
(Wagner 2014, 420).  
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Similarly, Abouheif accepts the limitations of inferring anything about similar 
genes or gene expression patterns alone. However, he appreciates the unique role that 
certain genetic elements, such as transcription factors, play in controlling gene expression 
and suggests that because these genes perform important regulatory functions, it is not so 
surprising that they are highly conserved, yet have evolved new roles in new contexts. 
Returning to the debate between Gehring and Dickinson about the role of eyeless and 
Pax-6 in eye development (whether similar gene expression patterns can provide a basis 
for homology), Abouheif brings attention to the distinction between the biochemical 
function of a gene/protein and the developmental role of regulatory genes (Abouheif 
1997, 407). Biochemically, both genes in the example function as general transcription 
factors to activate downstream genes. However, the developmental role of transcription 
factors can vary in the development of a complex structure, such as eye morphogenesis. 
So, a transcription factor gene’s biochemical function can be highly conserved while its 
developmental role can be co-opted to perform new functions in morphogenesis 
(Abouheif 1997, 407). This distinction leads Abouheif to conclude that the similarities 
between eyeless and Pax-6 present a likely scenario of developmental opportunity, in 
which “homologous regulatory developmental genes can be potentially co-opted to 
function in the origin of new traits through evolutionary time” (Abouheif 1997, 406). 
Yet, while Abouheif singles out transcription factors, he skims over exactly how 
or why their developmental role can be easily co-opted in evolution or how they are 
“relatively free to vary,” apart from stating that they possess an “inherent property” to do 
so (Abouheif 1997, 407). That is what Wagner’s account attempts to do. Wagner’s theory 
aims to explain how transcription factors display the properties Abouheif picks out. At 
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the foundation of Wagner’s thinking is a conceptualization of the regulation of gene 
expression during development in terms of gene regulatory networks. That is, Wagner’s 
uses gene regulatory networks as a strategy to get a handle on the origin of variation and 
its structure in evolution.  
There are a number of conceptual and methodological issues regarding the study 
of gene networks, their structures, their properties, and their evolution. The last section of 
this chapter provides a partial geography of research strategies on networks and propose 
one way to think about the structure and components of certain types of gene regulatory 
networks and their evolution. Making explicit the various research strategies used to 
study gene regulatory networks can provide tools for evaluating research that Wagner and 
others are conducting. 
The value of network strategies in Devo-Evo  
	
In the previous sections of this chapter, I attempted to establish what 
developmental evolution is and what it is trying to explain by looking at different 
research traditions in the history of evolutionary biology. In brief, developmental 
evolution is a framework focused on the generations of novel types, and the origin of 
structured variation. I next provided cases of research within developmental evolution to 
illustrate how it has contributed to conceptual problems in evolutionary biology, such as 
the distinction between convergent and parallel evolution, and the difficult problem of 
defining and identifying homology. What these cases of research in developmental 
evolution indicate is that much of this work centers around conceiving of the regulation 
of gene expression during development as gene regulatory networks.  
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There are several different research strategies to study gene regulatory networks 
in biology. One way has been to focus on the structural and mathematical properties of 
networks abstracted away from biological details. For instance, Stuart Kauffman, Albert-
László Barabási, and many others have taken this route (e.g. Kauffman 1992; Barabási & 
Oltvai 2004). Many scientists are now using computational tools to further investigate 
topological features of networks and to create generating models, which they then use to 
hypothesize about possible mechanisms that can make sense of genetic and metabolic 
data (e.g. Peter, Faure, & Davidson 2012; Berry & Widder 2014). Others have focused on 
the biological properties of the nodes in these networks – i.e. properties of the molecular 
or genetic constituents of the cell (e.g. Alonso & Wilkins 2005). Another related strategy 
looks at certain general types of genetic and molecular mechanisms hypothesized to play 
a role in the restructuring of gene networks in evolution (Emera & Wagner 2012; Wagner 
& Lynch 2010). This kind of research has engendered certain epistemological and 
methodological challenges. I address some of the challenges of identifying new genes 
and new networks within the strategy focused on the biological properties of networks in 
the following section. I then propose a conceptual framework to incorporate what I call 
the relational properties of regulatory networks into a research strategy focused on 
biological properties.   
The challenges of identifying new genes and new networks  
	
Within developmental evolution, there have been several discussions about what 
types of molecular or genetic properties, and what sorts of molecular and genetic 
mechanisms, are more likely to be responsible for changes in gene networks. Some 
scientists have challenged the centrality of modifications to enhancers and promoters (or 
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cis-regulatory mutations, more generally) in developmental evolution. In the previous 
section, I mentioned Wagner’s insistence that other genomic processes, such as protein-
protein interactions, transcription factor evolution, and the effect of transposable elements 
on genomic architecture, provide promising avenues for research on character 
determination and origin, apart from looking for changes to enhancers (Wagner 2014; 
Wagner & Lynch 2010).  
Similarly, Claudio R. Alonso and Adam S.Wilkins (2005) have argued that 
“alternative regulatory levels” (ARLs), comprised of different types of molecular 
elements involved in transcriptional and translational processing, might be at least as 
important to changes in networks of gene expression as enhancers, or other cis-regulatory 
changes. These alternatives include the processing of untranslated regions of transcripts, 
including UTR-dependent modulation of translation and alternative polyadenylation, the 
processing of exons in pre-mRNA, such as alternative splicing, as well as other 
regulatory functions of small, non-coding RNAs (Alonso & Wilkins 2005). This is not to 
say that changes to enhancers have not been effective in generating new variants in 
developmental evolution. The oft-cited study of the role of changes to the enhancer of 
Pitx1 in pelvic reduction in sticklebacks is a well-documented case of that phenomena 
(Chan et al. 2010). Scientists like Alonso and Wilkins, and Wagner, recognize these 
cases, yet want to draw attention to other sorts of changes to the genomic architecture, 
which are likely to produce resources for developmental evolution.  
Detecting genetic regulatory mechanisms, new genetic elements and new 
interactions between genes presents a challenge because of methodological constraints in 
molecular genetics and genomics. Gene networks can change in the following three ways. 
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A particular gene can be replaced by a new one that is functionally equivalent to the 
previous gene within a network. An established network may recruit novel genes into its 
existing regulatory network. Or, entire gene networks may by co-opted into new contexts 
to perform entirely different developmental functions. Biologists have tried to establish 
criteria to distinguish the similarities between gene networks, and by extension, between 
different kinds of changes to networks.  
In a paper later than the one cited above, Abouheif (1999) proposes some criteria 
to “outline some evolutionary properties of regulatory gene networks, and to establish 
both similarity and phylogenetic criteria for recognizing whether two genetic networks 
are homologous” (Abouheif 1999, 208). First, he argues that it is crucial to explicitly 
define the boundaries of the networks, or sub-networks, being compared. This is a 
challenging task because networks are complex and often parts of nested hierarchies or 
continuous with other networks. Consequently, there can be components of networks that 
are highly conserved and other components that have undergone extensive modification 
over evolutionary time. Given this, Abouheif argues that biologists ought to choose 
several sets of boundaries for comparison in order to judge how sensitive their chosen 
boundaries are to conclusions drawn from phylogenetic comparisons and experimental 
manipulations.  
Second, to identify whether two gene networks have similar regulatory genes, or 
whether a novel regulatory gene has been substituted in a derived network, similarities 
between genes must be established. This similarity can be established with sequence 
comparisons by determining whether the two genes are orthologues (i.e. gene copies 
produced through speciation), rather than paralogues (i.e. gene copies produced through 
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duplication events). However, this distinction cannot always be reliably inferred from 
sequence comparisons alone because sequence information cannot always clearly 
distinguish between orthologues and paralogues. While it is important to remain cautious 
in drawing conclusions from sequence comparisons, Abouheif suggests that biologists 
can reliably establish gene orthologues by reconstructing the history of the gene families 
being compared (Abouheif 1999, 213). However, duplication events can also occur after 
speciation, which can complicate straightforward comparisons (Abouheif 1999, 213). In 
such cases, biologists have to be careful with inferring similarities based on one-to-one 
comparisons.  
In addition to the challenges of defining the boundaries of gene networks and 
comparing the similarity between regulatory genes of two networks, there is a third 
challenge. Abouheif explains that in order to establish the similarity of gene interactions, 
researchers must not only compare the biochemical functions of the interacting genes, but 
they must also compare their developmental function, and the relative spatial position in 
which they are expressed (Abouheif 1999, 214). 
Recall that Abouheif’s primary aim is to identify criteria for comparing gene 
regulatory networks in order to establish when two networks are homologous, and to 
point out some of the methodological challenges of meeting these criteria. He does so by 
emphasizing some of the biological properties of regulatory networks, such as whether 
genes from different networks are orthologous or paralogous, and what their biochemical 
and developmental functions are. Because his criteria are meant to guide biologists in 
establishing similarities between networks, they can be helpful at indicating the ways in 
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which networks might evolve to perform similar functions, or to perform new functions 
in different contexts.  
Abouheif argues that given his set of criteria, it is reasonable to assume that 
convergent evolution of gene regulatory networks is much less probable than the 
evolutionary loss of a network. That is because, in the case of loss, all that is needed is a 
change that represses the expression of an upstream gene, whereas the independent 
construction of an entire new networks would require the evolution of numerous gene 
interactions (Abouheif 1999, 215). The idea here that certain kinds of changes to 
networks in evolution are more likely than others relies on the principle of parsimony. 
The principle of parsimony is a guiding principle in evolutionary biology that holds that, 
ceteris paribus, the best hypothesis will include the fewest evolutionary changes. While 
Abouheif explicitly appeals to the principle of parsimony, he is also appealing to the 
relational properties of regulatory systems in addition to the noted biological properties of 
gene networks. For instance, if some known gene regulatory systems display patterns of 
particular systems of regulation, such as feedback control, then studying the ways in 
which control systems can shift or change their regulatory states can provide insights into 
the evolution of these networks.   
In the next section, I propose a conceptual framework that combines the relational 
properties of regulatory systems with the biological properties of gene networks as a 
research strategy. Such a framework can perhaps provide a promising research strategy to 
study the evolution of gene networks and the patterns of novel variation that these 
systems are likely to generate.  
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Relational properties of regulatory systems in gene networks: a proposal for a 
combined strategy 
 
To help illustrate my proposed framework, which takes into consideration the 
relational properties of regulatory systems, as well as the biological properties of the 
molecular or genetic components of gene networks, I appeal to the simple feedback 
model of the lac operon, described in chapter one. Although Jacob and Monod’s model 
was based on experimental evidence from a prokaryote model, they nonetheless 
speculated that their logic of genetic regulation in E. coli could be generalized to serve as 
a model for understanding the processes of genetic regulation in multi-cellular eukaryotes 
(Jacob & Monod 1961).  
The discovery of a negative feedback circuit involved in enzyme synthesis 
presented an opportunity to look at the way in which both the control process of a simple 
genetic network operates and how it can be changed in ways that could either maintain its 
functional integrity or co-opt its causal structure to perform new functions. This 
opportunity is more perspicuous when one considers the abstract functional elements in 
the simplest model of negative feedback regulation. As the example of the lac system 
shows, negative regulation works by regulating some variable to ensure that some value 
or stable state is maintained in the system. Any disturbances to the system must be 
counteracted to ensure this stability. This kind of regulatory mechanism requires 
functional elements that can (1) identify the state of the regulated variable, (2) compare 
that value to the ideal reference state, and (3) cause the appropriate changes so that any 
differences between the identified state, or value, at any given instance, and the ideal 
reference, is minimized (Barker 2008, 10).  
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Philosopher of science Gillian Barker (2008) provides a taxonomy of the 
functional elements of a negative regulatory mechanism. She categorizes the following 
five elements in a system of negative regulation: 
• A reference that fixes the predetermined ‘goal’ value for the regulated variable 
(the reference value may itself vary according to conditions outside the control 
process, but in the simplest case it is constant.)   
• An indicator whose state is determined by (and which thus ‘senses’) the present 
values of the regulated variable. 
• A feedback loop that communicates the state of the indicator to the comparator.  
• A comparator that compares the state of the indicator with the reference. If a 
difference is detected, the comparator sends an error signal to the effector. 
• An effector that is induced by the error signal to modify the regulated variable in 
such a way as to reduce the error (the difference between reference and indicator 
values) (Barker 2008, 10).   
Here is how I think we can apply these abstract functional elements to the lac system of 
E. coli. When the lac genes are expressed, the reference value would indicate when the 
system is “switched on,” so to speak. This occurs when there is lactose present in the 
bacterium’s environment, which leads to the synthesis of β-gal and the other associated 
genes in the lac system (lactose permease and galactoside transcaetylase). The indicator 
could represent an environmental variable, tracking the level of lactose in the bacteria’s 
environment, or perhaps the gene transcripts or the enzymes in the cell responsible for the 
metabolism of lactose. The mechanism by which the repressor protein interacts with the 
operator – in this case, the DNA-binding site – would be the effector. The feedback loop 
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communicates the state of the expression of the lac genes and the level of lactose in the 
environment to the state of the repressor – i.e. the comparator – and whether or not it is 
binding to the operator. Such a system of regulation can track a changing reference 
condition that allows it to meet the demands of a varying environment. In the case of the 
operon, that would consist of the varying metabolites and substrates present in the 
bacterium’s environment that requires the synthesis of particular enzymes at particular 
times.  
This kind of simple negative feedback system has critical points of causal action 
(e.g. the effector or the comparator) that can be exploited to modify the network’s state or 
to modify the entire system of regulation. Recall from the descriptions of Jacob and 
Monod’s experiments that the repressor protein can modify the system’s state by 
repressing the expression of its genes or not, given the presence or absence of 
metabolites. Additionally, removing the repressor from the system completely also results 
in a constitutive phenotype wherein the enzymes are continuously synthesized. So, the 
comparator can be tinkered with or re-directed in different ways to modify the reference 
variable.  
In our current example, the comparator is a regulatory gene or, more specifically, 
a repressor. It should come as no surprise that most comparators in simple sorts of 
feedback networks will be regulatory genes, like the lac repressor. Similarly, there may 
be other kinds of genetic and molecular components that are more likely to possess the 
biological properties required to play the role of effector in other kinds of networks, or 
sub-networks, found in genomes, such as enhancers for example. Thinking about gene 
regulatory networks as systems of regulation with particular functional elements, can 
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provide a heuristic or framework with which to categorize certain types of molecular 
genetic components of networks as having particular kinds of causal roles. Therefore, it 
might be worthwhile to attend to the different systems of control and regulation, and their 
functional elements, as a way to identify the critical points of causal action that will affect 
the reference variable within a system of interest.  
Moreover, because identifying and analyzing the causal structures of regulatory 
systems could reveal which elements of gene regulatory networks might act as the 
comparator or the effector, they could also indicate how some elements are more likely to 
be available for co-option by other causal networks within a complex system. In other 
words, genetic and molecular elements that tend to act as comparators or effectors in 
regulatory control systems might be co-opted to function in other contexts as biological 
levers. Barker defines a “biological lever” as “a causal structure that transforms a small 
initial cause into a much larger effect” (Barker 2008, 12). The idea of a biological lever 
seems to represent well the fact that many transcription factor genes have been conserved 
in evolution, yet often co-opted or re-deployed in new developmental contexts.    
 Understanding the relational properties of gene regulatory network in terms of 
the functional elements of systems of regulation might help to identify and explain some 
aspects of the evolution of development, such as how a gene regulatory network might be 
re-deployed in a new context. This framework is thus a modest proposal for a combined 
research strategy that takes into account both the biological properties of the molecular 
and genetic constituents of gene networks as well as the relational properties of certain 
kinds of systems of regulation that occur in biology. This strategy might help to pick out 
the causal variables in particular gene regulatory networks, but also to identify whether 
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there are common causal structures in the regulation of gene expression that reliably 
cause the observable patterns at higher levels of biological organization. 
Conclusion  
	
In this chapter, I focused my attention on developmental evolution as a distinct 
research program within evolutionary biology. I argued that developmental evolution has 
a specific set of explananda, which includes the generation of novel types and the origin 
and structure of variation. Examples of this research have generated many new 
conceptual and methodological issues for philosophers and scientists to address. I 
outlined some of these issues, such as distinguishing between convergent and parallel 
evolution, as well as defining and identifying homology and novelty. Lastly, I addressed 
some of the research strategies to study gene regulatory networks in developmental 
evolution. There are several research strategies that take networks into account in 
developmental evolution and each of these have contributed to our understanding of 
genomic architecture and its evolution, yet each, in turn, face certain challenges. I 
focused on challenges faced by the strategy centered on the biological properties of gene 
networks and proposed a framework to combine this strategy with one that pays attention 
to the relational properties of systems of regulation.  
Finally, while molecular models of gene expression and gene regulatory networks 
offer insights into developmental evolution, they are not naively reductionist nor are they 
akin to previous gene-centered approached to evolutionary biology. While developmental 
evolution often focuses on the level of the genome, it takes the genome to be a locus of 
causal interactions rather than the metaphysically prior or efficient cause of the 
phenotype and its evolution. This research tradition, however, also allows for 
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consideration of non-genetic causal factors, including those from ecology, developmental 
plasticity, epigenetics, and social evolution, within its framework (e.g. Abouheif 2014; 
Gilbert 2009). 
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CONCLUSION  
	
Summary   
 
This dissertation began with two driving questions and a promise of how a critical 
evaluation of prevalent historical narratives of the molecular life sciences during the last 
half century can offer philosophical insights into the process of science and scientific 
change. The philosophical contributions of this dissertation are therefore reliant on a 
serious engagement with both the science of molecular biology and its history. I have 
engaged with three related, but separate, research programs within modern biology. 
Chapter one dealt with the research on bacterial genetic regulation, especially the 
problem of enzyme induction, during the zenith of molecular biology in the mid-
twentieth century. Chapter two addressed the research program on micro-RNAs in post-
genomic gene expression research. Finally, chapter three focused on developmental 
evolution and its explanatory domain, and analyzed its use of gene regulatory networks in 
developmental evolution research.  
Through my critical evaluation of historical narratives, as well as my investigation 
of the three research programs in genetic regulation stated above, I have reached the 
following conclusions about the epistemic practices within gene expression research. 
First, both past and current research programs engage with a multitude of approaches and 
research strategies in an iterative and integrative fashion, which cannot be adequately 
described by the labels of reductionism, anti-reductionism, or emergence. Second, the 
representations of gene expression as regulatory network interactions present several 
strategies for researchers to constrain their models and their experiments, and to control, 
manipulate, or intervene on the phenomena of gene expression. The dissertation 
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demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between the approaches within a science 
and its research strategies. A historical and philosophical study of the latter, rather than a 
reliance on labels like reductionism and emergence, can contribute to a better 
understanding of the historical and theoretical developments of a science. Additionally, 
my investigations in each substantial chapter have engendered future avenues for 
research contributions in the history and philosophy of science.    
Future avenues of research  
In chapter one, I proposed an alternative conceptual framework to the oft-used 
dichotomy between mechanistic materialism and holistic materialism, or reductionism 
and anti-reductionism, to understand and explain the developments in modern biology. I 
claimed that, for particular episodes in the history of science, a framework based on the 
notion of tracking processes would be better at picking out instances of conceptual and 
experimental convergence in science, as well as revealing how new research problems 
and questions come to the forefront within a research community. I appealed to a 
paradigmatic case study in the history of science to make a case for this alternative 
framework. However, this methodology faces the so-called dilemma of case studies 
within scholarship that attempts to integrate the history and philosophy of science (Burian 
2001; Pitt 2001). In short, the dilemma signals, on the one hand, the worry that going 
from philosophical analysis to historical case studies can reflect a selection bias in 
presenting historical cases that fit with preferred philosophical positions. On the other 
hand, beginning with particular historical cases to philosophical theses can lead to hasty 
generalizations about science and scientific practice as a whole. 
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 Recently, Raphael Scholl and Tim Räz (2016) have addressed this methodological 
skepticism concerning the dilemma of cases studies in HPS studies. They suggest ways in 
which both horns of the dilemma can by mitigated by, first, making explicit the criteria 
by which cases are chosen in order to evaluate the charge of selection bias, and second, 
bringing attention to the ways in which philosophical theses and historical narratives 
interact recursively over time to prevent assent to hasty or unwarranted generalizations. 
The dilemma, they argue, rests on outdated ideas about confirmation and falsification 
(Scholl & Räz 2016).    
 One of their proposed criteria for selecting historical cases is choosing 
“paradigmatic cases” as concrete cases of abstract philosophical principles or conceptual 
frameworks because they are typical of some particular aspect of science, in the same 
way that model organisms might represent something typical about particular organisms. 
The case of the lac operon is a clear-cut example of a paradigmatic episode in the history 
of molecular biology. Relatedly, Scholl and Räz further suggest that a reliable method to 
prevent problematic generalizations is to ensure that our philosophical theses continue to 
be confronted by further historical cases (Scholl & Räz 2016).25  
 Given Scholl and Räz’s proposed criteria and methods for integrative work in 
HPS, one avenue for future research would be to consider the applicability of the 
framework I proposed in the first chapter based on the notion of tracking processes to 
additional historical episodes. A study of the development and creation of the CRISPR-
																																																						
25 Problematic generalizations may occur both in the sense of thinking that philosophical 
conclusions inferred from one case are true for all of science and thinking that one counter-
example disproves a conclusion. 
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Cas9 complex in bacterial genetics can provide an apt case study with which to test my 
conceptual framework.  
The CRISPR-Cas9 complex enables biologists to target a specific gene by binding 
and splicing the DNA at specific locations, and then replace or repair the segment by 
inserting another sequence in its place. Potential applications of this technology span a 
variety of contexts, including health, agriculture, and ecosystems engineering. As a result, 
CRISPR technology has already captured the attention of philosophers and ethicists 
concerned with the ethical issues of this emerging biotechnology. However, this well-
documented case also represents an opportunity for historians and philosophers of 
science to analyze the epistemic practices of tracing certain kinds of biological processes 
and consider how these practices channeled researchers towards this breakthrough in 
biotechnology. One might do this by considering the ways in which several research 
projects into bacterial immune systems and genomic regulation developed and led to the 
creation of the bioengineered enzyme complex. Historians and philosophers can also use 
this case to address the epistemological implications of how biotechnological 
considerations have framed the development of genetic research in contemporary life 
sciences, as historian and philosopher of science Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has proposed 
(Rheinberger 2008, 2009).   
 Further, I claim in the second chapter that contemporary research in biomedical 
genomics and genetics often accounts for the context-dependency of molecular and 
genetic constituents, like micro-RNAs, by elucidating how they causally interact with 
other constituents within cell types. Some philosophers of science, in collaboration with 
computational biologists, have begun to explore how the tools of causal modelling, based 
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on an interventionist notion of causality, can provide useful methods and heuristics for 
causal inference in these sciences (e.g. Danks, Glymour, & Spirtes 2002). Yet, 
philosophers of science can also contribute to our understanding of the study of complex 
systems of gene expression by clarifying the metaphysical and epistemological 
challenges of choosing one set of variables over others when modelling these systems.  
 The problem of variable choice has been a persistent one in philosophy of science. 
Nelson Goodman’s (1955) famous new riddle of induction outlined this problem. In brief, 
because the predicates we use to describe properties of entities can be logically 
equivalent (e.g. green or grue), a piece of evidence can be used to support two different 
claims or hypotheses under a syntactic view of induction. Goodman suggested that our 
inductive practices ought to be based on “projectable” predicates; i.e. those predicates or 
properties that are historically entrenched. While this proposal has been criticized for 
different reasons, Goodman was right to point out the need to go beyond the purely 
syntactic structure of predicates in our inductive practices and attend to the content of the 
predicates as well. Accounting for “projectable predicates” that attend to content can be 
reinterpreted as a problem of choosing the right variables to represent phenomena in the 
world, which, in turn, grounds our explanatory practices. 
  The problem has recently re-emerged in the context of a particular framework of 
causation and causal explanation. This widely adopted framework is based on James 
Woodward’s theory of causal explanation (Woodward 2003). In brief, Woodward makes 
use of the interventionist notion of causation in his theory, defined as follows: 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with respect to 
some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y 
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(or the probability distribution of Y) when all other variables in V besides X and Y 
are held fixed at some value by interventions (Woodward 2003, 55).  
Philosopher Laura Franklin-Hall has recently argued that effective constraints on 
choosing causal variables under Woodward’s interventionist notion are lacking for high-
level explanations, which may lead to negative consequences for the explanatory 
practices of the life sciences (Franklin-Hall 2014). In that paper, she argues that while 
Woodward’s theory of causal explanation is typically used to defend explanations in the 
special sciences, it cannot be used to defend their superiority over physical-level 
explanations using his proposed criterion of proportionality. Proportionality, sometimes 
referred to as “causal fit,” constrains the choice of causal variables to include those that 
produce a proportional change in an effect variable given some degree of change in the 
causal variable. She argues that this criterion is not adequate to defend the sorts of 
explanations found in the special sciences because it cannot adequately guide choices 
between explanations with coarse-grain variables from explanations with finer-grain 
variables. She concludes by urging philosophers to develop and evaluate principles by 
which variable choice can be better constrained.  
In a recent paper, Woodward (2016) presents some criteria for variable choice. 
For example, he argues that stability, as well as the related criteria of specificity and 
sparsity, can provide a useful heuristic for choosing between variable sets. Stability 
signals a causal relationship between two variables that hold for a relatively significant 
range of background conditions. Stable causal relationships, in this sense, are preferable 
because they are more generalizable.  
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A non-specific causal relationship is one in which a causal variable X can have 
many other effects besides the effect of interest Y, and likewise, the effect Y may have 
many other causes besides X. Such causal relationships are also non-sparse because they 
tend to produce causal representation with many causally-connected variables. The idea 
then is that favoring specific and sparse causal variables that can adequately characterize 
an effect of interest is better than non-specific causal relationships. The criteria of 
specificity and sparsity, Woodward argues, provides better handles for manipulation to 
target the effect(s) of interest. For example, chemotherapy is a non-specific causal agent 
that targets tumor as well as healthy cells, whereas a more specific genetic manipulation 
might restrict the intervention to target the diseased cells (Woodward 2016, 1071). 
Woodward also claims that specific causes are more learnable and they reduce the 
chances of having several equivalent causal structures that are indistinguishable with 
available evidence. 
Given these recent discussions about variable choice, a future project is to 
evaluate whether Woodward’s criteria of stability, specificity, and sparsity actually do 
provide the benefits he claims in scientific practice. More specifically, the project can 
consider whether and to what extent Woodward’s criteria apply to the causal structures of 
genomic regulation in RNA biology, and evaluate the extent to which they characterize 
the explanatory practices of the molecular life sciences.   
 Furthermore, the historical discussion of the differences between evo-devo and 
devo-evo in the third chapter raised some questions about whether developmental 
evolution can be integrated with the population-level framework of evolutionary genetics. 
Wagner’s recent theoretical work in developmental evolution comments on this exact 
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issue. For Wagner, previous work in evolutionary biology – what he calls the 
population/functionalist strategy to studying evolution – was limited by its approach to 
variation. His aim has been to correct this limitation by studying the generation of novel 
variation in evolution through developmental genetic mechanisms. Wagner suggest that 
“the realization that complex organisms / systems have unique and historically contingent 
variational constraints and biases paves the way for a seamless unification of functionalist 
[traditional] and structuralist [developmental] agendas… (Wagner 2014, 19). How such a 
“seamless unification,” or perhaps, the integration, of these research traditions can be 
articulated and carried out remains an interesting conceptual problem for scientists, 
historians, and philosophers.  
Wagner’s suggestion also invokes interesting philosophical questions about the 
nature of unification and integration in science and the relationship between these 
concepts more generally. There has been a lot of recent work on these issues (c.f. 
Brigandt 2010; Mitchell 2003, 2004; Mitchell & Dietrich 2006; O’Malley & Soyer 2012, 
Plutynski 2013). For example, Ingo Brigandt has argued that it is the particular research 
projects, or ‘problem agendas,’ in the life sciences which permit some degree of local 
integration between distinct disciplinarian approaches (Brigandt 2010). Others, like 
William Bechtel, have argued that research projects that begin with a seemingly unified 
or integrated research agenda can end up being fragmented into new sub-disciplines, 
which demand specialized technical expertise, instead of providing a lasting integration 
of disciplines or theories (Bechtel 1993).  
A feature of Bechtel’s approach is that he examines integration as a process rather 
than an end goal. Similarly, Anya Plutynski interprets unification and integration in the 
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life sciences as parts of a process (Plutynski 2013). Using the historical development of 
the multistage model of cancer as a case study, she argues that integration is a process, 
which originates from a unifying theory or model. Integration occurs when there is a 
pressing question or problem which requires multiple sources of evidence from different 
fields of inquiry. Plutynski draws attention to the fact that unification is often thought to 
provide simplified or idealized explanations, whereas integration is thought to offer more 
complete, or comprehensive, explanations. But, she warns that thinking about integration 
as an attempt to be complete is misleading because integration in science is not singular 
in type and admits of degrees (Plutynski 2013, 474).  
Given these considerations about the nature of integration and unification, a future 
avenue of research is to test these varying philosophical accounts with respect to research 
programs described in this dissertation. I suspect that applying the varying concepts of 
integration and unification in the philosophical literature to these research programs will 
give similar insights into the process of science and the sorts of interactions between 
disciplines at play in the life sciences. However, another avenue of research is to focus on 
the normative aspects of unification and integration as regulative ideals in science. One 
way to address how these might be considered as scientific virtues is to consider further 
the research strategies that investigate the general patterns of causal dependencies in the 
regulation of gene expression. I take these strategies to be motivated in part by particular 
explanatory goals, which aim to unify some set of phenomena under shared causal 
patterns.     
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